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Abstract 
 
While social movement studies have developed extensive frameworks for studying the 
emergence, maintenance, and decline of social movements, temporal orientations and 
futurity have not been systematically mobilized as necessary explanatory dimensions 
of activism. This dissertation argues that activists' temporal orientations and future 
imaginings are crucial to understanding action, including organizational form, 
movement trajectories, and long-term projects. Futurity is particularly relevant and 
amenable to theorization in uncertain, politically volatile, and urgent times, when 
activist debates revolve around predictions, expectations, possibilities, and scenarios. 
I take grassroots activism in Istanbul, Turkey between 2016 and 2018 as a case in point 
to examine the changing dynamics of activism during regime change. Based on 
participant-observation at a local assembly that was established to campaign for the 
“no” vote in the constitutional referendum of 2017 supported by semi-structured, in-
depth interviews with activists, this study follows the changes in activists' temporal 
orientations and their relationship to different aspects of activism. 
 
The dissertation begins with an examination of the organizational structure of the local 
“no” assembly as a product of activists' critical engagement with the past and the 
future, by looking at their re-reading of the Gezi protests of 2013. The analysis then 
moves on to the period around the 2017 referendum, when future imaginings, in the 
form of anticipatory scenarios about the near future, played a constitutive role in the 
decision-making processes of the assembly, and contending futures resulted in its 
disintegration. Lastly, as the referendum was left behind and as activists were faced 
with defeat at the 2018 presidential and general elections, their engagement with the 
distant future came to the fore, in the form of hope, which enabled and was enabled 
by a future-oriented narrative of historical embeddedness. To conclude, I argue that 
scholars of social movements should pay more attention to the role of possibilities and 
future imaginings in political action, as well as the open-endedness inherent in 
activism, especially at times marked by uncertainty and urgency.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
There is a picture by Klee called Angelus Novus. It shows an angel who seems about to 
move away from something he stares at. His eyes are wide, his mouth is open, his 
wings are spread. This is how the angel of history must look. His face is turned toward 
the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would 
like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can 
no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call 
progress is this storm. (Benjamin, 1940) 
 
In the passage above, Walter Benjamin, in his theses “On the Concept of 
History” (1940), writes about the “angel of history”, inspired by the Swiss-born 
German painter Paul Klee’s famous painting Angelus Novus. This beautifully written 
passage is an inspiring starting point to think about our times, and about history in 
general. In the rest of his theses, Benjamin writes about the state of emergency as the 
normal condition; about history as accumulation of ruins; about the messianic moment 
and transformation. He looks back at the past and the defeated, dreaming of the future 
and of rupture. The angel, with its face turned toward the past and its back toward the 
future, tells us about the arrow of time. For Benjamin, history is anchored in the past 
while time pushes us forward. He sensitizes us to the workings of time and of history 
with his specific temporal orientation to them.  
 My dissertation follows a group of activists in Istanbul as they try to reverse 
the process of the consolidation of authoritarianism in Turkey. Contrary to Benjamin’s 
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angel of history, we witness the angel turning around its own axis throughout my 
dissertation. With each fluctuation in the political situation, and a regime that gets 
more and more repressive and overtly authoritarian at every turn, activists turn their 
glance from history-as-the-past toward history-as-the-future.    
 This study examines contemporary grassroots activism in Turkey based on 
political ethnographic research conducted from July 2016, right after the military coup 
attempt, to September 2018, a little after the presidential and general elections took 
place. At the broadest, it looks at how Turkey’s authoritarian turn affects grassroots 
activism on the ground. More specifically, the dissertation seeks to investigate the role 
that activists’ temporal orientations play at different stages of the organization and 
mobilization process, as they orient themselves with regards to a volatile political 
schedule and increasing repression by the state. This question entails addressing a 
range of issues from the adaptation of organizational structures and the changes in 
ways of doing politics to activists’ response to defeat and abeyance. By examining 
these issues and processes, I hope to critically engage with social movement theory 
and expand it to cover temporality and temporal approaches to the study of political 
contention.    
 At this stage, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by temporality by 
distinguishing it from time. On the one hand, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, time is “the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the 
past, present, and future regarded as a whole”, as in “living through space and time”. 
Temporality, on the other hand, is defined as “the state of existing within or having 
some relationship with time”. So, what sets temporality apart from time is that it is 
defined by a relationship to the latter. Whereas time is uncontrollable and 
unmanipulable by humans as “the continued progress of existence”, temporality as a 
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concept leaves more room for human agency. I take temporality to be more prone to 
an agentic approach to how temporal processes work because humans constantly play 
with their relationship with time: we make time, we work against time, we can be 
ahead of time, and so on. Surely, our experience of time is not always under our 
control: we might run out of time, there might be no time, time might feel like it has 
slowed down or sped up. Even then, the way we experience time itself can be 
intersubjectively constructed. Moreover, we often put work into commanding how we 
use our time (“time management” springs to mind), as well as adjust our perception of 
it (e.g. the difference between a deadline approaching and looking forward to the end 
of a period of time). Hence, my focus here is on temporality rather than time – a point 
to which I will come back in more detail in the section where I review how temporality 
and time are used in social movement studies – although I sometimes use them 
interchangeably when the word “time” makes more grammatical sense.  
Phrased in temporal terms, then, my dissertation is an account of how, with 
changing political circumstances and their position within it, activists’ temporal 
orientations changed, which in turn shaped their actions. Temporality, in other words, 
is not only the connecting thread that ties together the arguments and structure of the 
thesis, but also the main element through which changes and continuities are 
explained. Each empirical chapter depicts a different phase of temporal orientation: in 
the first chapter, activists are re-reading the Gezi protests of 2013, looking back from 
2017; in the second chapter, they are facing the near future, while having a solid 
glimpse of the distant future, with the sense of a storm building up; in the third chapter, 
the rotation is complete, and they are face to face with what used to be the distant 
future. Activists feel the debris of the past on their back, even when they are facing 
the future, and vice versa. As such, the past and the future are intertwined in action.  
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Each temporal orientation influences how people act in the present. The ways 
in which action is affected by different temporal orientations map onto the different 
themes that each empirical chapter addresses. In the first chapter, it is the changing 
reading of the past – which is itself informed by the present and the future – that 
informs grassroots organizational structures and the emergence of the local 
assemblies. In the second chapter, it is the relationship between expectations about the 
near future and movement trajectory or sustainment. In the last empirical chapter, it is 
the narrative of emplacement within an ongoing historical struggle that facilitates hope 
as a political resource, as a response to defeat.  
Taken together, these findings constitute the primary theoretical contribution 
of this dissertation: Temporal orientations of movement actors influence movement 
organization, trajectories, and strategies. Social movement theory, as I will discuss 
shortly, has not paid enough attention to the temporal dimension in these processes. 
Rather, I will claim that it has taken into consideration time as an overarching, analytic 
framework or simply as the standardised measurement of the passage of existence. 
What is missing from the analysis is an active notion of temporality, where the scholar 
recognizes that people (and research) do not only exist in time but have a relationship 
with time that operates on a collective level and shapes action. Movements do not only 
exist in their temporal context, but the different temporalities within and outside a 
single movement clash, align, contradict, expand, contract, and the list goes on. Time 
is not just an externality that happens to us. Activists co-construct the different 
temporalities with which they work, embedding themselves in different ways in 
different temporalities; looking backwards at times, forwards at others, or sometimes 
focusing on the present; they compete over how to use time, or the temporality on 
which to act. Temporalities, at least in some cases, lie at the heart of contention itself.  
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The secondary theoretical contribution is to studies of activism in transitional 
political contexts. The role of activism in western democracies and in authoritarian 
states has been well documented, as I will discuss in the second part of the literature 
review below. Activism during de-democratization phases, or during transitions to 
non-democracy, on the other hand, has been understudied even though de-
democratization is an increasingly frequent phenomenon. Ethnographic studies of 
such transitions in general, and activism under such conditions in particular, are even 
rarer. This research is well situated to help fill in this lacuna within the social 
movements and transitions literatures. This study will provide a tentative overview of 
the effects of an authoritarianism that is under construction in Turkey and the ways in 
which activism adapts itself politically, socially, and organizationally, in a bid to 
reverse the anticipated course of events. 
This study seeks to make an empirical contribution as well. It will serve future 
studies as an ethnographic account of grassroots organizing within a specific time 
frame, between 2016 and 2018, in Istanbul. This dissertation is not a full account of 
the period in question: My aim is not to provide a complete description of the social 
or cultural worlds of activists, the chronology of all the events that took place, or an 
exhaustive and all-inclusive view of existing activisms.1 What I do in this work is to 
give a situated account of grassroots activism as it seeks to orient itself with regards 
to lived and anticipated changes in macrolevel political structures (i.e. regime change). 
I focus particularly on a specific type of activism, namely, the local assemblies; and 
on certain themes that emerged out of my observations and interviews, and that I find 
theoretically more interesting. As such, my research does not document the whole 
 
1 See the next Chapter on methodology for the methodological approaches that constitute this study.   
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scene of political activism of the period in Turkey and instead provides a focused 
snapshot of a local “no” assembly.  
Beyond these limitations, the empirical account is still important if we consider 
the fact that styles of contention and state intervention help explain later moves on 
both sides. As Boudreau (2004, p. 1) puts it, “democracy movements arise against 
established patterns of contention: Their timing, base, and outcome reflect state-
movement interactions begun at the dictatorship's outset and reproduces (with 
adjustments) thereafter, in interactions between repression and contention. Institutions 
and repertoires of contention that survive, or are ignored by, state repression inform 
important aspects of anti-dictatorship movements, and influence the role that protest 
plays in transitions to democracy”. We can view this study as an account of early 
attempts at building a democracy movement from below. Whether the period with 
which this study deals comes to be categorized as such depends on how history plays 
out in the future, but the process through which activism is shaped will be important, 
nevertheless.   
It is important also because the volatility, darkness, and uncertainty that mark 
the period under study are not peculiar to Turkey. Activists’ ways of responding to 
these changes, and the forms of politics, spaces of contention, temporal and emotional 
orientations that they devise or adopt can be informative insights into how activism 
perseveres in other, similar contexts.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will proceed by introducing the political context in 
which this study took place. This section will include a brief outline of politics in 
Turkey as well as an account of the political events that occurred during my field work 
between 2016 and 2018. Then, I will review the literature on social movements with 
a specific focus on how temporality has been used. The next section will review the 
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literature on (de-)democratic transitions and social movements’ role in them. Lastly, I 
will present the outline of the dissertation. 
 
Political Context  
 
Founded in 1923 as a republic, Turkey has a troubled history of 
democratization, with multiple transitions to democracy and as many relapses into 
authoritarianism. Sunar and Sayari (1986) attributed Turkey’s centralist state and its 
bureaucratic elites to this convoluted history. After the transition to a multi-party 
system in 1950, the military assumed the role of a guardian (Heper, 2005) – the 
protector of secularism and of the state – and intervened in politics roughly every 10 
years.2 Even though electoral democracy was re-installed shortly after each military 
intervention, the guardian status of the military remained institutionally entrenched 
until the 2010 constitutional referendum. The role of the military, a strong executive, 
and the 10 per cent electoral threshold (introduced after the 1980 military coup) were 
the distinguishing features of Turkish democracy (Kalaycioglu, 2011) until recently.  
The Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym, CHP) is the first political party of 
the Turkish Republic and the ruling party during the one-party period until 1950. The 
party represents the Kemalist, secular, liberal strata of Turkish society, as well as 
social democrats. This position, however, has been questioned by libertarian socialists 
and leftists since it became the main opposition party throughout AKP rule.   
The left in Turkey was successful at mobilization in the 1970s, during which a 
proliferation of social movements was combined with polarization and violent clashes, 
 
2 Most notably in 1960 (military coup), 1971 (military memorandum), 1980 (military coup d’état), 1997 
(military memorandum), 2007 (e-memorandum), and in 2016 (military coup attempt). 
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which resulted in the 1980 military coup. However, the Turkish left has been 
traditionally weak, while the Kurdish liberation movement proved itself to be a 
stronger challenge to the Turkish establishment (Gunes, 2017). Although Kurdish 
political parties were established and closed down throughout much of the multi-party 
period (White, 2000), the most electorally successful party that comes from that 
lineage is the left-wing, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym, 
HDP) that was founded in 2012.    
Following a series of military coups, memorandums, and party closures, the 
Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym, AKP) came to power in 2002 as an 
economically liberal, socially conservative political party. Ozbudun (2006) describes 
the process by which the AKP came to power as a transition from political Islam to 
conservative democracy. The party came to be supported by a broad popular stratum, 
including the business community and some liberal intellectuals. In the first decade of 
AKP rule, Turkey saw rapid economic development and an expansion of democratic 
freedoms, and with the 2010 constitutional referendum, the AKP put an end to military 
tutelage (Kuru & Stepan, 2012). During the first half of its rule, the party seemed to 
be adhering to the core secular reforms of the Republic, was successful in local 
government, and was doing well economically. The Turkish trajectory of Islamic 
liberalism was offered as a model to other Middle Eastern countries in the first decade 
of the 2000s (Tugal, 2016a).   
The Gezi protests that took place in 2013 in Turkey was the largest mass 
protest in living memory in western Turkey. The global wave of uprisings at the time 
– from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen to the United States, Spain, and Brazil – 
assigned the Gezi protests a global significance. Gezi was interpreted as a movement 
for “reclaiming the right to the city” (Kuymulu, 2013), a politics of the body 
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(Gambetti, 2014), an urban utopia (Harmansah, 2014), a counter-hegemonic moment 
(Gencoglu Onbasi, 2016), an exercise in radical democracy (Inceoglu, 2015), among 
others. Prefigurative politics was brought to the forefront in terms of dominant styles 
of contention. Consensus, persuasion, non-institutionalism, and non-partisanship were 
valued organizing principles. The belief that “another world is possible” was boosted, 
and the focus on solidarity, listening to the “other”, doing things together, being local 
were popularized. Gezi and its immediate aftermath were a hopeful time for the 
opposition in Turkey.  
In the general elections of 7 June 2015, the HDP won 13% of the votes in 
Turkey and became the third largest political party in the parliament. The HDP’s 
election success put an end to the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 13 years of 
rule, making it not only a victory for leftist politics but for all democrats who were 
against the increasingly repressive politics of the ruling party. However, the hopeful 
atmosphere created by the elections did not last long. Following the end of the Peace 
Process between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish 
acronym, PKK) in July 2015, there were 111 illegal curfews in nine Kurdish-majority 
cities (HDP Report, 2016); 2,360 people, including 380 unarmed civilians, died in 
armed conflicts in these cities (Amnesty International, December 2016); and 24,000 
people living in Sur in the city of Amed (Diyarbakir) were forced to emigrate (ibid.). 
A series of bombings ensued. The first bombing in 5 June 2015 at the HDP rally in 
Amed (Diyarbakir) were followed by the bombings in Suruc on 20 July 2015, in 
Ankara on 10 October 2015, in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet district on 12 January 2016, in 
Istanbul’s Istiklal Avenue on 19 March 2016, in Istanbul Ataturk Airport on 28 June 
2016, and in Antep on 20 August 2016 (HDP Report, 2016, p. 1).  
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The terrorization of social and political life culminated in the AKP’s return to 
power as the ruling party. The 2015 elections were followed by other major political 
events; namely, the 2016 military coup attempt, the declaration of a state of 
emergency, and the constitutional referendum of April 2017. These events had horrific 
results for democratic rights and civil liberties in Turkey; thousands of government 
employees were dismissed by emergency rule decrees, politicians were arrested, 
including the co-leaders and thousands of members of the HDP, elected officials were 
replaced by government employees in tens of cities, and thousands of activists, 
lawyers, journalists, academics were arrested and indicted with membership of or 
aiding terrorist organizations.    
During the two years that this study covers,3 I witnessed a military coup 
attempt in July 2016, a two-year-long state of emergency that ended in June 2018, a 
referendum to reform the Turkish constitution in April 2017, and presidential and 
general elections in June 2018. These historic events are important milestones that 
provide the political context that is needed to understand the unstable social and 
political environment in Turkey which has affected this study.   
The meaning of the 15 July 2016 military coup attempt for politics in Turkey 
can be summarized under three interrelated headings: Debates about the weakening of 
the reshuffling Turkish State, legitimization of the state of emergency, and the 
establishment and institutionalization of a new regime through emergency rule. The 
dynamics and actors behind the attempted coup were a popular topic of discussion for 
both the ruling party AKP and the opposition alike. Even though this debate shed some 
light on the AKP-Gulen relationship, it was constituted mostly by accusations and 
speculations, and the details of the coup attempt will probably remain unknown for a 
 
3 Please see the next Chapter on methodology for a breakdown of my time in the field.  
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long time.4 What the attempted (or staged) coup d’état meant for the participants of 
this study was an excuse for Erdogan to further strengthen his authoritarian rule and 
increase the repression on the political opposition. It paved the way for the 
legitimization of the emergency rule and the decision to hold a referendum to change 
the constitution in favour of a specific type of presidential political system which 
concentrates powers in the hands of the President, with no checks and balances.  
Following the coup attempt, on 20 July 2016, President Erdogan declared a 
three-month long state of emergency that was extended for seven times until it was 
lifted almost two years later, after the presidential and general elections in June 2018. 
This means that the research for this study was conducted under emergency rule, 
which affected the actors of this study and the research itself. According to the 
European Commission’s Report in May 2019, “during the state of emergency, 36 
decrees were issued constraining certain civil and political rights, as well as defence 
rights, expanding police powers and those of prosecutors for investigations and 
prosecutions as well as foreseeing the dismissal of more than 152 000 civil servants, 
including academics, teachers and public officials” (European Commission Countries 
Report, 2019). Amnesty International’s report further confirms the previous report: 
“As many as 123 journalists and other media workers remain in prison while many 
university students are on trial facing terrorism related charges for merely expressing 
dissenting views or participating in peaceful protests” (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 
1). Furthermore, “as of December 2018, the total number of detainees in prison without 
an indictment or pending trial is 57,000; over 20% of the total prison population. 44,690 
people are in prison for “terrorism” related charges. These include journalists, political 
activists, lawyers, human rights defenders and others caught up in a crackdown that has 
 
4 See Çiçekoğlu and Turan (2018) for a collection on the “dubious” nature of the failed coup.  
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vastly exceeded the legitimate purpose of investigating and bringing to justice those 
responsible for the 2016 coup attempt” (ibid., p. 2). 
Tens of activists I had been acquainted with – including the district heads of 
political parties – were taken into custody, arrested, or were issued a warrant during 
the year when I was in the field. Aside from the heavy presence of riot police and the 
harassments of plainclothes police officers during protests, random criminal record 
checks, and countless unlawful practices, the danger of “fascist attacks” surfaced 
especially after the “yes” vote won the referendum, however fraudulently. On 5 July 
2017, 10 human rights activists were taken into custody during a meeting held in the 
Prince Islands in Istanbul. Six of these activists were then indicted with association to 
terrorist organizations and were arrested. After this incident activists in the field started 
voicing the approaching danger more frequently, thinking “if they arrest human rights 
defenders, they’ll definitely get to us soon”. A local “no” assembly “report” (called 
“notes” in the assemblies) took its place in the indictment as evidence, which made 
the situation even more perilous; criminalization of the assemblies had officially 
begun. This was what the state of emergency meant for the activists at my field site. It 
entailed the extension of the detention period under custody, the increase in political 
arrests, and the proximity of the danger. Hence, although emergency rule served to 
debilitate political action to a certain extent via the means I just mentioned, it did not 
eliminate it altogether. To the contrary, during my first 14 months in the field, political 
activism was vibrant and approachable, especially after the referendum decision was 
announced, which had an invigorating effect on political activity. 
The referendum campaign started an intense mobilization period, which is the 
subject of Chapter 3, creating a prosperous setting for this study. This period sped up 
political discussions, decisions, gatherings, and interactions. It provided me with the 
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added benefit of observing a diversity of people and organizations, a plurality I would 
not come across so easily otherwise. This period paved the way for protests and events 
that were unthinkable before, everyone started talking about politics, and there was a 
significant increase in political activity in general. When the “no” assemblies decided 
to continue in assembly form after the 16th of April, they became the grassroots 
nucleus of a possible “anti-fascist front” or “democracy block” in the eyes of the 
opposition; the left-wing opposition in particular.   
In the field, the mood was neither of defeat nor victory. In the words of the 
activists in the local assembly I attended, “neither yes nor no came out of the ballot 
box”. The general opinion was that the results were fraudulent, and the no vote won, 
but anxiety about the future became palpable. The expectation that oppression would 
increase incrementally, that Turkey had entered a period of what some called “the 
institutionalization of fascism”, others “regime change”, “dictatorship”, or 
“Bonapartism” was dominant. Anxiety, verbally and behaviourally expressed in the 
field, proved to be a double-edged sword: It generated the need to train new activists 
but also to be cautious of newcomers, and it created a feeling of urgency to do 
something but slowed down the process because the stakes were too high.  
The debates following the referendum were centred on the question of how to 
preserve and expand the 50 per cent "no" block. In August 2017, the opposition was 
debating the possibility of a “democracy front”, driven by the HDP’s repeated 
statements on the subject. At around the same time, local assemblies were discussing 
what their goal and program should be to spread and make the assembly form 
permanent. In December 2017 and January 2018, when I was in Istanbul for a month, 
the assembly, now called the local Democracy Assembly, was still discussing ways to 
move on, this time through discussing the general elections that were scheduled for 
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2019, and there were new attempts at “assemblyfication”, or spreading the assemblies 
to other districts and cities. The anxiety and the urgency were still a big part of their 
politics, especially with the law by decree number 696, which gave legal immunity to 
everyone who “took part in suppressing the attempted coup d’état on July 15, 2016, 
terror acts, and other acts which are considered to be a continuation of these”8, which 
was interpreted by activists at the times as a licence to kill for the paramilitary forces 
of the AKP, or a call for civil war.    
 The local “no” assembly that I studied split up during my visit to Istanbul in 
January 2018, which is the subject of Chapter 4, and soon after, a new period of 
election campaigns began, this time for the early presidential and general elections 
that were held jointly in 24 June 2018. My field site now dissolved into new assemblies 
and disjointed election campaigns, and the campaign being dominated by political 
parties (as an election is more ostentatiously the subject of party politics, while a 
referendum can be extra-party-politics and hence more amenable to grassroots 
campaigns), I had to rely on the network of activists rather than the assembly as an 
organization to gather data for this period. My findings from this period are discussed 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
 The time frame covered by my research ends here, with the immediate 
aftermath of the 2018 elections.5 What I would like to turn to now, based on this brief 
overview of the political context, is a) how to characterize the regime in question and 
b) how to characterize this particular period in question.  
 
5 To give the reader an idea of what happened soon after this research is cut off: In 31 March 2019, 
local elections took place. The CHP candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, won the mayoral office in Istanbul. 
However, the government renewed the elections in Istanbul in 23 June 2019, to lose again to Ekrem 
Imamoglu. In 19 August 2019, elected mayors (of the HDP) in three Kurdish cities – Amed, Van, and 
Mardin – were removed from office and replaced by AKP officials. 
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The transformation of the political system under AKP rule is reflected in 
academic studies. It has been compared with the “delegative democracies” 
(O’Donnell, 1994) of Latin America (Ozbudun, 2000), it was conceptualized as having 
changed from a semi-parliamentary to a semi-presidential democracy (Kalaycioglu, 
2011), and more recently, it has been characterized as sliding into neo-fascism (Tugal, 
2016b), competitive authoritarian (Baykan, 2018), and authoritarian neoliberal 
(Bozkurt-Gungen, 2018; Tansel, 2019), to name a few conceptual approaches. 
Throughout my dissertation, I use the word authoritarianism to define the regime in 
question. However, it is not an established, or consolidated, authoritarianism. Rather, 
I define the period under scrutiny as an authoritarian transition, where regime change 
in Turkey took its constitutionalized form, from a de facto authoritarianism to a de 
jure one. I will not go into a discussion here about the starting point of the authoritarian 
turn; I believe that is a question for historians of the period. My focus instead will be 
on the period under study in my dissertation, from the coup attempt in July 2016 to 
the elections in June 2018, as the developments that were underway during this time 
has been immensely consequential for activism in Turkey and for my study.  
Authoritarian tendencies have been present throughout the history of modern 
Turkey (remember the coups), and some scholars trace the changes under AKP rule to 
the military coup of 1980 (Ozyurek, Ozpinar & Altindis, 2018). When we concentrate 
on the period between 2016 and 2018, we first see a rehearsal of constitutionalized 
authoritarianism through two years of emergency rule that overruled the constitution 
and ruled by laws by decree; we then see it constitutionalized through the referendum; 
and lastly, we see its legitimization with the elections in 2018 when Erdogan was 
elected as the president.  
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Juan Linz (1964, 2000) distinguishes authoritarian regimes from democratic 
governments and totalitarian regimes by looking at two dimensions: “The degree or 
type of limited political pluralism under such regimes and the degree to which such 
regimes are based on political apathy and demobilization of the population or limited 
or controlled mobilizations” (2000, p. 54). Regarding these two dimensions, Turkey 
is still a multiparty system that holds elections, with episodes of mobilizations against 
the government and the regime. However, as Linz also acknowledges, these are a 
matter of degree, and not just of type.6  
There is a wealth of literature that seeks to classify the range of regime types 
between the two end points of full democracies and fully authoritarian regimes. Some 
of these categorizations are hybrid regimes (Karl, 1995), illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 
1997), delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 1994), soft authoritarianism (Means, 1996), 
semi-authoritarian regimes (Ottoway, 2003), electoral-autocratic regimes (Wigell, 
2008), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002), hegemonic-electoral 
authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002), and politically closed authoritarianism (Diamond, 
2002). The distinguishing commonality among contemporary authoritarian regimes is 
the existence of multiparty elections in nondemocratic settings (Bogaards, 2009, p. 
406).  
Levitsky and Way (2002) distinguish competitive authoritarian regimes from 
democracies by first laying out the criteria for democratic regimes. Their criteria are 
open, free, and fair elections; universal suffrage; protected political rights and civil 
liberties; and elected authorities possessing the authority govern without the tutelary 
control of the military or cleric leaders (p. 53). They state that fully democratic regimes 
 
6 Linz (2000, p. 54) offers five subtypes: Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes; organic statism; 
mobilizational authoritarian regimes; post independence mobilizational authoritarian regimes; and post-
totalitarian authoritarian regimes.  
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may at times violate these criteria, but not to the extent that these violations become 
systematic threats that impede democratic challenges. They continue by contrasting 
democracies with the operation of authoritarian regimes (p. 53):  
 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, by contrast, violations of these criteria are 
both frequent enough and serious enough to create an uneven playing field 
between government and opposition. Although elections are regularly held and 
are generally free of massive fraud, incumbents routinely abuse state resources, 
deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and 
their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, 
opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, threatened, 
harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or—less 
frequently—even assaulted or murdered. Regimes characterized by such abuses 
cannot be called democratic. 
 
Turkey fulfils all the criteria above to be classified as a non-democracy; and can be 
classified as a competitive authoritarian regime according to these criteria, with an 
adjective in front of authoritarianism instead of democracy (as in illiberal democracy). 
Levitsky and Way then distinguish competitive authoritarian regimes from fully 
authoritarian ones (2002, p. 53-54): 
 
Although incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes may routinely 
manipulate formal democratic rules, they are unable to eliminate them or reduce 
them to a mere façade. Rather than openly violating democratic rules (for 
example, by banning or repressing the opposition and the media), incumbents are 
more likely to use bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, 
such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies 
to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behaviour from critics. Yet 
even if the cards are stacked in favour of autocratic incumbents, the persistence 
of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas through which opposition 
forces may—and frequently do—pose significant challenges. As a result, even 
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though democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian 
incumbents and their opponents must take them seriously. 
 
To the extent that the banning and repression of the opposition and the media are 
concerned, the regime in Turkey can be placed closer to full authoritarianism. 
However, elections – although their openness, freeness, and fairness are highly 
dubious – still provide a means by which the opposition can gain meaningful (albeit 
limited and threatened) governing positions.7 As such, Turkey’s political regime can 
be characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime that has fully authoritarian 
leanings.  
In their 2018 book entitled “How Democracies Die”, Levitsky and Ziblatt 
identify four indicators of authoritarian behaviour (p. 64-65): The rejection of, or weak 
commitment to, democratic rules of the game; denial of the legitimacy of political 
opponents; toleration or encouragement of violence; and readiness to curtail civil 
liberties of opponents, including media. Following these criteria, I call the current 
regime in Turkey authoritarian because it shows a weak commitment to the rules of 
the democratic game. Elections that are somewhat competitive are held, which is why 
it might be called a competitive authoritarian regime in which there are multiple 
political parties that compete in elections. However, there have been constant (mostly 
successful) attempts at undermining the legitimacy of elections, and refusal to accept 
electoral defeat. Examples include the general elections in 2015; the removal of 
elected mayors in Kurdish cities throughout the two-year period and again in August 
2019; and the repeated municipal elections In Istanbul in 2019. Cancelling elections 
are backed up by the unwillingness to abide by the constitution, as evidenced by an 
 
7 For example, the “no” vote against regime change in the constitutional referendum in 2017 won in 
two of the biggest cities in Turkey; Istanbul and Ankara. Similarly, opposition candidates won the 
municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara in the local election in 2019.   
 25 
 
unusually long period of emergency rule. These were means used to restrict basic and 
political rights, as evidenced, for example, by the charges against Academics for 
Peace.8  
 Another symptom of authoritarianism in Turkey is the AKP government’s 
denial of political opponents. The imprisonment of thousands of HDP members 
including its former co-leaders is an example. The unending accusations on the HDP 
of being secretly allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party PKK (categorized as a 
terrorist organization in Turkey), pitching the HDP as a threat to national security, and 
describing the HDP as a criminal organization all point to the AKP’s denial of the 
opposition as legitimate political actors. The government’s refusal to condemn and/or 
to engage in precautionary measures against violent attacks on the opposition 
reinforces the label of authoritarianism. Furthermore, criticism of the government or 
the president has become punishable by an arbitrary interpretation and implementation 
of the law. Banning the right for assembly (i.e., protests and demonstrations) and the 
media, and jailing journalists and academics critical of the government have become 
common practice, couched in legal terms. 
In sum, the curtailing of political rights and civil liberties; criminalization of 
the opposition; sidestepping the constitution (through emergency rule); reforming the 
constitution following what has been documented as a rigged referendum (e.g., Oy ve 
Otesi, 2017); the condoning of violence against the regime’s critics; and the refusal to 
accept election results when no fraud can be documented are the reasons behind my 
choice of the term authoritarianism. Throughout the dissertation, I will use the term 
 
8 For more information on Academics for Peace, see: https://barisicinakademisyenler.net/node/1. 
Accessed 24 August 2019.  
For the 2017 and 2018 Amnesty International Report on Turkey, see: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/. Accessed 24 
August 2019.  
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authoritarianism bearing in mind the degree and the specific nature of authoritarianism 
in Turkey, as I have discussed in this section.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, defining the period in terms of the stage 
of authoritarianism is as important as defining its nature or degree. Therefore, moving 
on from characterizing the regime to characterizing the period, I contend that what we 
are looking at is an eventful time, in which major political events are condensed within 
a very short time frame. I take the events that organize this dissertation – the Gezi 
protests in 2013, the military coup attempt in 2016, the constitutional referendum in 
2017, and the general and presidential elections in 2018 – as a “relatively rare subclass 
of happenings that significantly transforms structure” (Sewell, 1996, p. 100). These 
are “transformative events” that “become turning points in structural change, 
concentrated moments of political and cultural creativity when the logic of historical 
development is reconfigured by human action but by no means abolished” (McAdam 
& Sewell, 2001, p. 102).  
Events taken as turning points that define the period I am looking at in the 
dissertation include not only those imposed by external forces like the coup attempt 
and a variety of elections, but also acts of resistance whether they be (collective or 
individual) hunger strikes, protests, independent election campaigns, new grassroots 
formations like the one I study, and so on. It is also a period of rapid institutional 
change: From the constitution to the parliament, from the political system to the armed 
forces of the state, the whole political structure is undergoing immense changes. The 
authoritarian turn in Turkey started long before I started conducting field work, but 
the events and changes that took place within the time frame of my field work do 
correspond to an acceleration of the process of constitutionalizing what was a de facto 
authoritarian regime. In this sense, it is a period defined by authoritarian transition. 
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The speed and magnitude of the said changes make this interval a good example of 
“intense times” (della Porta, 2016), times of crises or great transformations. We can 
also think of these times as “restless”, insofar as we view this period as a series of 
events seen as “a function of the ongoing interpretive and interactional competitions 
and contestations among principal actors and witnesses” (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010, p. 
1374).  
If the political context in which my field site is embedded sets the scene for 
this study, then the transition to authoritarianism – and the process of making it 
constitutional – is crucial for its effects on activism. Temporally, rapid and massive 
changes are underway, making these times “intense times”. With this political context 
and its temporal implications in place, my research questions, hopefully, take on a 
clearer significance. To reiterate them in light of the discussion above: How has the 
intensification of authoritarianism in Turkey affected grassroots activism during 
intense times? And how has temporality factored into the different stages of political 
action? I will now turn to social movement theory to see how the existing literature 
has dealt with questions of temporality.  
 
Temporality in Social Movement Theory 
 
In this section, I seek to find the temporal logics deployed in social movement 
theory. I will start with the political process model and the concept of cycles of protest; 
then move on to frames and narratives; and lastly turn to more recent works on 
temporality in social movements. I survey major works that have come to be 
associated with a certain theory and their revisions where applicable, and prominent 
scholars in their respective areas of research. My intention here is not to provide a 
 28 
 
review of social movement theory in general, but to have an overview of the theories 
and literature that I selected for their implicit or explicit considerations of elements 
regarding time and temporality. More specific discussions can be found in each 
empirical chapter.  
  
The political process model 
 
The political process model emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a 
corrective to two prominent bodies of literature: The social-psychological 
explanations of what was then referred to as the “classical” theories of collective 
behaviour and mass society, and the resource mobilization model’s over-reliance on 
the willingness of the elite to sponsor minority groups as well as the direct relationship 
it drew between grievances or discontent and insurgency9. The political process 
model, as developed by Doug McAdam in his 1982 book, Political Process and the 
Development of Black Insurgency 1930-197010, defines social movements as “rational 
attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance 
collective interests through noninstitutionalized means” (p. 37). The model rests on 
the assumption that social movements are the ongoing product of interactions between 
internal and external factors, and of the interplay of both institutional and 
noninstitutional politics. It is a processual model, as the name suggests, in the sense 
that it seeks to provide a framework for studying the emergence, development, and 
decline of movements; not only their emergence.  
 
9 For a detailed critique of the classical model of social movements, see McAdam 1982, Chapter 1. For 
an evaluation of the resource mobilization model’s advancements and deficiencies, see McAdam 1982, 
Chapter 2.  
10 McAdam became the most well-known theorist of the political process model, but he was working 
with the ideas already put forth by Gamson (1975); Jenkins and Perrow (1977); Eisinger (1973); Tilly, 
Tilly, and Tilly (1975); and Oberschall (1973), among others.  
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 The “process” in the political process model makes an explicit temporal 
argument to distinguish itself from the classical theories that view macro processes 
like industrialization or urbanization as directly increasing grievances and as a 
consequence, leading to protest. Rather than seeing protest as “the end product of a 
specified causal sequence” (p. 53) (and hence focus on explanations of the emergence 
of protest only), McAdam states that a key difference between the two models is “the 
time span during which insurgency is held to develop. The classical sequence of 
disruption/strain depicts insurgency as a function of dramatic changes in the period 
immediately preceding movement emergence. By contrast, the perspective advanced 
here is based on the notion that social insurgency is shaped by broad social processes 
that usually operate over a longer period of time” (p. 41, italics mine). The emphasis 
on a broader time span not only revises the definition of social movements to include 
their development and decline (therefore moving away from an understanding of 
protest as a moment of social “outburst”), but also continues the line of historical 
studies of social movements.  
McAdam suggests that there are three sets of factors that are crucial in the 
generation of insurgency. In his words (1982, p. 40):  
 
The first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population; the second, 
the collective assessment of the prospects for successful insurgency within that 
same population; and third, the political alignment of groups within the larger 
political environment. The first can be conceived of as the degree of 
organizational "readiness" within the minority community; the second, as the 
level of "insurgent consciousness" within the movement's mass base; and the 
third, following Eisinger, as the "structure of political opportunities" available to 
insurgent groups (Eisinger, 1973, p. 11). 
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Each of these three interrelated factors – the readiness of the aggrieved group, the 
collective assessment of the prospects of insurgency (or “cognitive liberation” as 
McAdam terms it), and the structure of political opportunities – reflects a 
consideration of temporality. McAdam views existing organizations prior to 
mobilization as “the primary source of resources facilitating movement emergence” 
(p. 48), as a capacity that is necessary to make use of political opportunities conducive 
to the emergence of movements. Agreeing with and referring to Oberschall, he states, 
“[if]f no networks exist, he contends, the aggrieved population is capable of little more 
than ‘short-term, localized, ephemeral outbursts and movements of protest such as 
riots,’ (Oberschall, 1973, p. 119)” (p. 44, italics mine). The thrust of the argument is 
that inter-organizational and inter-personal connections provide the aggrieved 
population with the facilities to initiate a movement, as these are the spaces in which 
cognitive liberation is most likely to occur. Cognitive liberation happens when 
“oppression is collectively defined as both unjust and subject to change” (p. 34, italics 
in the original). Recognition of the possibility of change has roots both in the structure 
of opportunities and the level of organization.  
The factors that facilitate movement emergence also affect the ongoing 
development of the movement, with the additional factor of the shifting social control 
response of other groups. McAdam draws attention to time here as well: “What is 
absent in the above discussion is the element of time. The point to be made is that the 
level of threat or opportunity embodied in a movement is not constant over time. Not 
only are the interests of elite groups likely to change, but so are important 
characteristics of the insurgent challenge itself” (p. 57).  
Time here is the frame of analysis: Longer term social dynamics, short term 
ephemeral protest, sequencing of events, the alignment and realignment of groups, 
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continuities between the emergence of movements and their trajectories and outcomes 
all happen over time, or in a certain time frame. The model’s arguments on a specific 
time span (i.e. long-term, historical analysis) and the changing dynamics of social 
forces over time are the key temporal elements in the political process model, even 
though it is not unaware of or insensible to the workings of time. 
Still within the political process logic but with a much narrower focus this time, 
in a 1986 article entitled “Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom 
summer”, McAdam weaves in considerations of time into his analysis of activist 
recruitment. He introduces the term “biographical availability” and argues that “those 
with less time to engage in activism or more personal responsibilities constraining 
involvement will be less likely to participate even if they are predisposed (and their 
structural location enables them) to do so” (1986, p. 83). He also makes an analytic 
distinction between “cost” and “risk”. Whereas cost refers to “the expenditures of 
time, money, and energy that are required of a person engaged in any particular form 
of activism” (p. 67), risk refers to “the anticipated dangers – whether legal, social, 
physical, financial, and so forth – of engaging in a particular type of activity” (p. 67). 
So, for instance, the act of joining a protest percussion group may be low-risk, but it 
may be high-cost in terms of the time needed to rehearse, the money needed to buy 
the instrument, and the energy needed to participate in the group’s activities. It is also 
a question of biographical availability: A worker with a dependent at home will be less 
available to afford the time and energy that participation would require.  
In this article we see a treatment of time that is very different than in the book.11 
Time is considered not only as an analytic framework, as changes in x,y, and z over 
 
11 In a 1983 article entitled “Tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency”, McAdam makes another 
temporal argument which is that tactical creativity speeds up the mobilization process. I am not 
including this article in the main text since his analysis of the pace of insurgency is very much like the 
cycles logic that I discuss next.  
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time; but as an explanatory element in itself that affects recruitment that crystalizes as 
having time and anticipation. Even though the importance of having time and 
anticipation of possible risks in movement participation are common knowledge by 
now, as I will show in the rest of this section, time or temporality as an analytic 
explanatory category has not been taken up by researchers until recently.  
 
Cycles of contention and waves of contention 
 
Incorporating Zolberg’s “moments of madness” (1972) into his longer-term 
analysis, Sidney Tarrow (1993) offers the concept of systemic cycles of protest to 
understand how forms of contention created during a period of upsurge in protest 
activity become part of the long and slow development (e.g., Tilly, 1978; 1986) of 
repertoires of contention. Tarrow argues that “[c]cycles of protest are the crucibles in 
which moments of madness are tempered into the permanent tools of a society's 
repertoire of contention” (1993, p. 283). Cycles are how new forms of collective action 
become permanent, and thus a part of the evolution of the repertoire of contention, that 
is, the culturally and empirically limited set of means that contenders possess to make 
claims on particular groups and institutions (Tilly, 1978). Here is a passage that 
demonstrates Tarrow’s core argument and the temporal elements in it (p. 302-303): 
 
Moments of madness – seldom widely shared, usually rapidly suppressed, and 
soon condemned even by their participants – appear as sharp peaks on the long 
curve of history. New forms of contention flare up briefly within them and 
disappear, and their rate of absorption into the ongoing repertoire is slow and 
partial. But the cycles they trigger last much longer and have broader influence 
than the moments of madness themselves.  
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Tarrow relates the short-term temporality of the protest event to its long-term effects. 
Here again, as in the political process model, time is the frame of analysis that comes 
into view in terms of speed, duration, and time span. The “cycles” perspective is 
intended to speak to the effects of different timescales. However, the cycles logic 
entails a view of contention that is, as the name suggests, circular, repetitive, and 
recurring in a cyclical manner. This is a pessimistic and conservative view of 
movements with a beginning and an end that then starts all over again.  
 Ruud Koopmans (2004) attempts to remedy the closed-circuit implications of 
the cycles language by replacing the word “cycles” with “waves”. The concept of 
“waves of contention”, in his elaboration, refers to the expansion, transformation, and 
contraction of the level of contention. Although he claims that “[t]he wave metaphor 
does not imply such assumptions of regularity [as implied by cycles], and simply refers 
to the strong increase and subsequent decrease in the level of contention” (p. 21), the 
metaphor does not escape the circularity of the cycles logic. Waves are more or less 
regular and orderly, and they come and go. If we start with the assumption that 
movements emerge, bloom, and subside, in that order, then we deterministically assign 
all movements their doom from the very beginning. In this sense, both concepts treat 
time in the same way, and their understanding of social movements is theoretically 
very similar.12  
 The cycles framework does not take into account the open-endedness of 
political struggles. Plus, I highly doubt that movement participants see themselves as 
 
12 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) have a different, but to a certain extent similar, critique of the 
concept of cycles of contention: “The theory’s weakness was that it remained largely a stage theory 
based on a deductively posited phase of mobilization followed by a distinct phase of demobilization, 
failing to account for mobilizations that emerge at various stages of the cycle and leaving untheorized 
the relations between actors, their actions, and their identities. By positing a recurring parabolic shape 
to episodes of contention, cyclical theory begged the question of the internal composition of the cycle 
and whether there are episodes that take different forms altogether” (p. 66). 
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in a cycle, doomed to fail and start again; they would not be activists if they thought 
they were in a pre-determined loop. Openness to possibilities and futurity is 
incompatible with the cycles or waves framework, even though they are obvious and 
essential to any activist or movement participant on the ground. Moreover, as others 
have argued (e.g., Gillan, 2018), this framework tends to favour analyses of the 
“peaks”, rather than the valleys, of contention, confining the analysis to the moment 
of protest only, narrowing down the time frame to a fraction of what comes before and 
after the spectacular instant of social protest, or what happens alongside it, less visible 
to the public.13  
 
Frames and narratives 
 
Frames are “interpretive schemata that enable individuals to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow & 
Benford, 1992, p. 137). Frames identify what is wrong with the current social 
condition, how it can be fixed, and a roadmap to fix it. For frames to be successful, 
“people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic 
that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem” (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 
1996, p. 5). Efficiency, or agency, is related to the conviction that collective action 
can bring about change, that there exist “agents that impress people as politically 
efficacious, by virtue of either their success in the past or their potential efficacy” 
(Klandermans, 1997, p. 18). Much like the political process model’s emphasis on 
 
13 Protest event research works with the same logic, taking into account the timing and sequencing of 
events, using time as an overarching analytic framework. However, exceptions that analyse broader 
movement dynamics and not just the protest wave exist (e.g., Hutter 2014; Almeida 2008).  
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cognitive liberation, the framing literature stresses the importance of convincing 
existing and potential participants that collective action will lead to its intended effects.  
Francesca Polletta (1998) sets narratives apart from frames using a more 
explicitly temporal language: “Narratives not only make sense of the past and present 
but, since the story’s chronological end is also its end in the sense of moral, purpose 
or telos, they project a future. This is the basis of self-identity and action” (p. 140). 
Building on White’s (1980) definition of narratives as “chronicles invested with moral 
meaning through emplotment”, she highlights the temporal dimension in identity 
construction through narratives as “the structuring of events into evolving wholes” (p. 
140). “Emplotment” in this context refers to the configuration of past events within an 
unfolding larger story, connecting them to subsequent events over time. In this sense, 
narratives not only give meaning to past events, but also allude to what will or should 
be in the future. As Davis (2002) puts it: “Narrative explanation operates 
retrospectively, since the events earlier in time take their meaning and act as causes 
only because of how things turned out later or are anticipated to turn out in the future” 
(p. 12). Activists thus narrate stories of defeat to set out the longer-term prospects for 
struggle and success (Voss, 1998; Beckwith, 2015), stories of “immaculate 
conception” (Taylor, 1989) that construct origin myths or movement histories based 
on which to build a collective identity (Blee, 2002; Armstrong & Crage, 2006; Meyer, 
2006), and stories of heroic individuals that spurred movement mobilization or 
successful outcomes and legacies (Polletta, 1998). 
Studies of framing and narrative are much more attentive to the temporal 
complexities of action, collective identity, and aspirations. They are sensitive to the 
plasticity and openness of activists’ own accounts. Still, when we look at the clusters 
of research that these studies have produced – such as origin myths, movement 
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histories, symbolic events and heroic leaders (or commemorations, for example) – we 
see that the explanatory focus revolves around the past, even when the analysis 
acknowledges the multiplicity of temporalities at work (e.g., how past events 
configure the present and the future, how expectations shape action in the present, 
etc.). Building on this and the previous bodies of work on social movements, this 
dissertation accentuates the role of anticipation and the future at different stages of the 
trajectory of the group that I study.  
 
Recent work on temporality in social movements 
 
As reviewed above, major branches of social movement theory have put 
forward concepts, theories, and arguments that deployed various temporal logics, but 
they have not taken temporality itself as an object of study or as an explanatory factor, 
like narratives or political opportunities for example. Recently, there has been an 
increasing interest in a more explicit engagement with temporality in the study of 
social movements. Scholars have written about “eventful protest” (Della Porta, 2004; 
2008) and “eventful democratization” (Della Porta, 2014), “time intensification” 
(Della Porta, 2017; see also Summers-Effler, 2010), “rhythms of social movement 
memories” (Merrill & Lindgren, 2018), “eventful events” (Wood, Staggenborg, 
Stalker & Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2017), “eventful subjectivity” (Meyer & Kimeldorf, 
2015), “temporal blindspots” (Wagner-Pacifici & Ruggero, 2018), “historical 
narratives, mundane political time, and revolutionary moments” (Lazar, 2014), to 
name a few. The burgeoning interest in temporality among social movement scholars 
has been remarkable, but the output of this emerging topic remains fragmentary. Here, 
I identify two strands that have clustered around a) the temporal dynamics of 
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prefiguration and prefigurative politics, and b) broader calls for a temporal approach 
to the study of social movements. After briefly introducing two scholars whose works 
have been influential for both of these strands, this section will review each of the two 
clusters in turn.   
William H. Sewell’s call for an “eventful sociology” (2005) and Robin 
Wagner-Pacifici’s account of the restlessness of events (2010, 2017) have influenced 
the development of social movements studies that are sensitive to the workings of 
temporality. Sewell discusses temporality in historical thinking, bringing to the fore a 
“lumpy, uneven, unpredictable, and discontinuous” (2005, p. 9) historical temporality 
instead of a linear one. He calls attention to an “eventful temporality” that recognizes 
the power of events: “An eventful concept of temporality assumes that contingency is 
global, that it characterizes not only the surface but the core or the depths of social 
relations. Contingent, unexpected, and inherently unpredictable events, this view 
assumes, can undo or alter the most apparently durable trends of history […] An 
assumption of global contingency means not that everything is constantly changing 
but that nothing in social life is ultimately immune to change” (1996, p. 102). As such, 
Sewell’s approach takes events as moments of structural transformation, moments that 
are open to human agency as well as structural continuity. Contingency is a crucial 
element in this approach.   
Wagner-Pacifici (2017) has devised an “analytical apparatus, termed political 
semiosis, for tracking the contingent ruptures, shapes, and flows of events” (p. 3), in 
order to get events out of their boundedness in space and time. She theorizes the 
“restlessness” of events (2010; 2017) in an attempt to grasp the “ongoingness” of 
events, “the ways they are restless and the ways they are subject to continuing 
oscillations between bounding and unbounding as they extend in time and space” 
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(2017, p. 5). For Wagner-Pacifici, restlessness is an essential characteristic that defines 
events (ibid., p. 88). Similarly, in her 2010 article on the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States, she examines how different actors were involved in an unfolding semiotic 
interpretive process to control the meaning of the events. Interpretation and re-
interpretation of events by multiple actors, and the spread, reproduction, and 
representation of events are at the core of Wagner-Pacifici’s inquiry.  
The works of Sewell and Wagner-Pacifici have opened up a more temporal 
conversation in social movement studies by way of theorizing the contingency and 
“restlessness” of events. The scholarship to which I will now turn have been 
influenced by Sewell’s call for an eventful sociology and his analysis of transformative 
events, as well as Wagner-Pacifici’s theory of the event. Below, I will first review the 
cluster of scholarship that discusses prefiguration and its relation to temporality, then 
turn to a more detailed discussion of calls for more temporally sensitive studies of 
social movements.  
The last decade has seen a resurgence in scholarly attention to prefigurative 
politics, defined as enacting in the present the changes one wants to bring about in the 
future, due to the practices of large-scale movements like the Alter-Globalization 
movement or the Occupy movements.14 Recent works on prefiguration and 
prefigurative politics focus on prefiguration’s relationship with strategy. While some 
contrast prefiguration with long-term strategy (e.g., Smucker, 2014), others claim that 
it is a strategic choice that links means and ends (e.g., Maeckerbergh, 2011). Petrick 
(2017) suggests that prefigurative protest sites, such as camps, uphold a counter-
temporality against capitalism by elongating the moment of protest, even though the 
means might not always fit the “strategic or organizing priorities” of the movement 
 
14 The concept of prefiguration has a long history. See: Boggs (1977); Breines (1982); Epstein (1991); 
Polletta (2002). 
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(p. 498). These sites and ways of protest have been analysed as experimentations with 
the desired future society (Yates, 2015), or as concrete utopias (Gordon, 2017). 
Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero (2018) go into a detailed ethnographic analysis of 
Occupy Philadelphia and find that there is a multiplicity of prefigurative approaches 
to temporality that lead to disjunctures in coordination. The recent interest in 
prefigurative politics is important since it demonstrates the adoption of temporal 
approaches to the study of social movements.  
Turning to scholars that call for more attention to temporality in social 
movement studies, I will begin with Donatella della Porta, who is a prolific scholar 
who has published an abundance of work on the topic of time in contentious politics, 
among others. She subscribes to the eventful approach, built mainly on the theory of 
the event and the notion of eventful temporality that William H. Sewell (1996) has put 
forward, that takes protest as event and as a rupture of routine (e.g., 2008; 2011; 2014; 
2017; 2018). In her 2008 article titled “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts”, she 
develops the concept of “eventful protest”, focusing on its emergent and contingent 
character, its potential to be a turning point for structural change, and its transformative 
capacity. Della Porta takes the protest itself as an independent variable in this article, 
looking not at what produces protest but what protest produces; not only its effects on 
public opinion and the authorities but its impact on the participants and the internal 
dynamics of movements as well. She identifies some protests as “eventful”, “that is 
they have a highly relevant cognitive, relational and emotional impact on participants 
and beyond participants” (p. 48).   
 In her 2016 book, “Where did the Revolution Go?”, della Porta deepens her 
investigation of eventful protest and looks at how “eventful democratization”15 (i.e. 
 
15 Della Porta’s 2014 book that focuses on different kinds of democratization, of which eventful 
democratization is one, will be reviewed in the next section.  
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waves of protest for democratization) has relational effects on its participants through 
intensified interactions (2016, Chapter 1). More relevant to my purposes in this review 
because it explicitly tackles with the issue of time, I will focus on another chapter of 
the same book, entitled “‘Like a house of cards’: Time intensity and mobilization” 
(ibid., Chapter 5). This chapter focuses on the relational mechanisms of “time 
intensification” and “time normalization” through an analysis of activists’ perception 
of time in general, and time acceleration in particular. During crises, protests, or 
dramatic changes, time “is in fact accelerated because of the breaking down of 
previous institutions, rules, and norms, and the capacity of movement actors to occupy 
these spaces, changing them in the process” (p. 155). Della Porta talks about “intense 
times” as “times of transition, in which crucial decisions have to be made quickly, in 
the heat of the moment” (p. 155). She finds that the perception of the acceleration of 
time during intense times goes together with contingency, the unexpected, and the 
unpredictable. Events are recognized as unexpected, surprise turning points, especially 
when unlikely new actors join the protests (p. 146-149). Unexpected actors include 
different, formerly unmobilized populations, but also new generations (p. 151-154). 
Predictability becomes unrealistic and contingency, uncertainty, and coincidence are 
accentuated at times like this (p. 156-157). Micro decisions can have macro effects in 
the chain of events that (retrospectively) become turning points. Unplanned, informal 
interactions, rumours, occasional or contingent happenings can have significant 
effects (p. 158- 161).  
In a more recent article (2018), della Porta integrates the findings of her 
previously reviewed work into an outline of what she calls a “momentous approach to 
social movements”. She states that movements and protest have been studied as 
“normal politics” in “normal times” but characterizes the times we live in as “intense 
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times”, as “momentous”: “Great transformation, great recession as well as great 
regression” (p. 3). Abrupt changes in intense times, times of crisis and rapid 
transformation, are back on the table. In this article, drawing on her earlier work on 
democratic transitions, the literature on critical junctures, and social movement 
studies, she theorizes protest events that lead to intense and massive waves of 
contention.  
 Della Porta (2018) offers the terms cracking, vibrating, and sedimenting to 
identify the sequence of processes that starts at the moment of protest (the crack), 
which then spreads to other locations and a wider population (vibration), and ends 
with normalization (sedimentation). By integrating temporal aspects of these 
processes into her analysis such as how time is perceived, ruptures or breaks with 
routine, exogenous shocks, surprise, uncertainty, contingency, legacy, and memory, 
della Porta renames the different stages of waves of protest: “Protest cracks, as protests 
trigger systemic shocks, vibrating in catalysing moments of intensified interactions 
and later sedimenting in changes that are stabilized inside and outside social 
movements” (p. 13).  
 Three lines of further investigation regarding time in social movements are 
suggested in this article: Restlessness, prefiguration, and anticipation (p. 14-16). First, 
della Porta turns to Wagner-Pacifici’s conceptualization of events as “restless” to draw 
attention to the malleability of memory and of the past and how they are empirically 
observable in the present. She connects this line of work as contributing to our 
understanding of the role of memory during the sedimentation stage. She calls for 
more research into commemoration and the “re-enacting of previous eventful protests 
in other movements” (p. 15), citing Gillan’s (2018) work – reviewed below – on 
vectors as evolving patterns as a useful concept. The second avenue of research on 
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time in contentious politics that della Porta suggests is prefiguration as “the enactment 
of the future in the present” (p. 15), as reviewed above. She finds empirical research 
on this topic most relevant to the vibration phase of protests, where the initial “shock” 
is reproduced and spread in other people and in other places. Lastly, and most relevant 
to this study, della Porta refers to Tavory and Eliasoph’s 2013 article in which they 
lay out a theory of anticipation, pointing to a need for more research on the connection 
between the present and the future. She claims that the role of the future in the present 
is most important during protest cracks where perceptions about the future change, 
and that more research is required into the ways in which these cracks act.  
 Della Porta’s eventful approach to protests brings contingency and the 
emergent properties of protest to the centre of her analysis. Not only is this a more 
nuanced way of detailing the workings of “spontaneity” in situ and as it happens, it is 
also intrinsically a temporal approach. The trajectory of her thinking on this topic 
proves how useful the eventful approach is for a temporally sensitive analysis. 
However, I understand her “eventful protest” to speak less to temporal dynamics than 
to the emotional, cognitive, and relational dynamics at play during the event. Even 
though the latter do not exclude the former, her relatively earlier work on eventful 
protest focuses on the emotional, cognitive, and relational aspects of protests rather 
than, say, dissecting the temporal workings of each and then connecting them to the 
temporal aspects of the macro institutional setting, like she does in her work from 2016 
and 2018. When left unpacked, the word “eventful” only points to a retrospective 
evaluation – by participants and academics – of the event as a memorable and 
important one based on its outcomes, which runs counter to the logic of contingency 
and its emergent characteristics that the eventful approach propounds.  
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 Movement scholars’ focus on protests as events is not new (see the above 
section on cycles of protest), and my critique of the cycles of protest approach applies 
here as well. Just as a protest or a series of protests does not necessarily make for a 
social movement, neither does the moment of protest make for the whole of the protest. 
Della Porta is well aware of the process that leads to and builds from protest, and this 
we gather from the whole of the vast variety of work she has produced. Nevertheless, 
it is worth cautioning against such simplifications that the eventful approach might 
cause when applied haphazardly.  
 Della Porta’s 2016 book and her 2018 article, both of which have been 
reviewed in this section, look at the inter-subjective and collective workings of time 
perception in the context of what she terms “intense times”. These works take 
temporality as an explanatory mechanism and alert us to how they operate at the micro, 
meso, and macro levels. These two works are significant also as calls for the study of 
temporality in contentious politics. Della Porta’s suggestions for further research very 
closely resonate with my dissertation.  
 She draws attention to the need to study the connection between the future and 
the present and suggests that this connection is most salient at the initial stage of a 
protest event, when the protest makes a “crack” in what people thought of as possible 
in normal times. I concur with the insight that protest, especially when it is a mass 
protest that spills over to unexpected constituencies and places, helps the horizon of 
possibility to break into new possibilities, new ways of being and relating, a new 
society, a new political order. McAdam’s 1988 study, Freedom Summer, tells the story 
of one such moment, only an elongated one. And I think the fact that the “freedom 
summer” and the “freedom high” lasted throughout a longer period of time than a 
single protest, and that its participants attempted to reinvigorate “the high”, and that it 
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became a fixed point in time in the personal histories of its participants as well as for 
the history of the struggle for civil rights in the United States of America and beyond 
– a turning point, an event – is itself telling. The point is that the “crack” in horizons, 
when previously unthinkable trajectories come to be perceived as possible, do not only 
belong in the protest event, or the initial stage of a cracking protest. These moments 
not only become engraved in their participants’ minds, re-enacted as symbols or 
triggers of collective identity, and get carved into the very histories and stories of 
movements; they may also last longer, spring up at different stages in the life span of 
a struggle (beyond the cycle of protest), and change their form and content over time.   
 Indeed, my dissertation demonstrates that the future does not only appear as a 
crack in the horizon of possibilities, and it certainly is not limited to the protest event. 
The future makes an appearance in the present in a lot of different ways, for example 
through anticipations, expectations, possibilities, threats and opportunities, future 
imaginings, dystopias, the political calendar, urgency, anxiety, hope, and more. 
Moreover, it exists throughout the dissertation: At the initial organizing stage, at the 
peak of mobilization, and later during decline and disintegration. Importantly, the 
future does not always appear as a better future. The many faces of the future that I 
find in my research make the connection between the present and the future much 
more complex than what della Porta has foreseen. Therefore, we can see this 
dissertation as an answer to her call for more research on this topic, and a contribution 
to it. 
Kevin Gillan is another scholar who thinks temporally and calls for a 
temporally minded approach to the study of social movements. In a recent article 
entitled “Temporality in social movement theory: Vectors and events in the neoliberal 
timescape” (2018), he offers a temporal theory of social movements that can account 
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for the interlacing dynamics of movements with the dynamics of the socio-political 
environment in which they are embedded. He critiques the extant literature of having 
a weak conception of temporality, whereby the cycles or waves logic (also mentioned 
above) tends to let individual waves to stand in for the movement itself and hence has 
a “foreshortened analytical timescale” (p. 3). The existing literature also overplays 
contextual factors, drawing a rigid boundary between internal movement features and 
external contexts (p. 3). The second temporality Gillan identifies in the literature is the 
interactional sequences logic, exemplified by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s Dynamics 
of Contention (2001). The sequences logic entails identifying causal mechanisms and 
processes of contention over short timescales and downplaying socio-political context 
(p. 3).   
In order to bring forth a more temporally sensitive understanding of 
movements and their environments, Gillan (2018) asks “what do the key 
characteristics of movements – including conﬂict, organizational form, and subjective 
motivations – tell us about their socio-political environment?” (p. 2). Based on his 
examination of the literature on the Alter-Globalisation, Anti-War, and Occupy 
movements, Gillan introduces what he calls “timescape thinking”, where timescape is 
a “metaphorical placeholder for the socio-political environment in which social 
movements operate, with the intention to include both durable patterns of interaction 
and the events which often serve to make social change visible” (p. 4). To capture the 
dynamism within a timescape, he uses events and Sewell’s “eventful temporality” 
(2005) as contingent, uneven, and discontinuous processes that are subject to 
interpretation and construction by different actors, as Wagner-Pacifici (2010) 
conceptualizes the event. To capture continuities, he introduces the notion of vectors, 
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which represents patterns of interaction that, through repetition, get carried through 
into the future (p. 5).  
Gillan contributes to the theory of social movements by adding a temporally 
sensitive approach to change and continuity. By examining the timescape through 
events and vectors, he accounts for the contingency of events, for micro-level relations 
coalescing into patterns of social relations, and for continuities within and among 
movements in a non-mechanistic way. Macro processes like neoliberalism come into 
view together with cultural and material dynamics of movements in this framework.  
The timescape logic, including the notions of vectors and events, is susceptible 
to changes and continuities over time and at different levels. The article makes no 
specific methodological suggestions for the application of the framework, but the way 
the article is written points to a combination of methods. Ethnographic studies are used 
together with historical and theoretical work on movement histories and broader 
political economic analyses. As such, the framework tends to favour historical (i.e. 
retrospective) accounts, since the researcher needs to be able to pinpoint past events 
and gather the meanings that were attributed to them by their participants and 
witnesses; collect data on how the ongoing rhetoric and discourse is shaped with 
regards to these events and lived experiences in the present; and an overall 
understanding of the state of the world. When combined, these are the elements that 
are needed as data for an analysis of material, cultural, organizational, and ideational 
changes and continuities over time.  
The timescape framework is helpful in framing processes in temporal terms. 
For instance, my research takes place within an authoritarian timescape, with a specific 
temporality at work that has to be predicted and according to which activists must 
orient themselves. This framing of the project lends itself to a theorization of the 
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temporalities of authoritarianism, closely linked to the temporalities of the state, which 
is beyond the scope of my dissertation and research. However, we see glimpses of the 
authoritarian state’s control over the workings of time throughout the study, from the 
perspective of activists. In a similar vein, some of the cultural and material (in the form 
of the effects of repression, for example) changes and continuities come into view in 
each chapter, whether they be as organizational structure, ways of doing politics, or 
narrative and temporal orientations towards the future.  
Ann Mische calls for a particular type of temporal approach, one that takes the 
future as the pivot around which action takes shape. In a 2009 article entitled “Projects 
and possibilities: Researching futures in action”, she outlines a framework for 
incorporating what she calls “future projections”, or future imaginings, into 
sociological literature and to our conceptualization of social action in particular. 
Responding to “practice theorists” like Bourdieu and Giddens, for whom action is 
structured via taken for granted understandings conditioned by a given actor’s social 
position within a field (think habitus and structuration theory, respectively), Mische 
argues that “we should refocus attention on the open, indeterminate, "polythetic" 
perception of the field from the point of view of the actor surveying the future in terms 
of multiple possibilities, as opposed to the "monothetic" view of the actor (or observer) 
who interprets the decision after it has already been taken” (2009, p. 696). She offers 
nine cognitive dimensions of projectivity – reach, breadth, clarity, contingency, 
expandability, volition, sociality, connectivity, and genre – that can aid us explore the 
form and content of future projections and specify how they lead to action or inaction. 
The article concludes by calling for a “sociology of the future” that examines how 
future imaginings shape and are shaped by social processes (p. 702).  
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In a more recent article entitled “Measuring futures in action: Projective 
grammars in the Rio+20 debates” (2014), Ann Mische further elaborates on her 
previous framework. She suggests three methodological approaches to studying the 
variations in and effects of the different dimensions of future projections; namely, 
longitudinal survey research, narrative analysis of texts, and observations of 
performance and conversation, focusing in this article on narrative manifestations of 
future projections in text and talk. She examines the online documents of the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and the ensuing “People’s Summit” 
of 2012 as “sites of hyperprojectivity” which she defines as “communicative settings, 
somewhat removed from the flow of day-to-day activity, in which the explicit purpose 
of talk is to locate problems, visualise alternative pathways, and consider their 
consequences and desirability” (p. 447). She argues that future imaginings inform 
action through affecting decisions, relations, and institutions; that they are empirically 
observable through the three methodological approaches she suggests; and that the 
future might be implicit in talk or routinized activity as well as explicit in contentious 
talk, especially in sites of hyperprojectivity.  
Mische’s work has been immensely influential in my research as her work 
provides useful analytical tools and a language with which to analyse and present my 
data. The image of “the actor surveying the future” in an “open, indeterminate” field 
(we could also use “timescape” in place of “field”, in Gillan’s terms) with “multiple 
possibilities” is how I take the activists in my field site to be situated. The local “no” 
assemblies, one of the reasons why I chose them as my field site being the lively and 
contentious discussions being held in them, are sites of hyperprojectivity. I also focus 
on talk and narrative, using data gathered from participant observation and interviews, 
but I also elaborate on the material and cultural forms that future imaginings inform, 
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namely, organizational structure and a specific way of doing politics and of being 
political actors.  
My focus on temporality eventually resulted in a contribution to the “sociology 
of the future”, as activists’ gaze or temporal orientation moved from the past towards 
the distant future at each turning point (hence the rotating angel of history in the 
opening of this chapter). As I have sketched a brief review above, social movement 
scholars have examined the past in relation to the present, and they have expanded our 
knowledge of how collective memory impacts identity building, movement histories, 
and narratives. Against the abundance of literature on the structural and historical 
dynamics affecting different aspects of movements, it comes to me as a surprise that 
social movement theorists have not incorporated the future in their analyses. The 
transitional and highly volatile political environment has surely facilitated the 
observation of such temporal dynamics, and possibly even made those dynamics even 
more prominent and fundamental to activism than under “normal” regimes and 
“normal” times. However, given that action, and political action in particular, always 
requires the consideration of the future in one form or another, I wish to incorporate 
futurity, possibilities, and open-endedness into my analysis.  
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Transitions and Social Movements  
  
My primary contribution will be to social movement studies but as I have 
mentioned before, the political context in which I carried out the research for this study 
was marked by Turkey’s transition to a constitutionalized authoritarianism. Therefore, 
I will now turn to the literature on transitions with a focus on social movements. More 
specifically, this section will identify two axes of literature within which I situate my 
study: The literature on transitions to and from democracy, and the literature on social 
movements in liberal democracies and in authoritarian regimes. While the transitions 
literature is useful for understanding the transitional character of the political context 
in contemporary Turkey, it has largely ignored the role of social movements. Scholars 
of social movements, on the other hand, have concentrated on either liberal western 
democracies or authoritarian regimes, without much attention to transitional periods. 
My study is situated at the intersection of these two axes and thus is a contribution, 
albeit an indirect one, to attempts at bringing together democratization studies with 
social movements. In what follows, I will start by reviewing the literature on 
transitions and then direct my attention to social movement studies and how they treat 
transitional periods. Even though there are some overlaps with the previous section in 
terms of the scholars I discuss, their work will be reviewed from a different point view 
and for different purposes.  
 There is a vast literature on transitions to democracy, and a growing interest in 
transitions from democracy. The literature on transitions, both to and from democracy, 
focus on structural conditions such as capitalism, economic development, and social 
classes on the one hand; and elite strategies and leadership on the other. Although the 
role of the working class and labor movements have taken their place in the literature, 
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scholars have accorded much less attention to the role of the broader category of social 
movements or grassroots mobilization.  
 Democratization studies initially looked at the role of economic development 
and class relations in transitions to democracy. Working within modernization theory, 
Lipset (1959) argued that there is a positive correlation between economic 
development and democracy, whereas O’Donnell (1973) argued that there is an 
“elective affinity” between “bureaucratic authoritarianism and high modernization”, 
taking economic development and class conflict as his main explanatory variables. 
Moore (1996) also pointed at capitalist interest in authoritarianism, at the same time 
recognizing the role of class struggles in the early stages of democratization. While 
Moore concentrated on the middle class as the driver of democratic change, 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) argued that it was the working class 
that was the reliable force of democratization and not the middle classes.  
 Shifting the focus from structural conditions needed for democracy to the 
process of democratization, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) stressed the role of elites 
and leadership during transitions characterized by “structural indeterminacy”. In their 
study, what they called “the popular upsurge”, where different groups come together 
to push for democratic liberalization, was observed to be only ephemeral. Huntington 
(1993) also wrote about mass mobilizations as a potential destabilizer of the political 
system. In 1996, Linz and Stepan argued that a vigorous civil society was important 
at all stages of the democratization process, but they still concentrated on elites and 
the institutional form of the previous regime. Kadivar more recently in 2017 argued 
that democratic transitions carried out by mass mobilizations were more likely to 
survive because they have the organizational structure, leadership cadres, and state-
society ties amenable to keeping checks and balances in place.  
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 Even more relevant to my study is studies of democratic breakdowns. These 
studies examine elite choices (Bermeo, 2003), the structural conditions of breakdown 
(Fish 2006), military and one-party regimes (Brooker, 2000), and political and 
institutional factors. As attention to the role of social movements is absent in this 
literature as well, I will concentrate on works that are the most relevant to the 
contemporary political context in Turkey. I leave out several studies that can be placed 
in this section such as Slater (2010) or Parsa (2000) because of their attention to social 
movements in authoritarian regimes. They will be discussed later in this section.  
 Milan Svolik is one of the most cited scholars in this literature, perhaps because 
his studies sum up the most consistent finding in this area: That a concentration of 
power in the executive is more likely to yield democratic breakdowns/regressions. In 
his article on the survival of democracies (2015) he argues that “incumbent takeovers”, 
where a democratically elected incumbent undermines key tenets of democracy 
(p.730), are a threat to democracies more than coups d’état. Using statistical models, 
he finds that “fuel exports and presidentialism raise the risk of incumbent takeovers 
but not coups; the Cold War and authoritarian neighbours raise the risk of coups but 
not incumbent takeovers; and a democracy’s military past raises the risk of coups but 
lowers the risk of incumbent takeovers”. His findings are supported throughout the 
literature. For example, Fish (2006) writes about “superpresidentialism” and Bermeo 
(2016) about executive coups. 
 Tomini and Wagemann (2017) use two-step fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis to examine varieties of contemporary democratic breakdown or regression. 
As the naming suggests, they consider this process as one of different degrees, ranging 
from a regression of democratic qualities to a transition to an authoritarian regime. 
Their findings point to two models of transition from a democracy to a non-
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democracy: An opposition-based model and a crisis-based one. They state that 
contrary to the modernisation theories, economic development is not a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for democratic breakdown. They also refute theories that place 
regional democratic context, the duration of democratic institutions, and the type of 
party system as a necessary or sufficient factor. Instead, they claim that “’mutually 
reinforcing inequalities’, which combine economic, social, linguistic, regional, ethnic 
and political exclusions, appear to be […] a strong indicator of a context that is prone 
to democratic breakdown” (p. 25).  
 In the opposition-based model, opposition forces coerce the government to 
implement, or abuse, a concentration of power in the executive. Tomini and 
Wagemann state that this type of democratic regression is more likely to lead to a 
hybrid regime with a powerful executive. A second version of this model is when the 
opposition comes to power and restricts freedoms and rights. The authors liken this 
version to Linz’s (1978) disloyal actors, and state that this version is more likely to 
give way to the rise of anti-systemic political parties and movements, gradually 
weakening the existing government and political parties.  
 In the crisis-based model, a crisis triggers anti-government protests, to which 
the government responds by taking authoritarian measures. Citing Svolik (2015) and 
Bermeo (2016), Tomini and Wagemann state that the result can be an “incumbent 
takeover” or an “executive coup” (self-coup or autogolpe), respectively. Another 
version of this model results in military reaction against the inept government. Here, 
the article refers to the 1980 military coup in Turkey as a reaction to the social and 
political conflicts of the 1970s (p. 23).  
 Deciding which type of democratic breakdown or regression defines the 
Turkish case is not among the concerns of this study. Such a decision would first of 
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all require pinpointing the beginning of the regression, which calls for a different kind 
of research. However, certain events in Turkish political history would qualify for the 
different types of democratic breakdown or regression that Tomini and Wagemann 
expose. I discuss some of these events using Bermeo’s (2016) terms, which cover this 
article’s arguments but provide a wider range of possibilities.  
 Nancy Bermeo (2016), in her article on “democratic backsliding”, examines 
different ways by which backsliding occurs. She observes that since the Cold War, 
classic coups d’état, executive coups, and election-day vote fraud have declined, and 
that promissory coups, executive aggrandizement, and the strategic manipulation of 
elections are more likely to occur. The main argument is that these latter paths to 
backsliding indicate a slower pace of change, increased ambiguity, and the increased 
difficulty of defending democracy when the regime in question is ambiguously 
defined. This argument and the terminology that she provides are incredibly useful for 
understanding contemporary democracy in Turkey.   
 Bermeo discusses Turkey as a case of executive aggrandizement, whose 
defining feature is that “institutional change is either put to some sort of vote or legally 
decreed by a freely elected official – meaning the change can be framed as having 
resulted from a democratic mandate” (p. 11). Discussing the state of media freedoms 
and judicial autonomy as prime sites for democratic backsliding, she aptly places the 
political trajectory of the current president Erdogan and the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) in the executive aggrandizement 
category.  
 It is beyond the purposes of this literature review to match each of Bermeo’s 
categories to events in Turkey but disregarding obvious connections would be to waste 
an opportunity to make the situation clearer. Even though she refers to Turkey only in 
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the executive aggrandizement section, several events from recent history spring to 
mind while reading the rest of the article. For example, while the above-mentioned 
categorization (executive aggrandizement) surely holds true, one can argue that the 
state of emergency (that remained in force for two years) counts as an “executive 
coup”, defined as involving “a freely elected chief executive suspending the 
constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep”(p. 7). Similarly, one 
could argue that election fraud has been carried out both on the election day (p. 7-8), 
as has been documented by independent election initiatives in the referendum of 2017, 
and strategically through manipulation via mass media, allocation of governmental 
funds, voter registration, changing electoral rules, harassing opponents, and the like 
(p. 13). We can add to Bermeo’s list of strategic manipulation tactics the use of 
bombings, arrests, and criminalization of political parties in the Turkish case, 
considering the events that took place before and between the two general elections in 
2015. These observations leave us with the last type of backsliding: The classic coups 
d’état and promissory coups. Again, the most recent coup attempt by the military in 
July 2016 can be categorized as the former, and the coups of 1960 and 1980 as the 
latter.  
 Where this mix of backsliding pathways places Turkey in the democratic 
backsliding scheme is, as I remarked before, beyond the scope of this study. However, 
Bermeo’s point that backsliding occurs slower than before, and that it leaves regimes 
in an ambiguous position is valid in the Turkish case. After arguing that ambiguous 
regimes are more difficult to democratize, Bermeo ends her article on an optimistic 
note, by saying that “the dictatorships that follow failed democracies today are, on 
average, less authoritarian than their predecessors” and that “as long as some electoral 
competition takes place, power can be clawed back” (p. 17). My study looks at exactly 
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how the activist opposition tries to “claw back” democracy. As Chapter 3 will show, 
the difficult-to-reverse-gradual backslide argument trumps Bermeo’s optimism about 
the prospects of reversals for the activists in my study. On this note, I now turn to the 
literature on social movements.  
 The social movements literature has been dominated by studies based in the 
liberal democracies of the United States and Western Europe for a long time; the major 
analytical and theoretical concepts that emerged from that literature came out of liberal 
democratic empirical cases. Another strand of the literature on contentious politics 
seeks to explain less-than-democracies by focusing on the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia. My study, by contrast, that takes Turkey as a case, sits somewhere in between 
these two branches of literature: It is neither a democracy nor an established and stable 
non-democracy. Rather, it is undergoing a transition from democracy to non-
democracy, in this dissertation called authoritarianism. Put differently, the activists I 
study are not (yet) fighting against an established dictatorship, nor are they fighting 
for a “better future” in a liberal democracy – they would first have to have enough 
democracy in the first place to fight for a better one. In fact, their struggle is for a 
return to more democracy, for the reversal of de-democratization, to be precise. Yet, 
both strands of literature have plenty to offer for this study.  
 The major theoretical approaches granted by the classic social movement 
literature are the resource mobilization model (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), the political 
opportunities or political process model (McAdam, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 
1996), and the framing model (Snow & Benford, 1988). These concepts have served 
scholars of social movements for decades and continue to do so. However, their 
overemphasis on structure, macro-political processes, and institutional politics has 
been criticised. In the early 2000s, scholars called for a more dynamic understanding 
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of social movements and change, stressing the need to uncover causal processes and 
their component mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). Accordingly, studies 
that made use of social networks (e.g. Diani & McAdam, 2003; Osa, 2003) and those 
that employed a relational approach (e.g. Goldstone, 2004; Mische, 2009) proliferated. 
The need to unify the divide between institutional and non-institutional politics – a 
compartmentalization that had led to the isolation of political scientists who studied 
political parties and political sociologists who studied social movements – was also 
addressed (Goldstone, 2003). The “cultural turn” brought in culture (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 1999), emotions (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2009), and narrative (Polletta, 
2009) into our understanding of social movements and politics. All these latter 
approaches place agency at the core of their studies, examining actors’ strategies and 
the interactions among a variety of actors, while at the same time paying attention to 
meso-level factors such as the role of organizations and macro-level ones, such as 
structural opportunities or political processes.  
 We see a surge of studies in the 2000s that follow the above rationale. Of 
special interest to me are the ones that focus especially on political contention in non-
democracies, as I believe these will provide this study with the concepts that it needs 
where the literature based on liberal democracies is unfit or insufficient. These studies 
have contributed to the social movements literature by using and revising its concepts, 
the literature on movement-state interactions, and the effect of repression in particular. 
Boudreau (2004), for example, expands the political process model by focusing on the 
interaction of repression and resistance in the Southeast Asian context. He identifies 
three ways in which repression affects styles of contention. The first effect is 
institutional and material: “Repression shapes the duration, direction and intensity of 
activist careers in ways that profoundly influence political contention. Where activist 
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forms and organizations survive state attack, generations of experienced dissidents 
bring their accumulated wisdom and leadership to the struggle; and provide a thicker 
and more complex network of support for new protest. Elsewhere, authorities may 
eliminate entire activist generations and deprive new claim makers of experienced 
leaders” (p. 10-11). This finding resonates with my field site where there is a history 
of military coups, disappearances, massacres, and banning of political parties. 
Boudreau’s second finding regarding the effects of repression is closely related to this 
history of repression, namely, its interpretive legacy: “Movements under authoritarian 
regimes must always anticipate state repression and explicitly incorporate this 
anticipation in their plans” (p. 11). This explains how history comes into play when 
activists make decisions or determine their strategies. His third and last finding is that 
“historically patterned modes of contention create distinct movement cultures in each 
setting” (p. 11). Boudreau contributes to the literature on social movements in 
authoritarian contexts by exposing the mechanisms through which repression affects 
the styles and trajectories of contention.  
 Schock (2005) similarly contributes to the re-theorization of the political 
process model with his comparative study on successful people power movements in 
South Africa, Philippines, Thailand, and Nepal. His focus is on movements’ 
organization and strategies with a special attention to key actors’ assessment of 
opportunities and threats. His analysis makes use of the literature on nonviolent action 
and earlier work on everyday resistance under repressive conditions (e.g. Bayat, 
1997), and is part of a growing literature that takes everyday or covert resistance as a 
mechanism of contention (e.g., Johnston, 2006, Scott, 2008). Schock’s work shows 
how earlier acts of covert protest often serve as a springboard for the later stages of a 
movement. Thus, he offers a strategic agency approach to reveal how movement 
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resiliency occurs, and how movements take advantage of the illegitimacy of the states 
they contest.  
 Another comparison of Southeast Asian cases directs attention to elites and 
state formation and asks, “Why are elites more prone to act collectively in some 
political systems than in others?” (Slater, 2010, p. 4). Taking contentious politics as a 
producer of political institutions rather than an outcome to be explained, Slater 
contends that “contemporary divergence in the elite coalitions underpinning 
postcolonial state and regime institutions has been primarily produced by historically 
divergent patterns of contentious politics” (p. 5). The insights in this work about the 
relationship between contention and elite coalitions point to possible pathways that 
will become important later on in this study (Chapter 4).  
 Parsa ([2000] 2008) also studies coalition formation and its effects on 
mobilisation but employs a multiplayer approach in his comparative study of the 
revolutions in Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. His work addresses the complexity 
of the opposition prior to mobilization, and identifies four main actors: Students, the 
clergy, the working class and unions, and the economic elites. By examining both 
structural conditions and actors’ strategies, Parsa expands our understanding of how 
movements – with their leaders, ideological and social divisions, strategies, and frames 
– shape class coalitions and the trajectories of the later stages of mobilization. I see 
Slater (2010) and Parsa’s work as complementing each other in terms of theorizing 
coalition building with particular attention to the role of contention.   
 The Middle East has also proved conducive to social movement theorizing in 
recent years. While the studies under review here all have roots in and contributions 
to make to the literature on social movements, the political histories of each region 
(and each country) have dictated different research interests. Therefore, whereas the 
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above-mentioned studies expand the literature on repression, those focused on the 
Middle East and the events of 2011 aim at extending or revising theories of revolution 
and of revolutionary situations. I will come back to this point when I discuss how this 
body of work is relevant to my study at the end of this section.  
 Kurzman, in his study of the Iranian revolution titled The Unthinkable 
Revolution in Iran (2004), draws attention to the time- and place-specific actions of 
the people that constitute the revolution. This approach differs from comparative 
studies of revolutions, which pay greater attention to institutional transformations or 
structural causes of such outcomes, with its focus on individual actors. Kurzman’s use 
of actors’ situational logics also informs his 2012 article on the Arab uprisings, where 
he discusses how structural opportunities are not external givens to which actors 
respond but can also be created by said actors. He is not alone in his use of this version 
of the “political opportunities” model (e.g. McAdam et al., 2001; Goldstone & Tilly, 
2001), but his contribution comes from the shift of focus from causes and outcomes 
to actors in ongoing situations, in a way doing what McAdam and colleagues intended 
to do in 2001.  
 After the upheavals in the region in 2011, studies of contentious politics 
burgeoned in search of new perspectives. In their article, “Towards a sociology of 
revolutionary situations”, Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule (2012) point out the need to 
devise a theoretical and methodological approach that takes into account the 
unpredictability, ambiguity, uncertainty, or contingency of revolutionary situations. 
They differentiate “between revolutionary intentions, outcomes, and situations, 
especially as the latter tend to transcend the conditions of their creation and their 
outcomes do not allow us to comprehend them retrospectively” (p. 3), and argue that 
“researchers should abandon the search for causes and instead focus their attention on 
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situations and individual actions in said situations, and subsequently attempt to 
delineate the typical processes that lead to them” (p. 12). This statement chimes with 
the “dynamics of contention” framework with its emphasis on processes, but the article 
proposes to go beyond McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s (2001) framework and suggest 
examining the sequences of actions and identifying relational and cognitive processes 
that lead to revolutionary situations. Two factors seem to stand out in this perspective: 
Methodological individualism and sociology’s need to observe actions and 
motivations in situ. Persons’ biographical histories, activist experiences, and their 
calculations and choices at a given moment within a sequence of action are research 
priorities for Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule. Thus, it is not surprising that they call for 
more longitudinal and ethnographic work to be done in order to analyse revolutionary 
situations. This article is an important contribution to the field of social movement 
studies, following the likes of Kurzman, Jasper, Duyvendak, and Filleule, with its 
emphasis on the ethnographic observation of actors and their actions in ambiguous 
situations.  
 Volpi uses the arenas of contestation framework and eventful sociology 
(Sewell, 1996) in his 2016 book, Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa to 
examine the different trajectories of revolutionary moments in Morocco, Algeria, 
Libya, and Tunisia. He reveals the processes by which de-institutionalization and re-
institutionalization occurred during and after the revolutionary situations in these 
countries. Placing the actors at the core of his study, he uncovers how new goals, 
meanings, and identities were constructed by these actors, and how these in turn 
affected political trajectories. This study is an important contribution to the study of 
revolutions because it aims at amending the dominant approaches to understanding 
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the region, putting Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule’s above-mentioned approach to 
practice.   
 Scholars of social movements have a lot to gain from the limited selection of 
studies I included in this review. Empirically, they show how repression works, how 
contentious politics affects the formation of repressive regimes, how elites are situated 
within the contention-state response framework, and the changing styles of contention 
that certain regimes elicit. Theoretically, they stress the fluidity of circumstances, and 
add to our understanding of the dynamics of repression and of revolutionary situations, 
pointing out the limitations of the “mechanismic” approach (Gerring, 2010) to 
contention.  
 This study also takes place in a politically fluid structure, but instead of a 
revolutionary situation aiming at democratizing the polity (which is the subject of both 
studies looking at liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes), we are looking at a 
de-democratizing state. This specificity of the time and place requires a reassessment 
of repression and contention. The aims of activism, and the means available to activists 
are affected by this specific type of political transition, which creates avenues for 
theorization and the revision of sociological concepts.   
 Donatella della Porta is the exception in the literature. In her 2014 study, she 
compares two waves of democratization, Eastern Europe in 1989 and the MENA 
region in 2011, explicitly bridging the literatures on democratization with social 
movements. In this work, she uses fundamental social movements concepts such as 
framing, political opportunities, and mobilizing structures, as well as examining the 
role of key actors traditionally used to explain democratization processes such as the 
military, elites, or civil society. She then incorporates the role of different forms of 
mobilization into her analysis. 
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 She finds that mobilization from below is present in different paths to 
democratization, identifying three paths with regard to the extent of the role played by 
protest, social movements, or both. She terms these paths eventful democratizations, 
participatory pacts, and participated coups d’état. Protest is most important in eventful 
democratizations, where a lively and democratic civil society faces closed political 
opportunities. In participatory pacts, faced with a divided elite, social movements 
bargain for democratic reforms, and participate in coups which is the most troubled 
path to democracy, a weak civil society faces strong repression, and especially with a 
split in the military, disruptive military coups occur. Della Porta places Turkey in the 
second category, that of participatory pacts, stressing that social movements have 
accompanied the multiple waves of democratization and democratization between 
1946 (first phase of liberalization) and 2013 (Gezi protests).  
 As one of the most important results of her attempt at bridging two disparate 
literatures, Della Porta confirms the emergent theoretical contributions of contentious 
politics in the Middle East and North Africa. More specifically, following Bennani-
Chraibi, Fillieule, Duyvendak, and Volpi (all of whom are discussed above), she 
highlights the eventfulness of protest, taken to mean that the logic of the situation 
creates its own resources and opportunities. Della Porta’s study is an encouraging one 
that manages to bridge democratization studies with social movements. It is a welcome 
addition to the comparative-historical, large-N studies in the literature. In fact, the 
majority of the research in the areas under review in this section are comparative, 
macro- or meso-level studies that rely on historical data. My study differs from these 
studies by introducing an ethnographic perspective to the study of regime change and 
contention. 
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Outline of the Dissertation  
  
 In the Introduction, I presented my topic, research questions, the main 
contributions I wish to make in the rest of this dissertation, and the methodology I used 
to study this topic. I included two literature reviews; one on how scholars of social 
movements have studied questions of time and temporality, and one on how social 
movements have been studied in the context of democratic or authoritarian transitions. 
Before pointing out scholars who have called for a more temporally sensitive approach 
to the study of movements, I argued that social movement theory has used time 
overwhelmingly as an analytic framework in which a certain time period is chosen for 
study, or cyclical and sequential events are chosen as the object of study and/or as a 
framework with which to analyse the lifespan of protests/movements. Reviewing the 
literature on transitions and social movements, I argued that studies of activism during 
authoritarian transitions were scant and situated my study at the intersection of social 
movement studies and authoritarian transitions.  
 Chapter 2 presents my methods in greater detail. In addition to providing 
information on why I chose political ethnography and qualitative interviews to study 
grassroots activism, this chapter also discusses how I use data, its relationship with 
theory, and my understanding of political ethnography. Chapter 2 introduces the local 
“no” assemblies via a detailed description of how I chose them as my field site. I walk 
the reader through the different stages of the research from the initial design to finding 
and integrating into the field site to the analysis and final writing-up stage. I also 
discuss how recent political events affected this study throughout my field work and 
in later stages. Finally, the difficulties of conducting research in a risky political 
environment, ethics, and my positionality as an activist researcher are expanded.  
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 In Chapter 3, I focus on the organizational structure of the assemblies and ask 
the question of why the local “no” assemblies were organized the way that they were, 
at the time that they were. I trace the specificities of the structure of the assembly that 
I study to the Gezi protests in 2013 and a series of local initiatives and grassroots 
mobilizations that followed. I find that the continuities and changes that grassroots 
organizing went through from 2013 to 2016-2017 were the result of a process of rapid 
political learning due to the effects of an elongated period of regime change punctuated 
by numerous transformative events in the span of only a few years. Regime change 
did not only result in these events and episodes of mobilization, but also the 
expectation of a more repressive state, which further affected how activists organized. 
This chapter accentuates the re-reading of Gezi as a point of reference for organizers, 
and thus deals with the re-evaluation of the past through present and future political 
needs.  
 In Chapter 4, I look at the period around the 2017 referendum and observe that 
activists were much less interested in the past during this time. The puzzle in this 
chapter is that even though the assembly was regarded as a success and all its 
participants agreed on the need for the opposition to unite against the common threat, 
the assembly split up and was disbanded. After describing what the distant future and 
the threat looked like for the activists at the time, I move onto analysing a series of 
meetings that marked the dissolution of the assembly. The main topic of the 
conversations revolved around what to expect in the near future, and more specifically, 
whether to expect an early election for which the assemblies should campaign. I find 
that the different dimensions of contending future imaginings were the underlying 
reason behind the participants’ inability to coordinate their actions and set a common 
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trajectory for the assembly as a whole, even though they agreed on the need to take 
collective action against a fascistic future.  
 In the last substantive chapter, I look at the effects of the early presidential and 
general elections in 2018. In the face of a disbanded local assembly and no room for 
grassroots activists to intervene in national politics, the elections mark a turning point 
as a defeat, unlike the 2017 referendum. In Chapter 5, talk of hope serves to reclaim 
activists’ decrease in political and temporal agency. Finding themselves in the 
dystopian future they cautioned against, activists tone down such dystopian 
imaginations and instead use a narrative of historical struggle that covers both the past 
and the future. Placing themselves within this much longer term and future-oriented 
narrative helps activists reclaim a sense of agency and hence, hope. I end by 
reconceptualising hope based on the complexities that I found at work throughout the 
chapter.  
 Finally, in the Conclusion, I review the main findings of each of the substantial 
chapters and draw out the common threads that link them together. I emphasize the 
importance of studying the role of temporality and the future in politics. Then, I outline 
the contributions of the dissertation for social movement studies and authoritarian 
transitions. I end this chapter and the dissertation by pointing out some of the 
theoretical implications and avenues for further research that have arisen from the 
findings of this study.   
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Chapter 2 
Methods 
In this chapter, I will lay out the methodological approaches that underpin this 
study. I will provide a detailed discussion about the methodological choices that I 
made at the different stages of the research cycle. This chapter will proceed in three 
parts. After introducing my case and field site, in part one, I will discuss the type of 
ethnography that I conducted, how I used data and theory, and will provide detailed 
information about my interviews. In part two, I will go into the specifics of my 
fieldwork and the writing-up period. In part three, I will delve into my own 
positionality and into the tensions involved in being both an activist and a researcher, 
the difficulties of doing participant observation in a transitional context, and the 
ensuing issues of risks and ethics that I have encountered, before concluding this 
chapter.  
The research on which this study is based relies on 16 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork and 46 qualitative interviews with activists, conducted over a period of one 
and a half years. My choice of the field site is typical among ethnographic studies of 
social movements where small activist groups or social movement organizations are 
investigated to understand internal dynamics of these formations or to make broader 
theoretical contributions (e.g., Burawoy, Burton, Ferguson & Fox, 1991; Luhtakallio, 
2012; Blee, 2012). My field site is an informal (i.e. not formally institutionalized), 
local, grassroots activist group that came together on the occasion of the 2017 
referendum, to campaign for the “no” vote against regime change. I study one of the 
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local “no” assemblies as a way of understanding the continuities and changes that 
grassroots activism went through in recent years in Turkey, and to see the effects of 
regime change on activism during a period characterized by rapid descent into 
authoritarianism.   
There were several reasons behind my choice of the local “no” assemblies as 
a field site. First, they offered a good place to observe the state of the social and 
political legacies of the Gezi Park protests of 2013, most importantly because they 
were founded by a group of activists that were actively involved in both the Gezi 
protests and the political initiatives that followed in its aftermath. Second, although 
local assemblies were initiated with the goal of campaigning for the “no” vote in the 
referendum, they quickly evolved into a long-term political project that viewed the 
assemblies as potentially long-lasting political formations based on popular 
participation. This was a good opportunity for me to examine the development of the 
assemblies over time. Third, the assemblies consisted of non-partisan individuals, 
members or sympathizers of political parties, and members of political organizations. 
This amalgamation of political activists opened up fruitful grounds for me to observe 
the intersection of social movement and political party activism. And lastly, the 
assemblies were not only sociologically but also politically important in that they 
carried out one of the most visible independent referendum campaigns in Istanbul and 
spread throughout the city’s major districts, gaining international and, as much as the 
state-controlled media allowed, national attention.  
The reasons behind my choosing of this specific local assembly were 
numerous: it was one of the first assemblies that were established, so I could observe 
its formation from the very beginning; it came to occupy a central position with 
regards to other assemblies, meaning it was almost an ideal-type local assembly during 
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the peak phases of mobilization; the central location of the district (being a 
transportation hub and one of the most central districts of Istanbul) made this assembly 
an important site of campaigning, adding to the assembly’s significance; and due to 
the ideological background of the district and the assembly’s participants, it was 
among the most promising assemblies in terms of making itself permanent after the 
referendum which meant that it had the potential of institutionalization and building 
itself as a permanent political actor.  The leftist and socialist leanings of the district 
made the discussions at the assembly a local embodiment of debates within the left-
wing opposition in general; turning the assembly into a micro-level manifestation of 
the opposition that included both the left and the left-leaning, liberal, secularist CHP 
voters.   
 
Part One 
Ethnography and participant-observation 
 
Ethnography is a contentious concept in the sense that what merits the label of 
ethnography has become a prickly subject. With the cultural turn in sociology and in 
social movement studies in particular, some have come to reserve the label for research 
characterized by what Geertz (1973) termed thick description, with a focus on the 
“cultural whole” in which specific issues are situated (Baszanger & Dodier, 2004, p. 
13). Others define ethnography as “a written account of the cultural life of a specific 
group, organization, or community which may focus on a particular aspect of life in 
that setting” (Watson, 2008, p. 100). Following this definition, others have put forward 
yet more expansive definitions of ethnography, in which “ethnography is writing” 
(Humphreys & Watson, 2009, p. 40), where it is more than a methodology for doing 
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research, and a way of giving a written account of the cultural workings of a case. The 
subject has become so controversial that it is commonplace to hear, both in the 
literature and in face-to-face academic environments, phrases such as “quick 
description”, “would-be ethnographers”, or “anthropological tourism” (Bate, 1997). 
For this reason, it is crucial to specify what I mean by ethnography and the particular 
strand of ethnographic scholarship that I subscribe to in my dissertation.  
I use ethnography to mean “writing about the world from the standpoint of 
participant observation” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 6). More specifically, I follow Paul 
Lichterman’s definition of ethnography in which the term “refers to research in which 
the researcher observes and to some degree participates in action as the action is 
happening. In sociology, ‘participant-observation’ names this mode of research more 
precisely […] Ethnographic research, unlike other research methods, investigates 
action in the setting of the actor, in the time of the actor” (Lichterman, 2013, p. 239). 
Here, the emphasis is on the concurrence of observation and the action that is being 
observed, with a focus on the method of ethnography for sociological inquiry rather 
than a strictly anthropological project that advocates for thick description. This 
definition does not monopolize ethnography as a method for the study of culture16 and 
it is open to different approaches to the relationship between data and theory, as I will 
elaborate in the next section.  
More specifically, this study is a political ethnography. As Auyero and Joseph 
(2007) point out in their introduction to the edited volume, New Perspectives in 
Political Ethnography, political sociology in particular and the study of political 
processes in general can benefit from ethnography since “much macrosociological 
work in political sociology rests on conceptually weak microfoundations and on an 
 
16 Although Lichterman works on culture, his methodological writings on ethnography are not 
exclusively for cultural sociologists.  
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understanding of politics that removes from sight much of what politics is really about 
(power, yes, but also desires, sacrifices, emotions, etc.)”. They go on to argue that 
ethnography “is useful for understanding how political hegemony is constructed, 
challenged, and reconstructed, how political habits are constructed, how activists 
make (or fail to make) choices, how “culture” enables and constrains individual and 
collective actions, how party or social movement politics connect (or disconnect) from 
everyday life” (p. 6). Following political ethnographers such as Lichterman (1996), 
Eliasoph (1998), Baiocchi (2005), Auyero (2006), and Mische (2008), I use political 
ethnography to study political actors, encounters with formal politics, and the lived 
experience of the political, as Baiocchi and Connor (2008) classify different types of 
political ethnographies, which I will elaborate more on in a moment. This 
methodology distinguishes my research from other studies on similar topics, as it 
enables me to examine the day-to-day practices, expressions, and actions driven by 
larger political processes and the oppositional structures produced by people outside 
of formal political institutions.  
Baiocchi and Connor (2008), when they distinguish between three types of 
political ethnography, acknowledge that it is usually the case that a combination of the 
three is found in any ethnographic research. My research mainly comes under 
“ethnographies of political actors and institutions”, which is defined by the authors as 
“studying politics, defined as the events, institutions, or actors that are normally 
considered ‘political’ (e.g., social movements, or states), but in an ethnographic way: 
at a smaller scale and as they happen” (p. 140). I study activists who are overtly 
political actors, and who self-identify as such, in the original place and time in which 
they act. The scale is small in that I focus on a specific group of activists that have 
coalesced into a group at a specific point in time. In this sense, I do not make a claim 
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of representativeness; I cannot claim that this case represents the whole of activism in 
Turkey in this period. A study of that range would need to be a much larger one, 
spanning more groups and a wider time frame. However, considerations of why this 
group formed in the shape that it did and at the time that it did (see below and Empirical 
Chapter 1) gives us insight into the historical development, continuities, and changes 
that local activism has been going through in light of larger political processes.  
Throughout the dissertation, I look at activists as they try to position 
themselves with regards to events. The major events that organize the thesis are the 
Gezi protests of 2013 and the declaration of the state of emergency in 2016 (Chapter 
3), the referendum in 2017 (Chapter 4), and the presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2018 (Chapter 5). All three events establish turning points in 
contemporary politics in Turkey. They are also moments in which “encounters with 
formal politics” crystallized. Baiocchi and Connor define ethnographies of this type 
as “studying routine encounters between people and those institutions and actors, 
encounters normally invisible in nonethnographic ways (e.g., the encounter between 
organized social movements and nonparticipants; or the encounters with state 
bureaucracies or welfare agencies)” (2008, p. 140). Although all of these events are 
highly visible instances of political mobilization, observable by non-ethnographic 
ways as well as ethnographic ones, they were sudden and regime-changing 
impositions by the state to which the opposition had to respond. In this sense, 
temporality as the orienting theme of this dissertation emerged owing to the extensive 
and long-term ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted. In other words, I could look 
at grassroots actors’ encounters with the state from the perspective of temporality 
because ethnographic methods allowed me to observe temporal patterns and 
experiences much better than non-ethnographic methods. My own embeddedness 
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within both macro-political processes and the internal dynamics of the group I was 
studying led me to recognize temporality as an organizing factor in social movement 
politics.   
To a much lesser extent, but still worth mentioning, is this study as an 
ethnography of “the lived experience of the political”. Baiocchi and Connor define 
this type as studies about “other kinds of events, institutions, or actors altogether, that 
while invisible from non-ethnographic vantage points, are of consequence to politics 
in some way (e.g., apathy, or nonparticipation in social movements)” (p. 140). This 
study, with its focus on temporality as an explanatory factor in social movements – 
whether it be in the form of the lived experience of time, future imaginings, or 
narrative – is loosely connected to this type of political ethnography. I found that time 
– how it is experienced, used, and narrated – is consequential for politics through the 
way they enable or constrain activists. Although not directly a politicized topic, 
temporality helped me to explain the different stages that I observed in the field.  
 
Data and theory 
 
There are two main approaches to sociological ethnography that draw from 
competing epistemologies: grounded theory and the extended case method (Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2009). Each has its own take on the relationship between data and 
theory. On the one hand, grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) encourages 
theorization “from the ground up” through systematic coding, analysis, 
conceptualization and constant comparisons with similar research areas. It requires 
micro-level, close-up data to generate empirically grounded theoretical claims. The 
boundaries of a case, and therefore the narrative of the research, originate in the field 
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and its members, as they experience and shape their social world. On the other hand, 
the extended case method (Burawoy, 1998) prioritizes theory reconstruction, 
increasing the empirical content of a (usually grand) theory. Leaving the core 
postulates of their “favourite theory” intact, the researcher looks for “anomalies” and 
“extends” an already existing theory to accommodate such differences. As Burawoy 
himself puts it: “We begin with our favourite theory but seek not confirmations but 
refutations that inspire us to deepen that theory. Instead of discovering grounded 
theory we elaborate existing theory” (1998, p. 16). In the extended case method, “these 
theories provide the boundaries and structural plot of the narrative” (Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2009, p. 255).  
Building on the above, I used both grounded theory and the extended case 
method. While I went into the field with particular research interests in mind, I did not 
have a “favourite theory” that I wanted to reconstruct by “extending” my case. Still, I 
was interested in grassroots politics at a time of political turmoil, and my previous 
degree was on social movements, so I tended to think more in terms of social 
movement theory. I did not, however, go into the field with the goal of reconstructing 
the political process model or resource mobilization, for example. In terms of setting 
the boundaries of the case, I let the fieldwork itself direct me, but I did not exclusively 
and not always primarily rely on “ethno-narratives” (Tavory & Timmermans, 2009), 
or the narratives people in the field constructed about themselves. In terms of 
theorization, the themes in this dissertation are empirically “grounded” and emerge 
out of the data, but they are not confined to how people in my field site theorized the 
social and political world. Much like the activists I worked with, I am interested in the 
larger social forces that shape the situations in which we are embedded, as the 
extended case logic propounds.  
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In order to make sense of this combination, I turn to Lichterman (2002) once 
more. Building on Burawoy’s extended case method but also drawing on Glaser and 
Strauss (2012 [1967]) for some “analytical techniques” that “can assist a project that 
follows extended case logic” (ibid., p. 120), Lichterman makes a distinction between 
field-driven and theory-driven participant-observation. In the former mode, “[a] given 
subject matter ‘in the field’ directs the goals of the research […] A ‘theory-driven’ 
project, in contrast, aims to address a theory, rather than to elucidate a substantive 
topic or field site with perhaps several theories” (p. 122). In this sense, mine is a 
theory-driven project in which the “researcher ‘extends’ his [sic] view of a case by 
theorizing it as a very specific instance of social and cultural structures or institutional 
forces at work. Participant-observers make these analytic moves into the macro by 
building on pre-existing theory.” (p. 122-123). Just like grounded theory, this type of 
ethnography looks at the “how”, but for the purpose of understanding how larger 
forces and structures shape action in the particular context in which it happens, as it 
happens. Temporality for me is the “analytic move” into the macro from the micro 
that explains the “how” and “why” of the processes I observed.  
The extended case method focuses on anomalies for theory reconstruction. I 
do not reconstruct social movement theory based on the observation of an “anomaly” 
in my field site defined as a divergence from existing theory. I was more prompted by 
an “unbearable silence” (Lichterman, 2002, p. 143, note 8) in the theory. That is, I 
experienced and observed others experience or talk about the impact of time on action 
in the field. Even though what activists did and talked about constantly was related to 
some element of temporality, this was a theme that was missing from the theory, or at 
best was left under-theorized. My attempt at theoretical innovation is thus driven by 
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an obvious observation that I think needs to be incorporated into our understanding of 
activism.17 
Both grounded theory and the extended case method emphasize going back 
and forth between theory and data, expectations and observations, or the researcher’s 
concepts and the concepts readily found in the field. As is encouraged by grounded 
theory, I used my field notes to notice “problems” in the field, things I was surprised 
about, or instances that made me uncomfortable. I used these to form new questions 
and expectations, with a view to search for an answer the next day, the next session, 
or in the next period. Concepts, themes, and topics emerged out of this day-to-day 
back-and-forth between theory and data.  
Theory-driven participant-observation not only helped me to extend my micro 
case into the macro, but it also allowed me to have a critical lens while at the same 
time writing from the standpoint of the activists that I was studying. Rather than pure 
description and an unquestioning reproduction of what I heard and saw in my field 
site, or of what people told me, theory-driven participant observation enabled me to 
contribute my own analysis and theorization into both the activism that I was engaged 
in, and the theory that I was interested in expanding.18 
 
17 In this dissertation, I remain at the level of theorizing the social and political processes that I observe, 
and only suggest implications for broader social forces and regimes of power in the conclusion.  
18 Uncritical engagement, whether it arises out of pure “objective” observation or of an embeddedness 
in the movement that one studies, risks blind glorification of the movement. In the case of Gezi, for 
example, some well-meaning scholars’ uncritical engagement led to celebratory accounts of the Gezi 
protests and their organization. These accounts were informed by the participants’ sense of 
empowerment and the enthusiasm that came from participation in mass protests. Celebratory stories of 
horizontalism in scholarship were bounced back to the participants in return, with a focus on the forms 
of protest and organization rather than the goals. Defining the protests in terms of its form and not 
content led to the reproduction of the horizontalist rhetoric, which proved unsustainable for groups 
aiming for national-level change, and possibly affected the outcomes. Surely, the fascination by 
horizontalism and related phenomena like leaderlessness, anti-institutionalism, etc. cannot be attributed 
solely to activist-scholars’ work. The point here is that although being an embedded researcher gives 
us a sense of “giving back”, reciprocity, or being an “organic intellectual”, it is important to caution 
against uncritical engagement and celebratory accounts as they might do more harm than good in the 
long term. Not only activist scholarship, but “militant ethnography” (Juris 2007) also runs this risk.  
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Interviews 
 
I use interviews in conjunction with ethnographic observations. I conducted 46 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with activists both within and outside of the local 
assemblies. These interviews serve to test my observations, fill in the gaps in my data, 
and to enlarge the immediate circle of the assemblies. The majority of my interviewees 
are participants of the specific local assembly that is my field site, even though their 
level and time of participation differ. Most of these are core organizers or regular 
participants of the assembly, although participants of other assemblies in different 
neighbourhoods are also included in my sample through their interactions with my 
field site. Other interviewees include members or leaders of organizations that have 
campaigned for the referendum without being involved in the assemblies. I also spoke 
with two HDP and CHP former and to-be MPs. As a result of their greater level of 
engagement with the assemblies, members, supporters, or local representatives of the 
HDP are represented more than CHP supporters and members. As leaders, 
representatives, or influential figures within groups are already more vocal and visible 
in the field, I prioritized interviewing less vocal and less visibly influential 
participants. I also tried to keep a balanced gender representation, even though I did 
not ask my interviewees for their gender identity, as it is irrelevant for the research.  
I conducted half of the interviews in the second phase of my fieldwork, most 
of which were done after the referendum in April 2017. The other half was done in the 
third phase, before and after the elections in June 2018. My rationale was to trace the 
changes that these events might have caused. The second round of interviews had a 
slightly different focus, or rather, my questions were more focused and tailored 
 78 
 
according to my respective chapter themes than in the first round. After the first 
interviews and the initial analysis, I revised my questions so that they were more apt 
to answer the themes that emerged from the first round of data collection and the new 
orientation of the dissertation around temporality.  
Most of the interviews were between an hour and a half and two hours long, 
although my first one lasted more than five hours, and I had one interview that was a 
bit longer than 30 minutes. I conducted the majority of interviews at cafes and bars 
that activists regularly frequented in the neighbourhood, and I met a few interviewees 
in their homes. I either knew my interviewees or was referred to them through personal 
connections, so gaining access and trust was relatively easy. Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. Before I started recording, I informed my interviewees of the topic of 
my research and the kinds of questions that I would ask and asked for their verbal 
consent. In a high-risk political environment, I chose verbal consent over a written or 
recorded one, as documenting the participants’ consent would be to risk exposing them 
to legal troubles in case they were confiscated from me (more on this in the risks and 
ethics section). It would also make the interviewees uncomfortable because a more 
formal consent would entail a more formal interview setting and also seem overly 
litigious in this context. Even though nearly all of my interviewees (except for two 
CHP members) told me that they would not mind their name appearing in this work, I 
anonymized all names, locations, and organizations throughout the dissertation.  
I asked non-directive questions to make room for my interviewees to express 
themselves in their own terms (Weiss, 1995). I approached the interviews as a “guided 
conversation” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995) where I tried to make the interview setting 
a familiar one – a conversation or a discussion – in which I as the researcher was an 
attentive listener that guided the conversation through prompts, follow-up questions, 
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and probes. I typically started the interview by asking broad questions about the 
interviewee’s political biography; continued by asking about the reasons for their 
participation in the assemblies (or other structures if they were not involved in the 
assemblies) and their role in them; went on to ask about their interpretations and 
predictions about past or coming events (e.g., past involvement in different 
organizations or movements, the 2017 referendum, the 2018 elections); and ended by 
asking if there were any topics that they would like to talk about that we have not 
covered. Throughout the interview, I asked clarification questions, more specific 
questions about particular events, discussions, or clashes that I witnessed, and follow-
up questions based on the significance the interviewee accorded to certain subjects or 
happenings. Therefore, my interviews have an analytically fruitful degree of 
digressions, misunderstandings, and everyday conversations, as well as my efforts at 
deconstructing the taken-for-granted assumptions of my interviewees (e.g. variations 
of sentences that start with an off-handed “you know”, that assumed that I had 
witnessed an occurrence, and experienced and/or interpreted it the same way as they 
did).  
 
 
Part Two 
 
The first phase of the fieldwork (July 2016 – January 2017) 
 
The first four to five months of my fieldwork were highly exploratory as a 
result of the dramatic political events that significantly changed the course of my 
research. I spent most of this period trying to understand how different social 
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movement organizations or activist groups reacted to the state of emergency that 
followed from the failed military coup attempt in July 2016. During this phase, I was 
trying to make sense of the grassroots political scene, find a field site that was both 
politically significant and responsive to my newly emerging research interests, and 
gain access to a diverse range of groups.  
I went to Istanbul in June 2016 to conduct ethnographic fieldwork at an 
LGBTQ+ organization with the aim of studying the relationship between movements 
and parties from a relational (Emirbayer, 1997) perspective. I had three interrelated 
questions: how do ideas and practices travel across networks of political action? How 
– if at all – do some networks congeal into discernible institutional forms? And how 
do these networks change or stagnate as an effect of their interactions? I was interested 
in the field of political action; the object of my analysis was relations; and I wanted to 
question the boundaries between social movements and political parties as they were 
drawn in the literature. In choosing my field site, I prioritized those spaces in which 
multiple networks came together to construct “empirically observable boundaries in 
interaction”, as I phrased it in my SO500 submission at the end of the first year of my 
PhD studies. I wanted to observe different politics coming together in one space, where 
people’s multiple social and political identities clashed, merged, or interacted in some 
other way. Grassroots mobilization in Istanbul at the time was suspended, so to speak, 
as it had only been a little more than six months since the two general elections of 
2015. Given these considerations, I had chosen an LGBTQ+ organization as a primer.  
However, none of the above was actually carried out as only a short time after 
my arrival in Istanbul, in 15 July 2016, there was a military coup attempt. It was one 
of a series of unforgettable life events that also changed the course of this research. 
The path it paved in the social and political life in Turkey marked every stage of my 
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field work, analysis, and thesis. While the coup attempt had a decisive impact on my 
research, it did not completely overturn my research interests; I still wanted to study 
grassroots activism, but my initial research questions seemed far less significant now, 
and maybe even irrelevant, at least to me. I was unclear about my research questions 
because I was also unclear about the political situation. What was going on in the 
army? What was happening between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and 
the Gulen Movement, who were long-time shareholders of the state? How would the 
Gulenists react? What would happen to the Gulenists within the AKP? What would 
the other political parties do? These and many more questions were up in the air, but 
there were even more basic questions: What happened? Who did it? What would 
happen now? 
The answer came without further ado, on 20 July 2016, with the declaration of 
a three-month long state of emergency, which was reissued seven times in the two 
years following its first announcement. It was lifted anticlimactically on 18 July 2018, 
after two elections carried out under undemocratic circumstances. As I have included 
more information on this period in the Introduction, I will only reiterate here that the 
crackdown on the opposition intensified with emergency rule.  
These developments threw my neatly planned research design out the window 
and I had to start exploring anew. I was curious about how the opposition evaluated 
the situation after the declaration of the state of emergency and which course of action 
they were planning to follow. I attended everything I could find – panels, meetings, 
conferences, forums, closed group meetings, neighborhood gatherings – that were 
organized by a variety of organizations ranging from feminist organizations to peace 
activists, from environmentalists to neighborhood associations. I also had my eye on 
another political platform, “Unity”, that was newly founded in mid-2016, led by two 
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former CHP MPs as an autonomous political platform (a “democracy platform” as 
they called themselves), which called for the unification of all democratic forces 
against war, autocracy, and lawlessness. It aimed at creating a ground for struggle and 
focused on topics such as equal citizenship, humane working and living conditions, a 
renewed understanding of secularism/laicism which includes the freedom of religion 
and conscience, to name a few. It was an elite organization bringing together 
intellectuals, politicians, celebrities, and the like. Accordingly, its preferred instrument 
of collective action was press conferences. It had generated excitement within the 
opposition with its opening proclamation and was welcomed as a potentially effective 
new political force. Moreover, its connection to the CHP and the HDP, the two 
opposition parties in the parliament, together with leftist political parties and 
organizations suggested it was the ground on which the cooperation and conflict I 
needed to observe were taking place. The coordination meetings which were attended 
by high level executives and independent activists could give me clues as to how “high 
politics” was conducted. I thought Unity could become the site through which I could 
connect the micro-politics of the grassroots with macro-politics of political parties, 
and the site in which I could observe grassroots activism connect to or disconnect from 
elite politics. 
In Unity, political parties (CHP and HDP, but also smaller leftist parties from 
within the HDP and other Marxist-Leninist parties), non-governmental organizations, 
social movement organizations, and important political figures from the left were 
involved. The platform had declared that they were constituted of more than 100 
organizations, including the HDP and the CHP. Seeing these two parties together was 
highly unusual in Turkey, so I thought the platform would be both politically 
significant and methodologically interesting to study. Since they claimed to have a 
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non-hierarchical structure open to everyone, I tried to gain access to them the way I 
gained access to all the others: It was usually as simple as signing up to the listserv or 
following their social media accounts, and then showing up at their meetings or other 
events. If that did not work, I would ask around and find someone who was involved 
to tag along with them. However, I could not get access to this platform, either because 
they did not hold public meetings, or I did not hear about them, except for their press 
conferences.   
 At the same time, I was involved in a small group that later became pivotal in 
my search for a field site. “Solidarity” was a group that was established in November 
2016 after HDP co-leaders Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag were arrested. 
The idea was to gather those involved in the previous independent election initiative 
for the parliamentary elections of 7 June 2015, to think of possible actions to take in 
protest against the arrests, as their election campaign was for the HDP less than one 
and a half years ago. By December 2017, this group had already taken the initiative to 
design a pamphlet against the extension of the state of emergency, in a form that was 
particularly suited to be distributed into people’s mailboxes.19 They had been inspired 
by Unity’s campaign for the same cause in which facts about the costs of the state of 
emergency were listed. Solidarity used these and added more facts to their creatively 
designed pamphlet. This was both creative and effective; anyone who found the 
pamphlet in the mail would read it. Solidarity had re-activated their ties in other cities 
– ties they had from the 2015 election campaign – to spread the flyer. With the 
declaration of the referendum in January 2017, they added a “no” stamp to the 
pamphlet, which became one of the very first materials to be distributed by the 
 
19 For purposes of anonymisation, I cannot disclose the exact shape and content of this campaign 
material.  
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assemblies. I will come back to this point in more detail when I reflect about the second 
phase of fieldwork.  
From the end of July 2016 to the end of that year, I went from one group to the 
other, trying to figure out what each did, their interpretations of what was going on, 
their plans for how to resist. I was trying to choose a field site where I could observe 
the effects of regime change on grassroots politics. All these groups I was plugging in 
to surely went through some changes, but they mostly stuck with their earlier agenda, 
tactics, and organization. For example, the environmentalists, who were a remnant of 
the Gezi protests, kept working on their campaign against the third bridge, without 
making any changes to their tactics or organizational structure. Feminists 
acknowledged that women and minorities would be hit the hardest, and there was 
increasing anxiety around the laws by decree20, but they, too did not go through an 
immediately observable transformation. The attempts at building neighborhood 
networks were covertly an attempt at bringing the dissipated local initiatives back 
together, and overtly a preparation for the Big Istanbul Earthquake, the nightmare of 
all Istanbulites. However, these initiatives were too local, too small, and too unreliable 
and volatile to make a case or be a site. I wanted a site where I could observe the 
effects of the new regime, as well as something that could be permanent, that took on 
the new challenge, that engaged with politics at the national level, that could have an 
effect, and that brought diverse actors together. I was not observing significant 
changes in these organizations at the time. This does not mean that there have been no 
effects and no changes; they should be studied. I, however, was impatient (read: I had 
 
20 Feminist groups are probably the ones that have the most academics in them, and the clampdown on 
academia in general and the Academics for Peace in particular was especially relevant in these 
organizations/groups.  
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no time) and I still had not found the kind of site that would answer my questions until 
December 2016 and January 2017. 
 
The second phase of the field work (January 2017 – September 2017) 
 
The second phase, which I roughly delineate from January 2017 when the referendum 
was announced to September 2017 when I returned to London, is the one where I 
gained access to Unity, during which the local “no” assemblies were formed, and when 
I decided that my field site would be the local assemblies instead of Unity. The period 
covers the referendum campaign and its aftermath. In this phase, I found my field site 
and more importantly, I became immersed in it as an activist and as a researcher. I also 
conducted my first round of interviews during this time. 
This phase starts on a candle-lit, snowy night in January 2017, after the 
parliament voted for the 18 constitutional changes to be made, which brought about 
the constitutional referendum of 16 April 2017. It was the first public meeting21 of 
what would later be called the local “no” assemblies. I was invited to the meeting 
through my connections with Solidarity. There were about 30 people in the room with 
long windows with a view of the sea, and no electricity because of the snow, hence 
the candles. The meeting was organized by a well-connected local organizer, 24 years 
of age, who was involved in Unity and who also had contacts with other local 
organizers, political parties, and organizations. When the constitutional referendum 
passed from the parliament, the need for a grassroots campaign was obvious to 
everyone.  
 
21 In my later conversations and interviews, I learned that this meeting was not the first time that the 
idea of creating local structures to campaign for the “no” vote in the referendum was discussed. It was 
the first narrowly public meeting – narrow because activists and organizers were invited; there had been 
no call for the wider public. 
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The meeting was constituted of various political parties, organizations, and 
individuals, as well as different grassroots groups, like the environmentalists, 
Solidarity, or the local women’s groups. I was, for the most part, lost in that meeting 
because I did not know most of the participants, and could not make sense of where 
they were coming from only from the few sentences they had the chance to utter; there 
was also confusion among the participants as to the institutional character of the 
meeting. The general understanding, as far as I could gather from the questions and 
conversations before, during, and after the meeting, was that Unity had made the call. 
In reality, as I would later find out, it became clear that it was only loosely Unity’s 
idea to call for this particular meeting, and more the initiative of the young organizer. 
The meeting was relatively well attended because of the extra-partisan nature of the 
referendum and because the idea to put together a campaign was already brewing 
among disparate actors. Therefore, it was not surprising that at the end of the meeting, 
it was agreed that a non-partisan, bottom-up, localized referendum campaign that 
would speak to a wide voter base should be convened. This was the beginning of my 
field work, as what would soon become my field site partly emerged out of this 
meeting, even though I did not know it then. I met with the organizer who was from 
Unity and gained access to it, thinking I would be studying them. I also followed the 
formation of the local “no” assemblies but was not involved in the initial backstage 
proceedings. 
 I started going to Unity’s coordination meetings, as it was difficult to come by 
a general assembly meeting open to the public. At this stage, the bill that was designed 
by Solidarity had attracted Unity’s attention and travelled there through personal 
connections of those within Unity22. In February 2017 the local “no” assemblies were 
 
22 These were former partisan or organizational ties, and local organizers’ personal connections to 
different groups and other organizers.  
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instigated with a general forum attended by some 600 people. Within the initial 
organizers, who helped materialize the idea of a grassroots “no” campaign in the form 
of local assemblies, were a few participants of Solidarity. At first, I expected 
Solidarity, the local “no” assemblies, and Unity to work in tandem with one another, 
each fulfilling a different function. Solidarity would be the creative leg of the 
campaign, designing and producing campaign materials; the assemblies would be the 
main vessels through which the campaign would be carried out, and they would be 
autonomous local bodies where local decisions were made and the campaign tailored 
according to each city, district, or neighborhood; and lastly, Unity would serve as the 
coordinating body, “the scaffolding” around the local assemblies as a member put it, 
that would publicize, financially support, and nationally spread the assemblies. 
However, participants of Solidarity decided to work within the local assemblies 
instead of with them or separately from them, seeing the assemblies as much more 
influential than their own group. In the meanwhile, the assemblies started fast, grew 
big, and spread in Istanbul quickly – within a few weeks. Unity started talking about 
its relationship to the assemblies, whether they should be called “assemblies” in the 
first place23, what their respective roles would be, whether they should remove Unity’s 
logo from the flyers that they wanted the assemblies to distribute, as they had more 
“human resources” and better reach to the “street”.  Slowly, but retrospectively surely, 
a hostile relationship developed between Unity and the assemblies. Even though I was 
very much interested in this hostility, I was more and more drifting towards the local 
“no” assemblies as my field site.  
 The reason why I was drifting towards the assemblies was because the 
assembly that I was following, when compared to Unity, was much more advanced in 
 
23 A completely irrelevant discussion as it had been already decided by local participants that they would 
be called “assemblies” and not something else.  
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its discussions, starting from February 2017 when it was first established. Assembly 
participants were self-reflexive, critical, forward-looking, and much more flexible in 
their discussions; whereas Unity avoided all conflict and only focused on tasks like 
organizing a press conference, calling the media, putting together the press release, 
and so on. They also relied heavily on a senior, renowned member’s writings, waiting 
for him to write important documents that sketched out the groups’ strategy and 
rhetoric. The assembly was action-oriented, without shying away from discussion and 
conflict; Unity was talk-oriented, and evaded debates to the point where they could 
not discuss crucial topics like the structure of the organization, the content of the 
campaign, or what they would do after the referendum.24 The assemblies not only did 
more and talked more, but they were also closer to what I wanted to study in the sense 
that they had succeeded in drawing the attention of and recruiting the non-affiliated, 
non-organized, local people. Taken together, assemblies were sites of 
hyperprojectivity “in which the explicit purpose of talk is to locate problems, visualise 
alternative pathways, and consider their consequences and desirability” (Mische, 
2014, p. 447). 
From then on, my relationship with other groups were defined by this primary 
affiliation to the assemblies. I still went to Unity, but as a participant from the local 
assembly; I went to the CHP’s meeting with non-governmental organizations to ask 
for support with printing and complain about the municipality; I talked at press 
conferences as an assembly participant; I went to the Istanbul coordination meetings 
 
24 For example, the internal structure of the coordination group was on their agenda for more than six 
months, until I left the field. The content of the campaign was left to a “working group” headed by an 
advertisement agent which was pretty much unchecked by the rest of the coordination, let alone the 
larger general assembly that was supposed to be the main decision-making body of Unity. In terms of 
planning, they were so focused on the immediate logistics of press conferences that they were left with 
tens of thousands of flyers with their logo on them one week before the elections, because they had not 
planned for their distribution.  
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of the assemblies as a participant from a specific local assembly. The intensity of my 
involvement in these sites varied considerably depending on the structure of the 
organization, the type of politics they pursued, and the type of social capital that 
counted as reputable. For instance, I was mostly an observer at the meetings and press 
conferences that I attended at Unity while in the local “no” assembly I had more 
opportunities to participate. I was, indeed, one of the organizers of the assembly: I 
attended meetings and commemorations, participated in the decision-making 
processes, handed out campaign flyers, helped organize events and protests, was a note 
taker and a moderator, and so on. It also helped that I was living in the same 
neighborhood as most other participants, and I had the same everyday world as 
everyone else: I followed the writers and media they followed; I watched their online 
programs and read the interviews they conducted; I went to the bars and cafes they 
went to, and shopped at the local shops they shopped at. Meanings between the lines 
and the underlying patterns of communication would not be accessible to me had it 
not been for this involvement. By means of this social network, I was able to reach a 
wider range of organizations and activists than my immediate field site, allowing me 
to secure interviews with activists from outside of the limits of the assemblies.  
After an intense campaign and the few weeks right after the referendum in 
April 2017, the assemblies started to have discussions about the new role of the 
assemblies and their possible institutionalization through Unity. I sped up my 
interviews after the wave of protests rejecting the referendum results subsided, while 
still being actively involved in the meetings and actions of the assembly.  
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The third phase of the field work (December 2017 & January 2018; May 2018 
– September 2018) 
 
For a month from December 2017 to January 2018 and then for about four months 
around the time of the elections that took place in June 2018, I visited Istanbul for a 
second round of interviews. Although I had no intention of carrying out fieldwork as 
extensive as I had before, I was curious about the state of the assemblies in January 
and wanted to witness the political atmosphere of the elections first-hand in the 
summer. So, in the third phase, I experienced the dissolution of the local assembly that 
I studied, I observed the 2018 elections, and conducted more interviews.  
When I visited Istanbul for a month in the winter, the assembly had been going 
through a rough time. The “assembly” had downsized to the coordination group only, 
and there was a deadlock about the path that the assemblies would take after the 
referendum in April 2017. I never lost contact with the assemblies: I was still part of 
the WhatsApp group and their email list, but I was also personally in contact with 
several participants. I had an idea of the general developments within the assembly, 
but I was still curious and wanted to see for myself. The first day I arrived in Istanbul, 
I went to the coordination meeting, interested to see what they were up to and excited 
to see my friends. I was a bit late, so the meeting had already started when I got there. 
I was hoping to sneak in from the second door in the back and find a free chair without 
disturbing the meeting, but I was seen. A few people immediately called my name, 
welcoming me, telling me how glad they were to see me. They stood up to take a 
cigarette break with me in the small kitchen opposite the meeting room. The person 
who was speaking had to stop and greet me.  
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As happy as I was with the reaction, I could see how it was also caused by the 
heaviness of the conversations, the seeming impossibility of resolving the deadlock, 
and the way in which the conversations were being carried out (see Chapter 4)25. The 
room was full, with about 30 people around a rectangular table, and with lots of new 
faces that I did not know from before. This was unexpected and a positive 
development; although they had been discussing the same thing – whether to campaign 
for a possible early election or the elections of 2019, or to campaign against the state 
of emergency – for months by then, I did not know the severity of the situation. Soon, 
I was invited to a splinter meeting, from which the “election assemblies” emerged, and 
different groups started doing different campaigns around the elections. I went to these 
meetings too, as much as I could in a month, to grasp the groups and their trajectories 
more clearly. My second empirical chapter is based on the data from observations 
made during this period.  
When I was back in Istanbul in the summer of 2018 to observe the elections, 
the local assembly that I studied had disintegrated, and the variety of organizations 
that emerged out of it, or like it, were more aligned with certain political organizations 
or parties than with the “grassroots” per se. I attended their meetings and conducted 
interviews with participants who had also been at the local assemblies, but I did not 
actively participate in their campaigns. My participation during this period was limited 
to making observations and discovering the new scenery, while at the same time 
carrying out my interviews. The particularities of this phase are reflected in the way I 
use the data in the relevant chapters, which I will turn to in the section below. 
 
 
25 I was surprised at how tense and even insulting the way talk was delivered in this meeting. For 
example, people from one organization were making faces or hand gestures to each other that implied 
disapproval of a speaker, and I witnessed verbal attacks questioning how revolutionary the speaker was, 
which were highly unusual for the assembly.  
 92 
 
Writing-up 
 
In the first empirical chapter that I wrote, in which I discuss the changing 
organizational structures of local organizing towards a critical engagement with the 
organizational and ideational legacies of the 2013 Gezi protests, I repeatedly found 
myself emphasizing past experiences as well as expectations about the future. 
Activists talked about the lessons learned from Gezi, but these lessons were drawn in 
accordance with their expectations of what was going to happen. It was based on their 
interpretations of Gezi, of the 2015 elections, or the state of emergency and regime 
change in Turkey, but it was also based on an understanding of the necessary fit 
between the regime and the types of organizational structures that were and would be 
needed to face an authoritarian regime that was in the making.  
I decided to follow up on this realization about the central role of expectations 
in the next chapter and took on the challenge of writing about temporality and its 
effects on action. Looking at how the assembly disintegrated at a time when 
coordinated action was deemed absolutely essential, I found that future imaginings 
were a crucial element in not only decision-making and tactical choices, but also 
movement orientation and trajectories more generally. Activists thought of themselves 
and other actors around them – other activists, organizations, political parties, the state, 
etc. – in relation to each other and to possible changes in politics and the political 
situation. They constantly talked about how they imagined the political situation in the 
distant future, as well as what they expected to happen the next day, the next week, or 
in the next elections – whenever they might be. Additionally, all this was happening 
at a specific period that was extraordinarily eventful. The temporal aspects of regime 
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change and of activists’ temporal orientations were a significant and necessary 
contribution to make to social movement theory.  
The second empirical chapter that I wrote led me to reorient the dissertation 
around temporality26, and sensitized me to the temporal aspect of hope and defeat that 
I had experienced and observed in the third phase of my fieldwork around the 2018 
elections, which became my third empirical chapter. This thread of inquiry also made 
me tailor my questions in the second round of interviews.  
In the third empirical chapter, I use data from my observations at different 
meetings and everyday life but rely more on interviews. The ethnographic 
observations in this chapter mostly appear as auto-ethnographic experiences that 
sensitized me to certain patterns, when compared to the previous chapters. There is a 
practical and a methodological reason for this change: the practical reason is that the 
collapse of the local assembly meant that the “field” was much more dispersed, there 
were a number of newly established groups and assemblies that some of the former 
assembly participants joined, but some remained unaffiliated, scattered around the 
neighborhood or in between different groups. The methodological reason follows from 
the practical one, in that my observations grew more scattered within this more limited 
amount of time, and it was harder for me to rely on observations based on fewer 
observations made at each meeting. Therefore, allowing my observations to sensitize 
me to debates and emerging struggles, I chose to rely more on the interviews.  
 
26 Ironically, this meant that I needed more time to think through my topic and analysis and go back to 
the literature and the data; a normal process in research but a luxury that we do not have in academia 
today.  
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Part Three 
Temporalities of activism and research 
  
Participant observation is characterized by studying an ongoing process in its 
own time and place, as it develops. As such, it is a method that is inherently sensitive 
to the temporal dynamics of the phenomenon that is being researched. The 
ethnographer goes through the workings of a process as a participant while at the same 
time being exposed to the specific temporality of research, too. I consider this as 
another tension in the dual role of being a participant observer.  
I conducted field work during a period that was particularly eventful and 
uncertain. The future is always unknown, but it was the stakes that were involved in 
activists’ ability to change a dreaded future that made my research especially prone to 
experiences and observations perceptive of temporal dynamics. It was difficult to 
predict what lay in front of us. Therefore, ambiguity and tentative anticipation 
informed my study not only thematically but also methodologically. I paid attention 
to what people said before the event, for example, instead of relying only on 
retrospective accounts. By doing this, I attempted to replicate as closely as possible 
the original temporality that was experienced or imagined at the time. In the cases that 
I do use retrospective reflections, I therefore make it clear in the text. I wanted to 
replicate temporal processes in the analysis and in writing, by writing from the 
perspective of an activist from within the moment as events unfolded, in activists’ own 
time, without knowing how things would end. I tried to preserve the open-endedness 
of changing political situations in which we (activists and I) were embedded in the 
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themes and structure of the dissertation, and to reflect shifting temporal orientations 
in each substantive chapter.  
However, at certain moments, temporality as experience of time came into 
conflict with the temporality dictated by research. The week of the referendum in 
2017, a week spent organizing protests that declared the rigged results illegitimate, 
was one such moment. We had not planned for a week of protests, so we had a lot of 
preparing to do. Alliances were made; meetings were held; banners, leaflets, slogans, 
declarations, and social media materials were created; risks, goals, relations with the 
press and the police were discussed; protests were evaluated; self-critique was made… 
We slept very little and worked long hours. We had to consider waning participation 
over time, as well as the fact that immediacy (of the need for action) was of utmost 
importance if the protests were to have an effect on the government. Acting quickly 
was also key to sustaining the momentum; to not lose the numbers that showed up to 
the first night of protest. In the middle of all this, I was doing research.  
Taking notes takes time and writing up field notes takes even more time. My 
notes from that week are therefore all retrospectively written. I did not take notes 
during meetings as extensively as I usually did, for example, and I did not take time 
off from the work of organizing the protests to write field notes. The political moment 
was ephemeral, and I prioritized political action over research. In a way, the tension 
here was between the ethics of politics and the ethics of academic work. I was 
responsible to the people I worked with and being involved was also a political 
responsibility.27  
 
27 A similar type of clash of temporalities exists between the requirements of the academy and those of 
research. Academic production is expected to be fast – we have to publish; we have to be writing; we 
have to be “productive” – whereas research is a relatively slow process. We design projects, apply for 
grants, conduct research, analyse, write, present, publish. There is no time to make mistakes, to change 
our mind, to take a step back. Juggling these two (somewhat opposing) temporal demands seems to 
have been established as part of doing academic work. 
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Being an activist researcher  
 
 Activist scholarship, participatory action research, positionality, and 
reflexivity, and reciprocity are some of the keywords that circulate among scholars 
who are actively engaged in the spaces they study. These debates are simultaneously 
about epistemology, methodology, and ethics, and therefore impossible to cover in a 
section of a chapter on methodology. In this section, I have a much less ambitious 
goal: I will focus on some of the questions I have been asking myself throughout this 
research based on my position as both an activist and a researcher.  
 I will follow Colin Barker and Laurence Cox (2002) in starting with the 
observation that academic work is “parasitic”; we rely on the facts, knowledges, and 
histories that movements we study have produced. It is not uncommon to observe 
cases where movement scholars in the academic industry use the movements they 
study purely to further their own – academic – careers, but the parasitic relationship is 
not confined to such careerism. We produce concepts and theories tailored to fit in or 
expand the literatures that academia deems important (which might or might not be 
deemed important by activists). Given the pressure to publish and the demands of an 
industrialized academy, it is not always acknowledged that movement actors 
themselves theorize at every turn, and academic theorizing usually tends to lag behind. 
How, then, can we contribute not only to an academic literature but also to the 
movements that we study? In other words, how do we reciprocate?  
 I will leave aside simplistic solutions such as making donations or presenting 
one’s academic work to groups of activists. I find monetary contribution to not be 
worthy of the label “contribution”, especially because the movement that I study is by 
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nature against such transactional relationships, where even the “hierarchy of labour” 
is actively rejected. Presenting one’s academic work to an audience of movement 
actors might be a meaningful contribution, although emphasizing its contribution runs 
the very realistic risk of overemphasizing the value of the knowledge produced by the 
scholar while underemphasizing the fact that the knowledge has, in reality, been 
produced collectively, and hence already known by the audience. Moreover, the 
concepts and mechanisms that academics come up with to speak to an academic 
audience can make those processes less accessible instead of more conducive to a 
better understanding (I presume that we all read books and articles where a simple 
point is made in convoluted ways and in an obscure language that do not lead to a 
meaningful – academic or otherwise – contribution).  
 I am not in any way exempt from such a parasitic relationship. In fact, I have 
struggled with what I think of as a dual relationship; I was a PhD student studying 
activists, and I was also one of the activists that I studied. The difficulty for me comes 
from my largely cynical view on the value and uses of academic knowledge 
production; I do not believe that a public policy section at the end of the dissertation 
is of any importance, and I do not believe that I know more than the people I study. It 
is true that as academics, we have the time and resources to compile the knowledges 
produced by movements, historicize them, compare them to others in other places and 
times, but our knowledge is only partial, like activist knowledge, and can only be one 
among all the others. Nick Crossley (1999) refers to this as academicism, where 
academics have a certain “hexis”, or style of expressing themselves, that non-
academic activists find alienating (and even condescending, in my case). Indeed, the 
all-knowing scholar at meetings, or the academic who writes in a public journal about 
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a movement of which they witnessed a couple of meetings, induces antipathy in my 
field site.  
 As an activist, I try to avoid academicism. The practical antidote to the 
academicism that might arise from my dual position as an activist who is also a 
researcher has been, for me, to separate the two roles. Although other fellow activists 
knew that I was a researcher – and I always took extensive notes, it was hard to forget 
that I was doing research – I did not speak as a researcher in activist and social 
contexts. This was not to deny my privilege as a PhD student at LSE, who had “one 
foot abroad”, when most of the activists I worked with either had to or wanted to live 
in Turkey, regardless of the risks, dealing with repression and involved in everyday 
struggles, whereas I could leave and live abroad.28 I also do not deny that I was putting 
into practice what I had been learning in my academic studies alongside my 
experiences in activism. In this sense, the distinction between the two roles appears to 
be artificial, but it is useful where academic arrogance is a common trait among 
engaged scholars in these fields.29 
To clarify, I will go back to Colin Barker and Laurence Cox. Following 
Gramsci’s (1999, p. 131-162) “traditional” versus “organic” intellectuals, and 
Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) “established” versus “movement” intellectuals, Barker 
and Cox (2011 [2002]) introduce a distinction between “academic” and “movement” 
intellectuals.30 They argue that these two types of intellectuals theorize differently, 
 
28 This is a statement about class and privilege, although a native researcher’s relationship to their field 
is more complicated than just the ability to leave the country.  
29 Feminist scholarship and activism are a good example of the convergence of the two roles, and 
feminist theorists have a more developed and critical understanding of knowledge production than 
(most) social movement scholars. Even there, these are questions that have not been solved; I have in 
mind trans exclusionary radical feminism, the intervention of queer theory, or the interventions of trans 
activism, for example, and how activism and scholarship feed into each other, through mutual learning 
but also through conflict.  
30 I will not go into this discussion to avoid digression, but the category of “intellectual” should also be 
questioned.  
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from different perspectives, and for different goals. For example, while academic 
intellectuals engage in contemplative theorizing, activist theorizing involves making 
practical proposals (p. 2-3). Movement intellectuals therefore do not only observe a 
movement but offer practical solutions as well as justifications for the movement (p. 
4). They carry out intellectual, and at times directive, activities on behalf of 
subordinate classes and groups (p. 5). And lastly, the “role of ‘movement intellectual’ 
has to be won and won again as a much more uncertain qualification. For the settings 
in which movements act and argue and the strategic and tactical problems movements 
they [sic] face, and in which movement intellectuals make their contributions, are such 
as to demand constant rethinking and innovation” (p. 5). I would also add time, 
commitment, generative insights, diligence, and inter-personal relationships, among 
other factors, to the requirements of the role of the movement intellectual. 
Furthermore, as Barker and Cox (2002) also acknowledge, the directive role of these 
intellectuals (or in Gramscian terms, their “intellectual function”) are usually 
undertaken not by individuals but by groups within movements, or cadres. Some of 
the backstage intellectual activity goes unrecognized as intellectual activity per se (p. 
5).  
One of the key underlying points in their article is that activist groups work 
with different sets of credentials, status symbols, and value systems than the academic 
field. In my experience, mixing the two – so, thinking that one’s credentials as an 
academic will suffice to be taken seriously by or be useful for activists – can very 
quickly lead to academicism as discussed above. This is partly what I mean by 
separating the two roles. I worked with activists as an activist, learning and helping to 
create a specific way of speaking and relating to one another, contributing to decision-
making processes when I could, organizing protests, going leafletting, colouring 
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banners, negotiating for funds from institutional bodies, and so on. I was involved both 
in the “back office” and in “front-line” work (Smeltzer, 2012). In other words, I did 
not confine myself to the purely academic role of “knowledge production” within or 
for the movement. I was, however, involved in strategizing groups at certain points 
during my field work, as someone who was trusted within activist circles.31 In this 
sense, I was using the skills of my academic discipline to further the group’s 
immediate and long-term goals. My practical propositions and directive role were 
channelled into these debates, in practice, and as part of a group of activists.  
In terms of theorizing, this thesis is more “contemplative” than “activist”, in 
Barker and Cox’s terms, aiming to understand a process and contribute to an existing 
body of academic literature. Temporality was not a topic that was problematized in 
my field site, that is to say, it was not worded as such. However, it was and is, as I 
argue in the dissertation, an important part of the processes that I study and that 
activists problematize: how to organize spaces of contention, how to strategize and 
make decisions, how to sustain resistance. While my thesis does not offer any concrete 
solutions to specific problems, I do, however, think of this work as part of the self-
reflection and self-critique that activists carry out after intense periods, and wish to 
contribute to ongoing discussions on defeat, organizing, and resilience, among others.  
As can be deduced from the discussion above, I have not found a definitive 
way to resolve the tensions arising from my dual role as activist and researcher. Still, 
I believe immersing myself fully in the struggle that I studied was a crucial ethical 
choice in this particular case, both politically and in terms of research ethics. Having 
 
31 I had already been involved in previous struggles and was relatively well-connected when I started 
my field work, although not everyone trusted me as an activist from the beginning. In fact, researchers 
are notorious for their exploitative and misrepresentative or overly simplifying tendencies in my field 
site. My being involved in almost every stage of organizing from no-risk to more risky situations, my 
long-term commitment, and personal ties helped me build trust.  
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said this, I agree with Gillan and Pickerill (2012, p. 135-139) when they argue that 
immediate reciprocity (being embedded in the movements we study and doing the 
work of activism) is not necessarily more ethical than general reciprocity in the form 
of a contribution to knowledge developed in and for the academy. It does not exempt 
me from the responsibilities I have as a researcher either. These questions are not to 
be resolved. Instead, they require persistent reflexivity.  
 
 
Risks and ethics 
 
 I have already started discussing ethical issues in Part three, but a methodology 
chapter calls for a more conventional section on risks and ethics as well. In the 
following section, I will therefore turn more deliberately towards a discussion of the 
risks and ethical concerns my study entails.  
 Most notably, the topic of this dissertation is a risky one by nature: the people 
I study are actively opposed to the current government and the regime. Moreover, 
there was a state of emergency throughout the period I am looking at. Around a dozen 
people I personally knew were arrested and imprisoned during my field work, several 
of whom I interviewed either before they were detained or after they were released. 
Protestors being taken into custody was common, and more often than not, after a 
week in jail, they would be arrested and imprisoned without trial for months. Police 
raids to political parties’ offices and members’ homes were also common during this 
period and are ongoing at the time of writing. Right after the 2017 referendum, more 
than ten local assembly participants were taken into custody at a protest in support of 
Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça, an academic and a teacher who were on hunger 
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strike protesting the laws by decree that purged thousands of people from their jobs 
after the military coup attempt. At around the same time, activists’ homes were being 
surveilled by the police, including mine, so we had to live in other places to avoid 
getting arrested in case of a raid. Notes from a local assembly meeting were quoted at 
length in an indictment charging human rights activists for aiding terrorist 
organizations. In sum, the people I studied were at risk.  
I study activists, who, by definition, have consented to the risks involved in 
doing activism in an authoritarian regime. The design of this research project did not 
expose activists to more risks than they had already consented to. However, the 
information I was gathering was highly sensitive. As a precaution, I anonymised all 
names, locations, and organizations to protect participants’ identities, to avoid this 
thesis from being misused by the government in case it gets fully or partially 
published. I was careful to not disclose any information that was confidential to a 
group, so that I would not carry confidential information from one group to another. I 
stored all digital data on the LSE’s server and not on my personal laptop. I never kept 
more than one interview on my recording device and uploaded them onto my LSE 
account as soon as possible before deleting the copy from my device. I kept my 
handwritten notes in different and safe places to avoid confiscation in case of a house 
raid.   
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I laid out the methodological approaches that are constitutive 
of this dissertation, including detailed information on my field site and the data 
collection process. In the first part of the chapter, I presented my approach to political 
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ethnography as theory-driven participant observation, following Paul Lichterman 
(2002). I then discussed how the data that I gathered inform my theoretical 
contributions, and how my theoretical interests inform the way I use the data. In the 
second part, I went into a detailed account of how I chose my field site, the difficulties 
I encountered, and how the whole research process – from the necessity to rethink my 
research questions to choosing an appropriate field site, to ethical considerations – was 
affected by major political events as well as the internal dynamics of the groups 
involved. In part three, I turned to issues of risks and ethics along with the details of 
my positionality as an activist-researcher in a high-risk political environment with 
access to sensitive information.  
 Now, I will turn to my research findings, starting with the first substantive 
chapter entitled “Re-reading the Past, Engaging the Future: The Local Assembly”. I 
will explicate the changes that grassroots organizations and their organizers have gone 
through since the Gezi protests, the type of politics that the local assembly embodied, 
its organizational structure and activities. I will focus on the role of organizers’ 
accumulated experiences in shaping the assembly and how activists’ reading of the 
past and the future influenced their politics.   
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Chapter 3 
Re-reading the Past, Engaging the 
Future: The Local Assembly 
 
 
 Previous episodes of contention were organized in a variety of different ways, 
but none had taken the form of local assemblies. This chapter aims to answer the 
question of why the “no” campaign took the organizational form that it did at this 
specific moment in time. 
Tracing the transformation of grassroots organizational forms back to the Gezi protests 
of 2013, I will identify the continuities and changes that grassroots organizations went 
through between 2013 and 2017, when the local “no” assemblies were first 
established. I will then discuss how activists re-read the Gezi protests in light of the 
current political environment and adapted the way they did politics. I will argue that 
regime change led activists to combine rapid political learning through accumulated 
experiences with their expectation of increasing repression, which resulted in the 
specific form and structure of this local “no” assembly. In addition to the assembly’s 
organizational structure, this chapter will also detail the kinds of activities and events 
that the assembly organized, the materials they created and distributed, and the 
assembly’s position with regards to other local assemblies that were established after 
it.  
 105 
 
 
“Gezi was ages ago!”: Gezi and its Aftermath 
 
“So, are we going to talk about Gezi? It was ages ago!” reacts a potential 
interviewee, in May 2017, on the phone, when I tell him that I work on grassroots 
politics in Istanbul and would like to interview him. It is telling that he immediately 
thinks of the Gezi protests in 2013 upon hearing the phrase “grassroots politics”, that 
is, Gezi comes to mind as the only grassroots mobilization on a mass scale in 
contemporary Turkey, other than the decades-long Kurdish liberation movement. It is 
also telling because it was only four years ago that the largest mass protests in living 
memory had happened, and yet it felt “ages ago”. He was not alone in feeling like this 
either; what he said was only one of the variations on the same theme of Gezi seeming 
to have happened a long time ago, which was a common reaction by interviewees 
when I first told them about my research topic.   
 The reasons for the perception of the Gezi protests having happened a long 
time ago were twofold: The first was the number of political events that took place 
between Gezi and the referendum; the second was the meaning of these events, or in 
other words, the change in the political context. A young organizer of the assemblies 
who had been a part of the Gezi protests, and who has been involved in grassroots 
activism since then, put it concisely:  
 
I learned so much from these experiences […] we lived through everything in a 
very condensed way, you know? There was Gezi, then squats, then there were 
the presidential elections in 2014 and [the HDP’s candidate] Demirtas won nine 
percent, then the local elections, then general elections [in 2015] and the 
threshold was passed [by the HDP], then there was 1 November [2015], then the 
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referendum. We experienced victories and defeats all together. We experienced 
in four, five years what a normal person could only fit into 50, 60 years.  
 
The eventfulness of the period between the Gezi protests in 2013 and the referendum 
in 2017 led to the feeling of having experienced “50, 60 years” of political change. 
Again, this was a common perception in my field site. “We have undergone a lifetime 
of political experiences during this time”, another participant of the assemblies texted 
the common WhatsApp group of all the assemblies in Istanbul, a week before the 
referendum. As the interviewee quoted above makes clear, the condensation of 
political experience in a short period of time led to rapid political learning for those 
who were actively involved in the various campaigns or attempts at organization since 
Gezi. As I have already elaborated on the political significance of these events in the 
Introduction, I will concentrate here on the different forms that grassroots attempts at 
mobilization that preceded each electoral event took.   
The Gezi protests of 2013 were a series of protests that started with the 
uprooting of trees in Gezi Park next to Taksim Square in Istanbul. The protest to stop 
the destruction of the park quickly ascended to a mass protest after videos and 
photographs of police violence became viral and then spread across the country. A 
considerable amount of academic, semi-academic, and journalistic articles was written 
about the Gezi Park protests since then. Activist milieus mostly focused on the politics 
of the commons, horizontal organization structures and leaderlessness, direct 
democracy, new social movements, and urban social movements and the right to the 
city (e.g. Express Dergi, 2013, Issue 139). After the occupied Gezi Park was 
evacuated, participants gathered in parks in their neighbourhood and established local 
forums. Forums met regularly (every evening in the beginning, then every week until 
they transformed into other structures), and they aimed at having inclusive 
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discussions. The park forums lasted for a few months until winter. Some of these 
forums dissolved altogether; some were replaced by local initiatives, associations, and 
squats; and some turned into neighbourhood solidarity groups in 2014. 
Local initiatives established after the park forums were the remnants or the 
legacy of the Gezi protests and the park forums. They were organized to keep 
participation at a stable level and to have more permanent structures in place so that 
Gezi’s organizational structure of non-hierarchy and leaderlessness, its decision-
making procedure based on consensus, and its political culture of inclusiveness, anti-
sexism, anti-racism, and respect for one another could be kept alive.32 These initiatives 
focused almost exclusively on local issues such as running the squat, late-night noise 
in residential streets, and protesting against the construction of a new car park in the 
neighbourhood. Some of these initiatives are still up and running.33 
With the 2015 general elections, grassroots political activity gravitated towards 
election campaigns. This form of organization and mobilization started with the first 
general election in 2015,34 followed by the snap elections 4 months later, and 
 
32 I am drawing on my unpublished master’s thesis (2015) based on ethnographic research conducted 
in the summer of 2014 in one of the squats in Istanbul. The thesis looked at the ways in which the 
squatters combined contentious forms of protest that were directed against the government with 
autonomous forms of protest that rejected institutional politics as a point of reference.  
33 Onur Eylul Kara has recently published his book, “Yapabilecegimizi Yapmak: Minor Siyaset ve 
Turkiye Ornegi” (2019) which analyses local initiatives in Turkey, established before and after the Gezi 
protests.  
34 The 7 June 2015 general elections have taken their place in the collective memory of the opposition 
as its biggest victory in a long time. What makes this election so important is that it was highly regarded 
as a moment of success beyond an electoral victory. The success was due to the HDP’s passing the 10% 
election threshold to put an end to the AKP’s 13-year long seizure of power as the governing party, and 
the HDP’s proving itself as a strong mass political party and the 3rd largest party in the parliament. This 
perception in the opposition did not change after the government recommenced the war in Kurdish 
cities, when bombs started to go off in both the east and the west of Turkey, and when the HDP was 
“hollowed out” by way of being imprisoned charged with aiding terrorist organizations, engaging in 
terrorist propaganda, and/or insulting the president or the Turkish state, in the months leading up to the 
snap elections on November 1st of the same year. The most noticeable effect of this success on leftist 
and socialist activists was the reappraisal of doing mass politics: Doing “mass politics” – meaning, 
doing politics with the masses – was an important lesson for socialists in particular, whose political 
parties on the margins of society had little to no contact with non-socialist voters since the late 1960s. 
The HDP, being a “mass party”, was partially successful at reaching out to the non-Kurdish, non-
socialist voter and by becoming the third party in the parliament, it proved itself as a political force, a 
player in the game, so to speak. It became the only viable option for those on the left of the economic 
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continued with the constitutional referendum in 2017. Independent election campaigns 
organized by grassroots activists were independent initiatives in the sense that they 
were not connected in any institutional or organizational way to the political party for 
which they campaigned (in this case, it was the HDP). The nature of these initiatives 
surely differed from previous grassroots organizations; whereas election campaigns 
were overtly targeting national politics, previous grassroots initiatives targeted their 
neighbours, local issues, and focused more on involving as many residents as possible 
into their daily lives and activities. However, for the organizers of these initiatives, 
there is a continuity between all these different forms of organizing that resulted from 
not only an overlap in their organizers, but also from the rapid accumulation of 
experience. In the case of the election initiatives, the continuity and the process of 
political learning manifested themselves in the adaptation of organizational structure 
and the decision-making process.  
 This background of a series of grassroots organizations and mobilizations that 
correspond to different episodes of contention within only a few years is important to 
answer the question of why the “no” campaign took the organizational form of local 
assemblies. In the following sections, I will discuss how the Gezi protests were re-
read as part of the self-critique of its participants, describe the adaptations in 
organizational structure and the problems encountered during and after the campaign, 
and give a detailed overview of some of the materials and activities that the assembly 
organized.  
 
 
and social spectrum, their only chance at democratization in the period until the referendum. After the 
referendum, the assemblies’ main concerns were becoming permanent political actors, 
institutionalization, and having a say in the negotiations for a democracy front, but in matters 
concerning protests or campaigns, discussions centred on the key phrase “regime change”, a point I will 
come back to below. 
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From the Gezi Spirit to the Ills of Gezi: Adapting Organizational 
Structure  
 
The literature on Gezi and the park forums, neighbourhood collectives, and local 
initiatives established in its aftermath has consistent references to the “Gezi spirit”. 
Most commonly, the term refers to the inclusive nature of the protests and the 
initiatives that followed. A squatter in 2014, for example, remembers Gezi and calls 
for a return to such politics: “She remembers the camp in Gezi Park, where people of 
all ages, genders, classes, from all kinds of religious, political or ethnic backgrounds 
lived and resisted together […] ‘So we need to keep reminding, keep growing, keep 
spreading this united spirit […]’, she says” (Zucker, 2014). Forums that were 
established following Gezi tried to revive Gezi’s “spirit of togetherness” (Ugur-Cinar 
& Gunduz-Arabaci, 2018, p. 18). Inceoglu (2014) similarly characterizes the Gezi 
spirit as being “about hearing and negotiating with the ‘other’” (p. 28) and claims that 
the local elections in 2014 “hijacked” this spirit, a claim supported by others as well 
(e.g., Çarkoğlu, 2014). Likewise, Karakayali and Yaka (2014, p. 128) confirm the 
overall characterization of the term when they state, “what was popularly meant by 
the term was collectivity and solidarity on the one hand and the sisterhood of the 
people of all ethnicities and identities, on the other”. Here is another description of the 
period, from Zeynep Tufekci (2017, p. 74):  
 
The forums tried to replicate the Gezi Park experience, which people had taken 
calling the “spirit of Gezi”. People gathered and took turns speaking, but no 
formal decision- making or organizational mechanisms emerged, and there were 
no existing networks of civil society that were widely accepted and able to 
mediate conflicts that arose in these spaces. Over time, energy waned, and the 
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forums were attended increasingly by younger people with time to spare, or by 
ideologically less representative but more committed people from fringe political 
groups. 
 
The Gezi spirit, then, did not only refer to a spirit of togetherness and solidarity with 
the “other”, but it also denoted certain mechanisms of decision-making (i.e. 
consensus) and a non-hierarchical, horizontal organizational structure, even though 
they were not formalized, as Tufekci points out in the quoted passage above. 
Yegenoglu (2013, p. 4) captures the solidarity, inclusivity, and the consensual (as 
opposed to oppositional) aspects of the Gezi spirit when he writes on the Gezi protests:  
 
The specific culture and spirit that materialized in the protests attests to the 
emergence of, or perhaps the desire for, the advent of a democratic sensibility 
whereby people with different lifestyles, political leanings, religious inclinations 
and identities are able to express mutual care and listen to each other, thus seeking 
inclusivity rather than following the oppositional politics instituted by the 
secularists and Islamists over the last 90 years or so. 
 
The “democratic sensibility” to which Yegenoglu (2013) refers was indeed part of the 
Gezi spirit, and it manifested itself not only in the culture of inclusivity but also in the 
way people organized. Participatory and direct-democratic mechanisms were adopted 
and cherished during the occupation of Gezi Park and after, in park forums.  
In sum, the legacy of Gezi was horizontal organization based on participation 
among equals: A non-hierarchical, participatory-democratic way of doing 
prefigurative politics, a “politics of doing” (Gumus, 2017), of living on a smaller scale 
the way people aspire to live (as was evidenced in experiences with squatting and 
neighborhood solidarity initiatives in the aftermath of the Gezi protests). Ideas of 
direct democracy, of a more participatory democracy, inclusivity, non-violence, non-
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hierarchy, and openness to different worldviews were all legacies of the Gezi protests, 
what people mean when they refer to "the Gezi spirit". However, as participants of 
these political initiatives accumulated experiences, another side of the same coin, 
namely, "the ills of Gezi" started to bubble up. These ills referred to the same features 
of Gezi, but from a critical perspective: The fascination with horizontalism that did 
not lead to any tangible political results; people who "played the democracy game", 
who were so blinded by being democratic that they could not take action against 
undemocratic ideas or practices among themselves; an antipathy against hierarchy so 
complete that led some people to reject the idea of political parties or institutional 
politics (i.e. aiming to be in power) altogether; and a focus on local politics so 
overarching that the bigger picture was lost. The realization that the application of 
these principles held activists back, making them politically inefficient, led to their 
adaptation. It is through the subsequent endeavours of the most committed activists 
that these lessons were learned and transmitted. As the leader of a left-wing party put 
it in November 2017, “we have not been able to transfer the outcomes of Gezi to the 
political field. 20, 30, 40-year-old political habits are still casting a shadow on Gezi’s 
legacies. We are in a phase of learning” (WebIz, 2017).35  
A re-reading of Gezi and its aftermath was a fundamental part of the self-
criticism of those involved in grassroots activism. Below is an example of such self-
critique: 
 
To be honest, Gezi was an attempt at democratic revolution …The main reason 
for its collapse was the lack of a claim, a programme, and a goal around which 
the movement could organize in order for it to recreate itself in new platforms, to 
 
35 Erkan Bas, head of the People’s Communist Party of Turkey (HTKP), WebIz TV, programme titled 
“The timeliness of leftist and socialist politics”, on 16 November 2017. In the 2018 general elections, 
he was elected as an HDP MP, and later switched to the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP). 
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spread the insurrection …As time went on and we lost momentum, the game of 
democracy became the disease [illet] of park forums. It gnawed on the forums 
from within; the podium got drowned in epic rhetoric, romantic poems and songs. 
In the face of hundreds of ideas, the creation of effective decision-making 
mechanisms was avoided and the forums, which consisted of thousands of 
people, became both unmanageable and weak, disappointing masses of people 
who had high hopes before they [park forums] dissolved altogether. (F., 
Interview, April 2017) 
 
Listening to F., who is an unaffiliated (i.e. not a member of a political party or 
organization) activist who has been a participant of Gezi and all the other initiatives 
that followed, it is difficult to see Gezi and its aftermath through rose-coloured glasses.  
F. traces mistakes all the way back to the Gezi protests, where the lack of a goal and 
programme caused the potential of the uprising to go to waste. His unapologetic 
comments help him name “the disease”: “The game of democracy”. He goes beyond 
the dream-like ghost of the “Gezi Spirit” and locates the problem to move forward. 
This diagnosis came to be known as “the ills of Gezi” (Gezi’nin illetleri), used widely 
by the core group of activists to refer to the legacies of the Gezi protests which turned 
out to be an obstacle in the way of organizing.  
Note the emphasis on mechanisms and efficiency. By 2016, the focus was on 
devising mechanisms that would allow quick and effective decision-making, while 
maintaining the participatory-democratic values of horizontal organizing. Another 
participant of the assemblies, N., who was also involved in other types of grassroots 
organizing since the Gezi protests, confirms the “ills of Gezi”: 
 
Every attempt at organization after Gezi was too democratic. There was too much 
democracy, but it was not really democratic. It was stealing people’s time, 
dragging out the discussion, and repelling people outside of these activities. It 
makes no sense at all to discuss for five hours how to move this glass from this 
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table to the other. I think everyone comprehended how ridiculous this thing called 
consensus was. Of course, coming to an agreement is important. Yes, it is 
valuable to come to a decision that will be implemented with peace of mind by 
everyone. But we must accept that consensus is not always possible. I think this 
was the biggest downside. We could have done so much more instead of racking 
our brains about unnecessary drudgery for days, weeks, months. Going through 
a month of discussions to paint a wall was ridiculous, unnecessary, disappointing, 
and repelling. We tried to avoid this in the “no” assemblies. We talked about 
excessive democracy not being democracy when we were organizing the 
assemblies. We tried to minimize the inability to make decisions, and thus the 
inability to cover ground. And then the units that we had established in the 
independent election initiative in 2015 were transferred wholly to the “no” 
assemblies. 
 
The independent election initiative in 2015 was the campaign organized by 
people not affiliated with the HDP, to campaign for the HDP. More specifically, these 
were activists who had met during Gezi, or at the local initiatives established after 
Gezi, who saw the political (and arithmetic) importance of the HDP’s passing the 10 
percent electoral threshold. As one of my interviewees who took part in the election 
initiative told me, “For me, the 7 June 2015 elections were the presidential system put 
to trial because Erdogan had already declared that he would speed up the transition to 
a presidential system after the elections. The campaign was one in which the 
opposition against the presidential system would be explained through the 10 percent 
threshold”. Another participant of the election initiative recounts how it was 
established in our interview:  
 
[After the forums and the local initiatives disbanded,] their participants still 
wanted to stay together. We were already friends, by that time all of us were 
living in the same neighborhood, and [the 2015] elections were getting closer. 
The local solidarity association was over. But the habit of doing politics together 
remained. We were talking among ourselves, “it will be a strange election, the 
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electoral threshold is something that the CHP voters and the secular liberal strata 
can be convinced of, shall we do something?”. One of us came up with the idea 
of doing an electoral campaign. It was possible to do something harsher, but we 
could not predict if that would serve the purpose. So, we started archiving all the 
written material that was out there [in newspapers, journals, the internet]. 
Everyone was writing about the need for such an initiative. We started to get 
together every day. We were nine people. We were brainstorming. We came up 
with [a name for the initiative]. We decided to focus on the HDP’s passing the 
10 percent threshold. We first kept the initiative to ourselves, reaching out only 
to the people we had worked with three to five months ago [at local initiatives]. 
This independent election initiative was an electoral campaign for the HDP 
carried out by people who had done politics together after Gezi, so it had a direct 
and organic connection to Gezi. This is true for the local “no” assemblies as well. 
 
In this snippet, the links between the Gezi protests, the initiatives founded in the 
aftermath of Gezi, and the local “no” assemblies are established in terms of the 
continuity of participation from one local initiative to the other. However, it was not 
only persons that the local “no” assemblies inherited from earlier political experiences. 
Going back to N.’s point above, it was also the organizational structure devised in the 
2015 election campaign that was replicated. N. had prepared the presentation that 
introduced the organizational units to which she refers in the quote above. This 
organizational structure had been presented and agreed upon as the structure of the 
emerging assemblies in the first big meeting that launched the “no” assemblies at the 
end of January 2017. The same form, with slight changes, was adopted by the other 
assemblies that were established soon after the main one was founded.  
The units to which N. refers are the legal, finance, production and 
communication, and the coordination and organization committees. The legal 
committee’s function was to advise on legal applications and to “get us out of trouble” 
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if need be, as N. put it in her presentation.36 The finance committee dealt with finding 
funds and kept track of expenditures. The production and communication committee 
came up with ideas for the campaign based on the decisions made in the general 
assembly, prepared printed and digital material, and managed the assembly’s social 
media accounts. The coordination and organization committee ensured 
synchronization with the neighborhood assemblies and other initiatives, advised new 
neighborhood assemblies, managed the distribution and circulation of the printed 
materials, and organized events. The last two committees were the most active. The 
first three committees – legal, finance, and production and communication – reported 
to the organization committee which met every week to review what had been done 
throughout the week and to plan the next. As N. explains, “anyone who had an 
expertise in a related area, or anyone interested in working on that subject could join 
whichever committee they wanted to join; and in terms of the labour that went into the 
work, we shared the workload”. In addition to the permanent structure of the assembly, 
smaller commissions were formed temporarily when practical issues arose, such as the 
management and organization of an event for which a sound system, a place to hold 
the event, additional bullhorns, and the like were needed.  
 The coordination and organization committee was linked directly to the 
general assembly that was called “the no assembly”, as the former served to implement 
and “concretize” the decisions made in the latter. During the three months leading up 
to the referendum, the general assembly met regularly every week. Participation was 
open to everyone and was announced weekly on the assembly’s social media accounts. 
These meetings were usually the most crowded ones during the campaign, as people 
from the neighborhood assemblies and the general public joined them as well. The 
 
36 The legal unit dissipated due to inaction. In its place, the production and communication unit broke 
up into two units in practice.  
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number of people who participated fluctuated from about 30 attendants to 100 at 
“normal” times, when the next week’s action plan was debated. The number of 
attendants fluctuated based on the agenda: When the neighborhood assemblies had 
enough material to distribute for the next week, and enough events organized, less 
people would participate; when a new plan was needed, more. General “inclinations”, 
suggestions, and “tendencies” were drawn out form these meetings, which were then 
given shape and direction by the organization committee. Even though anyone could 
join this committee at any time, it was encouraged that at least one or two people from 
each neighborhood assembly participate to ensure communication between different 
levels of organization. However, it was usually the more committed participants who 
joined the organization committee’s weekly meetings. The people I refer to as “the 
core organizers” were typically involved in this group.  
Even though the general assembly was the decision-making unit, the 
coordination and organization committee functioned as the place in which the 
particular “voice” of the assembly was shaped. In one of the early general assemblies 
in February 2017, it was agreed that “our propaganda language must not be like the 
AKP’s. We should not use the language of fear and instead use positive language. We 
need to get the upper hand in morale and rhetoric”. Suggestions from the general 
assembly that did not comply with the principles of the assembly were filtered out in 
the coordination and organization committee (as well as the production committee). 
For example, Kemalist voices of the general assembly were minimized in the material 
produced for distribution, instead adopting a more inclusive language that could 
embrace both CHP and HDP voters. “Laïcité”37, the Turkish flag, or images of Ataturk 
 
37 Instead of this word, “libertarian laïcité” (özgürlükçü laiklik) or “freedom of religion” were used, as 
laïcité has historically been used by the state to repress the religious and conservative strata of society 
in Turkey.   
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(the founder of the republic), and words like “terror” that are associated with the 
Kurdish movement and even the HDP for some voters of the CHP were avoided. Sexist 
language was also beyond limits. Likewise, overtly socialist or communist language 
was avoided, filtering out propaganda that used words (and colours) associated with 
the left in Turkey, such as “fascism” or “revolutionary resistance”. Inclusive language 
was crucial in reaching out not only to the “no” voter, but also to the undecided and 
even some of the “yes” voters. In other words, language was part of the agreed-upon 
strategy of the “no” campaign.   
The coordination and organization committee was hierarchically higher with 
regards to the other units, including the general assembly, because this was where 
strategic decisions were given shape. The committee would update the general 
assembly on its activities, and individual neighborhood assemblies could always use 
their own materials or devise their own strategy, but the need for fast decision-making 
during the campaign meant that the committee could take the initiative on what to say 
and how to say it. This somewhat special status of the coordination committee never 
became a problem during my field work, and my interviewees confirmed this 
observation. The introduction of rotation and monthly moderation were crucial in this 
respect.  
The rotation of volunteers attending the coordination meetings and having a 
monthly moderator aimed at equal division of labor, maintaining minimum hierarchy, 
and training activists. Equal division of labor meant that certain tasks did not become 
a burden for a few people who constantly volunteered for the same job; minimum 
hierarchy meant that everyone was allowed to take part in any part of the process, at 
any time, and that no one monopolized their position; and training meant that someone 
who had never moderated a meeting could learn how to moderate, or someone who 
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had never organized a protest could join the protest organization committee and be 
responsible of security, slogans, or negotiations with the police. Whenever the 
question of who the next moderator would be was met with silence, the purposes of 
these practices would be explained. These two mechanisms were on the one hand a 
lesson learned from previous experiences and a way to systematize the structures put 
in place for efficiency while ensuring decentralization, and on the other hand it was 
preparation for a possibly more repressive future regime. Training activists was part 
of this preparation.  
Consensus as a decision-making mechanism was another structural element 
that was adapted in the local assembly. The “ridiculous, unnecessary, disappointing, 
and repelling” discussions over simple and complex decisions alike were believed to 
stem from an understanding of consensus that required every single person present to 
agree on the decision being made. Instead, what was called “systematic consensus” 
was put into place, where a general inclination towards a decision was deemed enough 
to start working on the details of the decision. Alternatively, the option that was least 
opposed would pass as the decision. Systematic consensus worked well when the 
decision to be made was relatively non-contentious or when it did not hold strategic 
or political significance. I will demonstrate an example of such a contentious topic 
shortly.  
 Systematic consensus worked well for the most part of the campaign period, 
as participants were happy with the democratic and inclusive yet fast decision-making 
process. The success of this mechanism was largely due to another principle, that of 
individual participation (birey hukuku). The assembly hosted participants who were 
also members of political parties and organizations, but individuals had to leave their 
institutional hats out the door when they attended an assembly meeting. Their partisan 
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identity was acknowledged but they were expected to be open to persuasion by others 
and to not push for agenda based on pre-determined decisions made in the context of 
their own organizations. Like consensus, the principle of individual participation was 
not formalized in the lifespan of the assembly. This led to problems when the issues 
at hand were politically divisive or strategic. I will discuss one such instance in the 
section on the problems encountered in the assembly.  
 The non-conflictual understanding of politics to which the Gezi spirit adhered 
was also challenged by 2016-2017. Building trust, being respectful of others, building 
long-lasting relationships with each other did not dissipate and lied at the heart of how 
participants related to one another. However, in terms of tactics and the specific 
understanding of politics, activists who organized the local assembly were much more 
openly conflictual and did not shy away from saying so. Immediately after the 
referendum, when participants were discussing how to proceed, an assembly 
participant said, “we should continue to fight with the certainty of the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
decision, as we did during the referendum campaign. We should continue the head-on 
collision. Forget about tangential issues”. By “tangential issues”, he was referring to 
those participants who wanted to proceed by turning to local issues and working with 
residents to deal with their problems. Contrary to the period after Gezi, the stress was 
on being a countervailing force, on making the most of a political opportunity that was 
the referendum. Surely, action brought activists together relationally – waking up in 
the morning to hand out flyers to people going to work, organizing protests, discussing 
politics in meetings that last until dawn all help to build trust and solidarity among 
participants – but this was not an end in itself. The “head-on collision” in the quote 
above makes a clear distinction between the regime (including the current 
government) and the opposition. Hence, it calls for a grassroots politics that does not 
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limit itself to the local; in fact, it sees the problems of the local as “tangential issues”. 
The main idea here is to extend the “momentum” of the referendum campaign to 
spread the assemblies and institutionalize them. 
 The last point about institutionalization brings us to the issue of the scope of 
engagement that the activists were willing to take on. Activists in 2016 were much 
more oriented towards “general politics”, or national, macro-political, institutional 
politics. In fact, activists during my field work were concerned with becoming 
permanent and recognized actors in the field of politics, alongside political parties and 
politicians. Being permanent actors in politics was a long-term project that viewed the 
local assemblies as the smallest unit of a broader constellation, or structure, of 
contention and democratic order. For example, listen to an assembly participant 
speaking at a joint meeting with another political platform:  
 
We need more than just to coordinate [activist groups]. We need a lucid and clear 
address. Fascism is being constructed. We should be discussing how to establish 
a [political] front that includes the opposition within the capitalist class and the 
democratic Islamists …The coordination debate is way behind this discussion. 
This is a matter of creating mechanisms where the minority can exist [as a 
minority]. Let’s discuss whatever it is that we need to discuss to this end 
…Politics is a matter of asserting oneself/of claim-making [iddia meselesi]. 
Many institutions were obliged to hand out flyers in a symbolic way. We need to 
be a force in politics. We need to aim to build healthy, organic relationships, be 
an address, and to become an actor in the stage of politics. (From my field notes, 
June 2017) 
 
These words are indeed assertive. We see again the emphasis on building efficient 
mechanisms, but what is more remarkable is the sense of urgency imposed on the 
speaker by the threat of fascism. This urgency drives him to push for a united front 
against the current regime, which points to the scope of engagement he addresses. He 
 121 
 
centres his argument on the need to be “an actor in the stage of politics”, while 
retaining the previous emphasis on democratic relations (“where the minority can exist 
as a minority”). “To be a force in politics”; “to be an address”; to assert oneself” are 
all part of the definition of being “an actor in politics”, as well as institutionalization.  
When I asked what they meant by “the stage of politics”, another activist told 
me:  
 
Lately, these three events are given as examples quite frequently: Gezi, June 7th 
[the first of the two general elections in 2015], and the “no” phase [the 
referendum campaign]. So, periods of mass mobilization when people work day 
and night to make things visible in the streets, making people discuss those 
things. What I mean [by being on the stage of politics] is to be involved in politics 
on the basis of certain commonalities, even if not as goal oriented as these three 
events were. The way the referendum campaign created a common ground, or 
the way the HDP was a political agent during the election campaign in 
2015…What I mean is to stir action in the bloc against the AKP through this kind 
of agenda-setting. (S., August 2017) 
 
According to S., the stage of politics opened space for popular participation via a mass 
uprising, the elections, and the referendum. These instances served to intensify the 
“head-on collision” with the regime, most recently through the referendum campaign, 
where activists organized the “no” vote against regime change, personified in the 
figure of President Erdogan. The collision was perhaps the most obvious in this period, 
when the activists’ “no” was so clearly and straight-forwardly against the regime. In 
the last two quotations, two inter-related goals are highlighted: Being engaged in 
institutional politics as a way to intervene in matters concerning the regime (i.e. the 
stage of politics), and being political agents within the field of institutional politics 
(i.e. actors on the stage of politics). Listen to another assembly participant, this time 
at a meeting in June 2017:  
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We find the pointers as to how to move forward in the process since the 
establishment of the assemblies. We set out by saying “no” in a way that included 
the whole of society. The assemblies widened the struggle by reaching out to the 
masses, by sharpening the target, and by placing the regime at the core of its 
argument. We won at Gezi, in June 7th [the 2015 general elections], and at the 
referendum. Our main target was regime change in all of them. As we move on, 
the goal of the assemblies should be to continue to be the places where we 
connect with the masses, where we maintain our existence in institutional form, 
where persons do not participate with their epaulettes. 
 
Once more, “maintaining our existence in institutional form” is emphasized. In this 
context, institutionalization meant becoming permanent political agents. This 
ambitious goal of institutionalization (which did not have a clear path, but signalled 
permanence and effectiveness in macro-politics) stemmed from the sense of success 
that this particular local assembly possessed after the campaign. Notice how three 
events, Gezi, the first elections in 2015, and the referendum are considered as 
successes, even though the potential of Gezi as a mass protest soon dissipated, the 
second elections in 2015 saw the AKP and Erdogan regaining the majority in the 
parliament, and the referendum was officially lost to the “yes” vote. As I will describe 
in the next section, the assembly was considered to be a success by its participants 
because of the visibility of the campaign, its having become a model for the other 
assemblies, and its participants’ decision to take to the streets on the night of the 
referendum. We will see in Chapter 4 how in a few months, this sense of victory 
dissipated, but it is important to make a note of it here, when the activists are trying to 
have the wind of a successful campaign at their back.  
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The Gezi protests, the June 7th elections, the referendum, the March for Justice 
[of the CHP], and the Conscience and Justice activities [of the HDP]38 are the 
most striking examples that show the potential the grassroots holds in the country, 
and they are instances that demonstrate that the success of the democratic 
struggle is only possible with a grassroots movement… In this environment 
where the channels of doing politics in the Turkish National Assembly have been 
so tightly constricted, the struggle must be pursued in the streets… It is 
imperative that politics be relocated to the public sphere… MPs to the local 
assemblies! (Circulated meeting notes, August 2017) 
 
In the quotation above, we see the same three events again as instances of success. 
Moreover, this quotation taken from circulated meeting notes from August 2017 
makes clear that tendency in the assembly was to think of the assemblies as part of a 
longer-term project for a different kind of politics. The call for the struggle to be 
pursued in the streets, to allocate “politics” to the public sphere, and calling for MPs 
to do politics in the assemblies instead of a parliament stripped of its democratic 
functions help describe this project, even though it was not a mature plan at the time 
but more of an idea to be developed.  
 
Contestations 
 
In the previous sections, I have sought to show the organizational structure of 
the assembly and the values it inherited and adapted from earlier episodes. The 
assembly carried out a successful campaign during the three months of intense 
mobilization leading to the day of the referendum. However, neither the content nor 
 
38 The CHP, on the night of the referendum and the following week, discouraged its voters from taking 
to the streets. Instead, in June 2017, the leader of the CHP Kemal Kilicdaroglu started to walk from 
Ankara to Istanbul in protest the government crackdown on the opposition and the corruptness of the 
judicial system. The CHP’s decision to protest the crackdown was triggered when a CHP member, Enis 
Berberoglu, got sentenced 25 years in prison. Having hundreds of their members imprisoned by then, 
the HDP expanded the justice activities and launched a series of events in July 2017.   
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the structure of the assembly was set in stone; that is to say, debates around 
organizational structure and issues of strategy were a constant struggle within the 
assembly. In this section, I will discuss some of the problems that were encountered 
in the assembly during and after the campaign.  
The organizational repertoires I have demonstrated above were not 
unproblematically implemented. Partisan identities remained a source of suspicion and 
mistrust. The most common cautionary remark I heard during field work was “let’s 
not turn this into a meeting of politicians” (in Turkish, “siyasetler toplantisina 
donmesin!”), which refers to the partisan identities of the participants. As I mentioned 
earlier, although participants’ political affiliations were recognized, everyone was 
expected to participate in the discussions as individuals and not as representatives of 
their organizations. This expectation meant that all participants, regardless of their 
political affiliation, had to be open to persuasion by others. The application of this 
principle, however, was imperfect: An experienced participant in the meetings could 
easily understand how some individuals insistently defended their respective 
organizations’ decisions. Participating in the meetings as representatives (perceived as 
such by others) manifested itself in the way people talked about the positions of certain 
individuals about a given subject. For example, outside of the context of the meetings, 
instead of referring to these individuals by their names, people referred to them by the 
organizations or political parties with which they were affiliated: Rather than saying 
“Ali wants to organize a protest”, they said “the Labour Party wants to organize a 
protest”.  
 Aside from running the risk of non-partisan disengagement, these partisan 
conflicts led to distrust in the commissions and working groups – smaller, issue- or 
task-specific, temporary groups created to discuss and decide on a particular issue or 
 125 
 
to coordinate logistics – especially when the issue was highly politicized. Two 
instances of highly politicized issues that led to the rejection of forming commissions 
are particularly illustrative. The first of these was about whether to read a letter from 
the imprisoned coleader of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtas, at an event organized by the 
assemblies (March 2017), and the second was the drafting of the aims and the political 
trajectory of the assemblies (August 2017). In both these instances, the suggestion of 
a smaller commission was rejected based on the openly expressed concern about the 
domination of the commission by one or more political organizations. “The 
commission will turn into a meeting of politicians!” and “everyone will want to be a 
part of the commission, what’s the point of creating one?” were how participants 
voiced their unease. Importantly, this concern was met with respect, even though it 
was not shared by everyone: “Okay, so we’ll hold another meeting. We obviously need 
to discuss more, so we will talk about this, even if we need to stay here all night”.  
 A similar unease broke out when the assembly had to work in tandem with a 
different body of activists. In April 2017, a temporary platform was formed to organize 
a protest march against the fraudulent results of the referendum. The platform 
consisted of political organizations and parties that worked within the assemblies, and 
others that did not. The rationale was to bring together the social bases of these 
organizations for a larger mobilization, but it also aimed at planting the seeds of a 
broader coalition of grassroots groups for the long run. The platform lasted for a week 
before it dissolved when the group of organizations that was not a part of the “no” 
assemblies claimed ownership of the protests in their news outlet. Regardless of the 
success of the platform, the coming together of different organizations was an 
opportunity for me to observe how the assembly drew its boundaries, as well as its 
interactions with other organizations.  
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The issue of partisan identities arose when the different organizations within 
the assemblies, participants who put aside their partisan identities when working in 
the assembly, put aside their identity as an assembly member and took on their 
organizational roles. In other words, they participated in the platform meetings not as 
individuals like they did in the assemblies, nor as assembly members, but as 
representatives of their organizations. The crisis crystallized during a discussion of 
whether to organize another protest in the weekend. The assembly had decided to 
organize the protest, and participants were expected to carry this decision to the 
platform. However, each organization within the assembly restarted the discussion 
during the platform meeting instead of communicating the assembly’s decision. About 
an hour into the discussion, one assembly participant who was also a member of a 
political organization, blurted out, “friends, haven’t we already made a decision on 
this topic? I’ll act as a representative of my own organization if we’re here as 
representatives!”.  
 This minor crisis did not build up to a major identity crisis, probably because 
the platform did not last very long. It was interpreted as “confusion”, 
“misunderstanding the individual participation principle”, “the lack of clarity 
regarding the rules defining the relationship among participants”. It was a mismatch 
between the assembly’s participation principle (where each person participates as an 
individual and not as a representative), and the platform which basically involved 
several other organizations outside of the assemblies, which participated in the 
platform as representatives. This arrangement required the assembly to act as an 
organization, a wholistic entity, alongside the other organizations. The confusion arose 
from this dual requirement, and before the participants had time to spell out the rules 
of participation, the platform dissolved. Even though the partisanship issue did not 
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grow into a bigger problem in the assembly, it foreshadowed similar deadlocks when 
participation waned and the assembly practically contracted into the coordination and 
organization committee.  
After the referendum and soon after the protests came to an end, in May 2017, 
a meeting with approximately 100 attendants was organized. The goal of the meeting, 
which was called a “workshop”, was to collectively think about and try to agree on a 
roadmap for the assembly. The organizers of the workshop, of which I was one, 
anticipated unfocussed and messy discussions, typical of meetings with a large number 
of people and without a clear question to be answered. Therefore, it was crucial to 
limit the length of the meeting (from 3:30 pm to 8:00 pm, with a half-hour break in 
the middle) and structure it beforehand. In the first half of the workshop, two people 
presented what the assembly had achieved over the campaign and compiled a list of 
issues that were recently being debated. The list, in which a couple of major issues 
were highlighted to structure the second half of the meeting, was printed and handed 
out to attendants on the day of the meeting. Moderation was of utmost importance in 
our attempt at structuring the day, so two experienced moderators, who were good at 
summarizing the main points in a discussion and leading speakers back to the subject 
of the meeting if they digress, were decided on before the meeting. We also decided 
on a notetaker as always, and we added an additional note taker, me, who took notes 
on the board for everyone to see as the discussions were proceeding. Planning was 
part of our structuring attempts.  
 The main goal of the meeting, as I mentioned before, was to decide on a 
roadmap, and if agreed upon, to draft a programme for the assembly (an issue I will 
come back to below). Deciding on a roadmap, in this case and at the time, clustered 
around two main axes: Means and ends. The former crystallized as doing local work 
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versus speaking to “high politics” and dealing with macro-political issues. The latter 
crystallized as doing issue-specific campaigns versus drafting a programme for the 
assemblies. I will start with the first issue, then move on to the question of the 
programme.  
 A group of people, which included members of a political organization but was 
not limited to them, pushed for local activities. Suggested activities were discussion 
or reading groups where topics like historical materialism or Marxist theory would be 
discussed; festive gatherings with music bands and a picnic that involved assembly 
participants offering homemade cookies to passers-by to recruit more people; and 
attending to the issues of the neighborhood such as problems regarding parking lots or 
the local high school being turned into a religious high school. Others advocated being 
involved in bigger, national, macro-political issues such as calling for Erdogan to 
resign, drafting a new constitution, and having a programme. It was a heated debate. 
During recess, I was talking with one of the most active participants of the assembly. 
In disbelief, she said: “For God’s sake, there is no middle ground. Okay, we might not 
be able to make Erdogan resign, but there is no need to bake cookies! The disease of 
Gezi…this is exactly it”. Later, when it was her turn to speak, she drew attention to 
the link between the local and the general/national. She said: 
 
I think what everyone has in mind when they say “local” is different. The local 
versus general discussion was also a popular topic after Gezi. We are an assembly 
with neighborhood assemblies. So, we have assemblies in neighbourhoods and 
when we campaigned for the “no” vote, when we had that macro rhetoric, we 
organized it locally. What I have in mind for what is next is the same thing. We 
will say something macro again. We will organize our macro politics at the local 
level. (Circulated meeting notes, May 2017) 
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She proposed to rent a place for the assembly, based on her prior experiences: “Having 
that space would be one of the biggest tools to organize at the local level. We have 
friends here with experiences with this. I also worked at the squats after Gezi and we 
witnessed how useful it can be. Of course, we cannot be stuck with the place and risk 
not being able to act outside of that place. But we have the experience”. Indeed, many 
people in the audience agreed with this suggestion, although some who had worked at 
these initiatives after the Gezi protests feared “being trapped in the local”.  
 From baking cookies to renting a place, doing local politics was a highly 
contentious issue. Considered by some as one of the ills of Gezi, concentrating only 
on local work brought about the fear of “being trapped in the local”, or being 
politically ineffective;39 one of the lessons learned from Gezi and its aftermath. Past 
experiences were still called on, even after the referendum, when the same issues 
resurfaced.  
   When I asked her about this meeting in our interview and reminded her about 
her comment on baking cookies, the owner of the last quote above laughed and linked 
the discussion on local versus general politics to that of structure: “There really is no 
need to bake cookies. We have to be flexible, not loose [gevşek değil esnek olmalıyız]. 
We can do macro politics, but we have to be able to make local issues ours in some 
occasions. The reason why our endeavours after Gezi could not be made permanent 
was this looseness”. Inclusivity, organizational structure, and strategy are interlinked 
in these conversations.    
 The debate on doing local politics was a contentious issue and doing macro 
politics was just as contentious. The debate on whether to focus on single-issue 
 
39 Renting a place brought about its own troubles; from worrying about how to pay the rent every month 
to legal issues (the assemblies had no legal standing in the sense that they were not official, registered 
organizations), from the difficulties of running the place to concerns about running the place becoming 
an end in itself, there were multiple meanings attributed to renting a place. 
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campaigns or to have a programme for the assembly reflected similar dynamics as the 
discussion above. Those who advocated for a programme came up against reservations 
about the risks involved in institutionalization. These reservations mostly reflected the 
type of politics that Gezi and its aftermath popularized, namely, anti-institutionalist, 
anti-partisan, local politics. Proponents of institutionalizing the assemblies by way of 
having a programme, however, referred to the change in regime type and the coming 
of a new political order as part of their argument. 
 The need for a programme was argued to be a tool to make the assembly into 
a permanent political actor. Here is one of the attendants at the meeting elaborating on 
why he thinks the assembly needs to have a programme: “What I mean by programme 
and rules is actually our principles to keep us together. People who will join us later 
should know where we stand. Why we are together, how, what our internal rules are, 
these are very important. If we don’t have principles, we will disband and disappear”. 
A programme, in other words, is necessary for the survival of the organization as well 
as for recruitment purposes.  
 Those who opposed a programme worried about inclusivity and resembling a 
political party:  
 
It was not only the AKP who lost in the referendum. It also suffered a blow in 
terms of the institutionalization of fascism. But when we are defining our 
assemblies, we should avoid such sharp-edged observations […] We should 
avoid being like those organizations with a programme, committees, and a 
management. We can only be the voice of society if we adopt a dynamism that 
enables us to renew our goals and reshape our structure. If we rent a place and 
have a programme, we will have spontaneously created a node of power. 
(Circulated meeting notes, May 2017) 
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In this quotation, we see how a programme is associated with a rigid structure that 
would create centralized power; an association that lies at the core of anti-institutional 
and anti-partisan ideas. Indeed, the fear of turning into a political party was voiced 
very clearly by another participant:  
 
This is what I worry about: In the year 1998 I was organized [örgütlendim] as a 
socialist youth. Since then, goals and programmes have been decided by older 
brothers and sisters. We thought they were probably right and tried to go along 
with them […] In my personal history, I did not see any good coming out of it. 
In the last four, five years, from the HDP and the HDK40 to Gezi, to other parts 
of the world, the idea is being formed that direct and a more participatory model 
works better. (Circulated meeting notes, May 2017) 
 
Here, the political party is contrasted with the “direct and participatory” model of the 
assembly. We see again the association with an organizational structure that produces 
centralized power. However, this anti-institutional and anti-partisan position was 
challenged by others, as this was against the flexibility (and not looseness, as we have 
seen earlier) that was cherished during the “no” campaign.  
 Those who advocated for the programme called for permanent structures of 
resistance; structures that could be replicated and adapted in other places, so that the 
local assemblies as an idea and as a structure could spread and become established as 
a political tool. Expectations about the future political order were a significant part of 
this reasoning:  
 
I think what we need is to draft a programmatic frame according to the needs of 
society. What we are faced with today is the threat of a totalitarian regime. We 
 
40 HDK is the Turkish abbreviation for the Peoples’ Democratic Congress, the HDP’s grassroots 
counterpart that organizes as local assemblies.  
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need to weave the broadest oppositional front against this threat […] As our 
actions are shaped around the programme, we will always be acting and 
discussing, so according to the social dynamics and the political agenda, some 
points in the programme will be brought to the fore and others will remain in the 
background. They will be determined during this process. (Circulated meeting 
notes, May 2017) 
 
The speaker here is trying to break the binary between having a programme and having 
a democratic structure. He draws attention to the malleability of the programme and 
to the importance of action, dynamism, and flexibility.  
 
For us to not be flung by the political agenda that is imposed on us, we need to 
put before us a political goal, a political route, and act accordingly. We can call 
this a programme or something else. But if we are going to have neighborhood 
assemblies and the committees that we had during the campaign, we will need to 
define clearly what each unit’s function is and how they are connected to one 
another. And this, I believe, would be a programme. If we want to make the 
assemblies into a permanent structure and to recruit more people, the first thing 
we should do is to specify our goals. We can call it a programme, a goal, or a 
vision, we should decide on that.  
 
 What these debates soon after the referendum demonstrate is that both the form 
and content of the assembly were still debated at the time. The main axes of discussion 
were the level of political engagement and the goals of the assembly. Other issues like 
organizational structure, specific actions, and institutionalization were discussed under 
these two headings. Gezi was still the main reference point in the past, and it was 
frequently mentioned together with the lessons learned or experiences gained from it. 
However, past experiences were not the only point of reference. The implementation 
of a more repressive regime was brought up in these deliberations. At least some of its 
participants thought of the assembly as a potentially permanent structure of resistance 
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against the political order of the future. Spaces of contention had to be made to fit the 
organizational and political needs of the time, as a long-term strategy.  
 Despite these contestations, the assembly made the decision to continue being 
active with the same structure but with a different name. There were three suggestions: 
people’s assembly, citizens’ (yurttaş) assembly41, and democracy assembly.  After 
months of deliberation, the assembly took the name “democracy assembly”, once 
more indicating the nature of the struggle and its participants’ decision to engage with 
national-level politics.  
 
The Campaign: Activities  
 
The first call for a public meeting to discuss avenues for a grassroots “no” 
campaign took place in late January 2017 in a historic French Catholic church, 
currently used as an arts centre owned by the municipality. An estimated 600 people 
attended this first gathering. In the first week of February, a general assembly was held 
and neighborhood assemblies were established. The first activity of the local assembly 
was to screen the film “No” directed by Pablo Larraín, about the tactics deployed by 
political campaigns in the 1988 plebiscite in Chile to decide on whether Augusto 
Pinochet should stay in power. The film was a morale booster and it also helped recruit 
people into the assembly – the sign-up sheet in the entrance had columns for name, 
neighborhood, and contact information (email and phone number). Soon after the film 
screening, each neighbourhood assembly started organizing their own activities while 
remaining in contact with the general assembly and the organization and coordination 
 
41 The word “yurttaş” translates into English as citizen. However, Turkish has another word that means 
citizen, “vatandaş”. While the latter denotes a legal status, the former has the root word of “home”. The 
word choice was deliberate.  
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committee. Below, I will first introduce the online leg of the campaign and then 
provide an overview of the kinds of activities that were organized offline, on the street.  
 
Social media campaigns 
 
 One of the first actions taken by the organizers was to set up social media 
accounts. By the end of the campaign, the assembly’s Twitter account had been viewed 
by more than a million people. Its Facebook account was less popular, probably due 
to the differences between the two social media platforms, with around 700,000 
viewers. One leg of the campaign was on social media, and announcements for events, 
activities, meetings, and relevant news were shared on these accounts. Weekly event 
calendars were posted at the beginning of every week, and events had their own page 
where people could mark themselves as interested or going on Facebook (the 
assembly’s Twitter account provided a link to the event). There was also a website 
that was launched by this assembly on behalf of all the other assemblies, on which 
links to the other assemblies’ social media pages were found, all the materials (for 
online or offline use) created were uploaded for anyone to print and use or be inspired, 
and the weekly calendars were posted.  
One of the first online campaigns was a series of questions typed in front of 
brightly coloured backgrounds. These were called “no questions”, “hayırlı sorular” in 
Turkish, with a pun in the word “hayırlı”, which means both “with no” (so, questions 
with the answer “no”) and also “with good luck” or “for the better”. One such question 
was “would you like the President to assign his/her whole family as his/her assistant?”. 
The post did not include the answer and instead prodded the viewer to come up with 
a “no”, and such questions were posted every day, for about 10 days.  
 135 
 
 Another social media campaign documented the activities of different 
neighborhood assemblies. These videos involved a wide range of activities like 
handing out leaflets at major transportation hubs, preparing stencils, or protests. This 
series was called “hayırlı işler” or “works with no”, again a pun on both the word “no” 
and the whole phrase (“works with no” and “have a nice working day” are the two 
meanings of the phrase). Another video series showed short street interviews 
conducted with a diverse population all calling for voters to vote “no”. Another video 
series was called “promises and realities”, in which someone from the assembly 
explained in each video one of the promises of the AKP and its social and political 
significance. These included the promise of fast and efficient decision making; the 
parliament getting more powerful; and jurisdiction becoming independent and 
unbiased. Yet another type of social media campaign used funny clips from old 
Turkish movies, adapted for the “no” campaign, shared with the hashtag 
“HAYIRKazanacağız”, which means “no we will win”.  
 Towards the end of the campaign, the assembly’s social media posts aimed at 
getting the vote out, and recruiting participants to the assembly, or more generally the 
assemblies, depending on potential participants’ place of residence. For example, 
when the deadline for registrations to become polling clerks was approaching, the 
assembly shared a post, on plain, bright pink background with white letters: “Go and 
register to be a polling clerk; if you wish to observe the counting of the votes on the 
day, they will not let you!”. A minimalistic image of a ballot box was used to attract 
more attention, with the caption, “attention – last 10 days!”.  
 Another target was people who would vote “no” anyway, but who could also 
participate in the assemblies; or people who would vote “no” but were hopeless about 
the results. Two posts (as well as a leaflet for distribution) were prepared for these 
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groups. One had the image of a conversation bubble that read “I already say no!”, and 
the other, “I will vote no, but yes will win”. The first post encouraged people to join 
the assemblies, to “work more efficiently towards multiplying the “no” votes”. The 
latter, acknowledging people’s worries about the referendum being rigged, 
encouraged “no” voters to register to become a polling clerk and to join the assemblies. 
 
Offline activities 
 
Even though a strong, semi-professional graphic design group and an active 
social media presence were deemed indispensable in my field site, “being in the street” 
was stressed even more as an essential part of the campaign. Printing materials like 
leaflets, posters, information cards, and the like required money, therefore one of the 
first events that the assembly organized, after the screening of the film “No”, was a 
solidarity party. The party was organized together with a bar/night club whose owners 
and managers were known to be leftists. The tickets for the party were sold beforehand 
and at the door, of which the price was set to a minimal amount, although the tickets 
worked more as an opportunity for individual donations rather than a ticket to an event. 
Two such parties were organized during the campaign to support and fund the 
assembly.  
 In March 2017, the campaign made a peak in terms of the events organized 
besides the usual leafleting every morning and afternoon. The assembly bought a 
“balloon screen” (balon ekran), an inflatable screen on which online material could be 
projected and set it up every afternoon at rush hour at the harbour, where all the other 
political parties had campaign stands. The balloon screen was set up opposite the 
HDP’s stand and close to the CHP’s stand, and there was an unwritten agreement on 
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when each stand would turn up the volume of their own jingles and music. The balloon 
screen was one of the most successful tactics used to distribute fliers and get the 
assembly’s message out, as it was not obvious at first whether it campaigned for the 
“no” or the “yes” vote, and funny clips and catchy images led to the screen being 
encircled by an interested crowd.  
 Festive weekends were another type of activity organized by the assembly. 
Local musicians were invited to perform, and there was food (courtesy of businesses 
in solidarity), and games for children. These activities took place in a park or a square 
in the neighborhood to be as visible to passers-by as possible. These events typically 
involved a forum and sometimes a panel. Forums in these events were spaces where 
both assembly participants and people who were not involved in the assemblies could 
speak about current events, or problems in their neighborhood. Panels hosted political 
figures, speakers from political parties, and academics, as well as participants of the 
assembly. The assembly gathered panels only a few times during the campaign, since 
the “expert opinion” that the panel format offers were regarded as contradictory to the 
inclusive and non-hierarchical values of the assembly. However, some neighbourhood 
assemblies used the panel format more often in their own events.  
 To distribute printed materials, assembly participants met at transportation 
hubs and city squares in the morning and in the afternoon. Besides this routine, the 
assembly organized collective “walks” that combined a protest march with leafleting. 
During these marches, we used a shopping cart, a sound system borrowed from the 
city, and bullhorns borrowed from political parties or organizations. The make-shift 
sound system that we had consisted of one or two loudspeakers that we placed inside 
the shopping cart and dragged along with us during the march. Jingles made by 
amateur music collectives or professional bands were played throughout the march, 
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alongside slogans. Our repertoire of slogans included one that was a remnant of the 
Gezi protests, “this is only the beginning, continue with the struggle”; a line from one 
of Bertolt Brecht’s poems, “there is no liberation alone, it’s all of us together or no 
one at all”; a list of social problems to say “no” to, such as “no to war!”, “no to the 
one-man regime!”, “no to a dependent jurisdiction!”, “no to workers’ murders!”, or 
“no to women’s murders”; an old slogan from the 2015 HDP campaign, “we will not 
let you be the President!”; and “thief, murderer, AKP!”. These walks were done in a 
festive mood, with the songs attracting attention from the residents, the passers-by, 
and people in their cars as well. Each walk took two to four hours, where we walked 
through a designated neighbourhood. Participation in the walks was high, with 30 to 
50 people attendants throughout the day. During the campaign period, there was 
minimal police interference in these activities.  
 The printed materials were diverse and ranged from info-cards to stickers to 
leaflets and bigger posters. Info-cards were first used during the 2015 election 
campaign for the HDP. They were cards the size of a business card, that read “NO” in 
capital letters on one side and a question on the other. They came in three different 
colours; orange, green, and blue. Each aimed at explaining the presidential system that 
was being voted with an analogy. The orange card likened the presidential system to 
handing over all of one’s possessions to the guard of one’s apartment building; the 
green one likened it to a football match in which the director, goal keeper, and the 
referee were all the same person; and the blue card was about pensions being taken 
away after retirement. Info-cards were good for attaching on cars and slipping under 
entrances of apartment buildings. Around 500,000 info-cards were distributed in total 
during the campaign.  
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 Stickers either had the image of the official stamp that read “choice” (tercih) 
with the caption “no” above, imitating the ballot; or they simply had the word “no” in 
capital letters, on a red, blue, or purple background. A little over 500,000 of stickers 
were stuck on doors, walls, cash withdrawal machines, bins, pipes, etc. Leaflets 
contained information on the referendum and the suggested presidential system; 
introduced the assemblies and invited people to join; or they were printed versions of 
some of the online material that was used for social media. Overall, more than 
1,000,000 leaflets were distributed throughout the campaign. Posters were only used 
to announce big events and for recruitment (e.g., a poster read, “there is something 
you can do!” and invited people to join their neighborhood assembly), and they were 
glued to the walls of the district and distributed to sympathetic cafes, bars, and 
restaurants. 
 Throughout the campaign, the constituents of the assembly, both its 
unaffiliated participants and partisan groups, worked in tandem with one another. The 
diversity and inclusivity of the materials, along with their catchy designs, were not 
challenged. In fact, the materials that this assembly produced and the events they 
organized were often adopted and adapted by other assemblies. Calls made by this 
assembly for joint meetings, events, and demonstrations were well received and most 
of the time, accepted. Soon after it was established, this assembly became a model for 
the others as it was considered to be a “real assembly”, meaning, it was not only the 
sum of political organizations and parties working under the guise of a grassroots 
campaign. Rather, it was a “real assembly” because local residents joined and counter-
balanced complications or conflicts that might have otherwise resulted from partisan 
affiliations. The model status of the assembly became even more pronounced on the 
night of the referendum and the following week.  
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The night of the referendum 
 
 The referendum was not free, especially in Kurdish cities where military 
officials had a constant and threatening presence, and it was not fair either: It took 
place when the rule of law had been suspended by the state of emergency. Moreover, 
on the day of the referendum, the High Electoral Council (Turkish acronym, YSK) 
passed a bill that allowed unsealed and unstamped ballots to be counted as valid votes, 
thus increasing the likelihood of fraud. 
 When the “yes” vote won that night, assembly participants had gathered to 
watch the proceedings together. News of rigged ballot boxes, instances of forced open 
voting or voting under pressure, and replaced ballots were streaming in. The High 
Electoral Council’s decision further motivated people to protest. Some assembly 
members were quick to go to the district’s Electoral Council building to protest against 
the fraudulent results, others waited for the official confirmation of the results. Where 
we were gathered, there was talk of taking to the streets, but no organization or 
political party had called for a protest.  
 As news and videos of people leaning out of their houses’ windows and 
balconies while making noise with kitchen utensils, accompanied by drivers in cars 
honking their horns in support of this protest in a number of districts in Istanbul, 
participants of the assembly were encouraged to call for protest. By word of mouth 
and later by text message, an impromptu meeting was organized to discuss whether 
the assembly should make the call. About 35 people gathered in a political 
association’s offices in which we frequently held meetings throughout the campaign. 
Jammed in a corner on the ground floor of the building, the small room unusually 
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filled with smoke and sombre faces, we were trying to make a quick decision. We 
were concerned: “What if there is a fascist attack?” “What if someone gets stabbed?” 
“What if there are provocateurs?” “Would people join us at all?” “People might be 
afraid to get out of their houses” “How will we ensure security?” were some of the 
questions I jotted down in my field notes for that night. Everyone was concerned about 
security and about ending up with a weak protest of only a couple hundred people, 
maybe even less. The videos, however, were a sign that people might join a protest, 
only if someone called for it. And then there was the question, “if not now, then 
when?”.  
 We stepped out of that building, some holding kitchen utensils, into the dense 
residential streets of the neighborhood, hoping that people would join us. And they 
did. A few streets down, and we were already more than a hundred. A couple more, 
and the numbers reached a thousand. An estimated 3000 to 4000 people took to the 
streets in the neighborhood. At the end of more than three hours of marching through 
the streets, an assembly member announced that we would be there again the following 
day and advised the crowd to look out for announcements on the assembly’s social 
media accounts. The next day, the number of people who joined the protest doubled, 
and the protests continued for a week.  
 This impromptu protest march started discussions about whether it would turn 
into a second Gezi, both in the opposition and the AKP alike. It also drew the attention 
of political platforms and parties to the assemblies as a legitimate and powerful 
political actor. The debates around becoming a permanent political actor in politics 
took their legitimacy and motivation partly from the successful campaign and partly 
from the assembly’s decision to take the initiative to take to the streets.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Gezi felt like it had happened ages ago, yet its effects were visible in the way 
organizers of the local assembly critically re-engaged with it. As I have outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, occupiers and protestors in Gezi Park and in the many 
neighbourhood associations, squats, or forums that emerged in the aftermath of Gezi 
were strong believers of “horizontalism”. Marina Sitrin, one of the most prominent 
scholars of this school of social movements, conceptualizes horizontalism as “a 
critique of hierarchy and authority, but it is more than that. It is about creating new 
relationships. The means are a part of the ends. It is not a question of making demands, 
but rather the process, which is a manifestation of an alternative way of being and 
relating” (2011, p. 1). Her emphasis on the means, the process, and the creation of a 
new way of relating resonates well with a classification made by Baiocchi, Bennett, 
Cordner, Klein, and Savell (2014). When they theorize the different types of “civic 
imaginations”, they distinguish three types: Those that are centred on power, those 
that emphasize solidarity, and a third category that focuses on problem solving. 
Sitrin’s characterization of horizontalism, widely shared by protestors during and after 
the Gezi protests, is closest to Baiocchi’s solidarity-centered imagination, which is 
defined as “the world of fellowship, neighbourliness, camaraderie”, where “civil 
society influences the political by fostering a sense of community” (p. 56). 
 Indeed, a sense of community had been attempted to be fostered in the 
grassroots initiatives in the aftermath of Gezi. The Gezi spirit, as it was frequently 
called, had to be kept alive. However, from the summer of 2013 to that of 2016, the 
political environment changed from one that was lenient to change, that had seen the 
largest mass protest in living memory, that had seen a global wave of protests, into 
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one that was marked by laws by decree, a crackdown on the opposition, and 
institutional and legal changes to constitutionalize an authoritarian regime. With 
frequent transformative events during those years, preceded by episodes of contention, 
activists learned from their experiences. Activists had to critically re-read Gezi and its 
aftermath in light of the political needs of the time. The Gezi spirit that was cherished 
only a few years ago gave way to the ills of Gezi, and organizational structures and 
forms were adapted accordingly. The local “no” assembly was chosen as the 
organizational form of the campaign (which was also a longer-term project). The 
specific continuities and changes in its structure, which was inherited from Gezi and 
its aftermath, were the result of activists’ engagement with the past and the future.  
 Organizers of the assembly inherited ideas like horizontal organization, 
decentralization, non-institutionalism, consensus decision-making, and other values 
such as inclusivity and anti-racism, gender equality, and mutual respect. Both 
horizontalism (understood as a strict principle of non-hierarchy) and non-
institutionalism were adapted during this period for an organizational and inter-
personal flexibility that would allow for quick decision making. Similarly, the non-
conflictual “spirit” of Gezi was also challenged. As participants of the assembly 
showed a tendency to expand the scope of political engagement, conflict with the 
government and the role of power in politics (e.g., becoming political actors in the 
stage of politics or making the assembly a permanent unit of contention) became the 
dominant, albeit contested, way of doing politics.  
This orientation to politics is in line with what Baiocchi et al. term a power-
oriented imagination, which “commonly involves naming an opponent or adversary 
and using confrontational and militaristic language” (2014, p. 60). “Head-on 
collision”, “fascism is being constructed”, “becoming an address” all point to such 
 144 
 
oppositional politics. However, it is important to note here that these distinctions do 
not perfectly map on to any single group or type of activism. In fact, understandings, 
imaginations, and tactics evolve as circumstances change, as I have sought to 
demonstrate. This chapter provides historical and empirical insight into how that 
change occurred, and what its consequences were for the political spaces that were 
created in a specific point in time.  
Even though the assembly was a model for the others, the campaign that they 
carried out was regarded as a success, and the legitimating effect of the initiative taken 
on the night of the referendum was beneficial to their project of institutionalization, 
the assembly split up 7 months after the discussions included in this chapter. In the 
following chapter, I will discuss how the assembly disintegrated and the temporal 
reasons behind its disintegration.  
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Chapter 4 
Future Imaginings and 
Disintegration: The 2017 Referendum 
 
 In the previous chapter, we have seen how the local “no” assemblies came into 
being and the types of practices they were engaged in during the referendum 
campaign. I have argued that the structure and the operational logic of the assembly 
was the result of an accumulation of experiences and political learning: It was a 
combination of the non-hierarchy, inclusivity, and decentralization principles 
popularized by the Gezi protests of 2013 with engagement with national (or “high” or 
“macro”) politics, flexibility in relationships with institutions (especially political 
parties and party members), and longer-term ideas about the goals and function of the 
assemblies. I have further argued that the specific form that the local “no” assemblies 
took, and their repertoire of contention were the result of activists’ re-reading the past 
with a view towards the future. Organizers discussed the lessons of Gezi, but also the 
political needs of the time, in expectation of a more repressive regime. It was on the 
basis of these considerations, of both antecedents and anticipations, that they created 
these new spaces of contention. The last chapter’s focus, however, remained mostly 
on Gezi, a past event, and the way it was re-read by activists. 
 In this chapter we turn our gaze, together with the activists, from the past to 
the near future. As the referendum was left behind, the question for assembly 
participants became much more about how to repurpose the assemblies and to predict 
the political schedule. The period this chapter looks at covers the dissolution of the 
assembly. As we have seen in the last chapter, the assembly was well attended during 
the campaign; it was a model for the others; it managed to mobilize a series of protests 
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against the rigged results of the referendum that started on the night of the referendum 
and lasted for a week; and most importantly, its break-up happened at a time when all 
of its participants agreed that the best way to move forward was to stay together and 
coordinate action. Hence, the disintegration of this assembly in January 2018 was as 
significant as it was unexpected. The question, then, is why and how what appeared 
to be a successful grassroots organization disintegrated at the time that it did.  
 
The Referendum 
 
This chapter engages with the question of coordinating action during 
transitional and politically volatile times, in high-stakes situations. I take grassroots 
activism in Istanbul, Turkey between 2017 and 2018 as a case in point, when a 
constitutional referendum and presidential/general elections took place, under the state 
of emergency, to institute a dictatorial regime. The overarching argument is that future 
imaginings are a necessary temporal dimension that has been largely overlooked by 
social movement theory. During transitional periods such as the one I am looking at, 
uncertainty is observed in the myriad possibilities that are constantly up for debate 
everywhere and at all times. Acting within the context of a transition means not only 
that the present is more unstable than in an established political order (whether 
democratic or undemocratic), but also that the future is under construction in a way 
that opens up quantitatively more and qualitatively more unpredictable possibilities.  
I look at how the local assembly disintegrated at a time when coordinated 
action was perceived as the only viable strategy by the participants. This is a 
particularly revealing case to explore the dynamics of sense-making, decision-making, 
and coordination under increasingly repressive circumstances marked by threat and 
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shrinking political opportunities. Even though this case is not unique, in that 
movement actors everywhere go through similar processes, it is one where their 
dynamics are exposed in a short period of time, making them more starkly observable 
and yielding to theorization. 
In this chapter, I focus on the period around the constitutional referendum that 
was held on 16 April 2017. The referendum put to vote 18 amendments to the 
constitution that would abolish the post of prime minister, remove the parliament’s 
right to initiate a motion of no confidence, give the president the power to appoint the 
cabinet, and allow the president to be affiliated with a political party, among other 
changes.42 Overall, the amendments would change the political system in Turkey from 
a parliamentary to a presidential system with no checks and balances and with great 
powers to the executive.43 The “yes” vote won by 51.41% against 48.59% of the “no” 
votes. However, the results were shown to be rigged by independent election 
initiatives.44 Not only was the referendum carried out during a state of emergency, but 
also the voting process was not free and fair, especially in the east and southeast 
regions of the country.45 Moreover, on the day of the referendum, the High Electoral 
Board (Turkish acronym, YSK) declared that unstamped ballots would be counted as 
valid unless they were proven to be fraudulent.46  
 
42 For the National Bar Association’s analysis, see: 
http://anayasadegisikligi.barobirlik.org.tr/Anayasa_Degisikligi.aspx. For the state’s official 
declaration, see: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/02/20170211-1.htm.  
43 The Venice Commission’s report on the proposed changes to the constitution also cautioned against 
them: “the proposed constitutional amendments would introduce in Turkey a presidential regime which 
lacks the necessary checks and balances required to safeguard against becoming an authoritarian one” 
(Venice Commission Report, p. 29). For the full report, see: 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)005-e.  
44 For Oy ve Otesi’s report, see: https://oyveotesi.org/referandum-degerlendirmesi/.  
For Hayir ve Otesi’s report, see: 
https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/185913-hayir-ve-otesi-referandumda-olu-secmen-tespit-ettik.  
45For the HDP’s report, see: 
https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/Referandumu%20Baskı%20ve%20İhlal
%20Raporu.pdf. 
46 For the original declaration, see: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/duyuru/duyuru/5574.  
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For the opposition, the 2017 referendum was a political opportunity to reverse 
the transition to dictatorship. In the period leading up to the referendum, especially 
with the popularity of the “no” campaign, there was increasing hope and belief that 
the referendum would be won, although the consequences of that win were ambiguous. 
The memory of 2015, when, after the electoral success of the HDP, the state 
recommenced the war on Kurds and the opposition in general was still fresh in 
activists’ minds. As uplifting as it was, the “no” campaign was carried out under an 
increasingly repressive and authoritarian regime, one that ruled via the unending state 
of emergency. The anxiety generated by this paradox was carried over to the period 
after the referendum as well. The difference was that before the referendum, during 
the campaign, the goal was clear: campaign for the referendum as a first step towards 
the way out. It was both a crucial institutional political opportunity whose strategic 
importance was undeniable, and it was also an external imposition with a deadline set 
before us. In the one year after the referendum, until the 2018 general and presidential 
elections were announced, there was no deadline, and no structural imposition that 
activists could agree on as a specific goal. The initial raison d’être of the local “no” 
assemblies, campaigning for the referendum, was no longer in existence. This is not 
to say that there were not enough issues to fight over: there was the state of emergency, 
laws by decree, hunger strikes, workplace deaths, arrests, to name a few. But it was 
difficult for the different groups involved to agree on the strategic significance of these 
events, as well as their public resonance. The local “no” assembly that I study, after 
months of deliberation, decided to change its name to “democracy” assembly, 
agreeing enough on the centrality of a vague “democracy” for the struggle to be 
pursued from then on. What everybody agreed on was the threat of fascism as I 
demonstrate in the section titled “the future”. However, this agreement was not enough 
 149 
 
by itself to keep the different actors together, as they anticipated divergent routes in 
the near future in the absence of a pre-determined political schedule.  
In what follows, I first provide an overview of the relevant literatures. Then, I 
proceed to show what the future looks like for the activists that I study and move on 
to a detailed discussion of an assembly meeting that marks the dissolution of that 
particular local assembly. Using ethnographic field notes, I show how differences in 
temporal frameworks eroded the basis on which activists usually coordinated their 
next steps, leading to an unresolvable mismatch in expectations and hence, in action. 
I conclude the section by reflecting on the importance of future projections for 
movement orientation and trajectories.  
 
Social Movements, Future Projections, and the Imaginary  
 
In an article reviewing the use of temporality in social movement theory, 
McAdam and Sewell (2001) concentrate on long-, medium-, and short-term processes. 
According to the authors, scholars of social movements have used two temporal 
templates: "long-term change processes" and protest cycles. The first template refers 
to processes like industrialization, urbanization, and state-formation, and has been 
employed by a wide range of scholars from classical social theorists through to 
McAdam's political process model. The second template, protest cycles, is a term 
coined by Sidney Tarrow (1989) and has been used to define the most active phase of 
a movement. Protest cycles get at the cyclical rhythm of mobilization with a focus on 
the medium-term, whereas long-term change processes focus on effects of historical 
developments and processes. McAdam and Sewell (2001) offer two new temporalities 
for the study of social movements and revolutions. The first is transformative events, 
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which embody a different temporality than the previous two. It is a short and 
punctuated temporality, where contingencies and the sequencing of actions may have 
durable and structural effects in the long run (p. 102).47 The second is what McAdam 
and Sewell (2001) call “cultural epochs of contention”. Like Charles Tilly’s (1977) 
repertoires of collective action, some forms of contentious politics remain available 
for long periods of time, being mobilized in times of transformative events (p. 112-
113). In their short review of temporalities in social movement theory, McAdam and 
Sewell go from long-term change processes to medium-term protest cycles, to the 
short-term, punctuated temporality of the event, and end with another long-term 
temporal concept, the epoch.  
The treatment of temporality in social movement studies has been limited to 
long-, medium-, and short-term processes or their effects. Even though we see 
references to temporality throughout the literature, they remain mostly implicit. From 
social movement framing to narratives, from strategies and tactics to the political 
process model, from identity to emotions, the literature on social movements takes 
into account past, present, and future orientations and goals; diagnosis as well as 
prognosis. Yet, temporality runs in the background of these theories rather than being 
an explanan, the thing that does the explaining. 
Ann Mische, one of the first social movements scholars who called for a 
temporal approach to study action (2009), employs temporality as a major element for 
explaining social movement phenomena. She offers the concept of the “project”, or 
“projectivity”, to go beyond the static, overly instrumental, or overly structural 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999) undertones of social movement theory. She argues that the 
concept of the project implies a more dialogical understanding of the processes under 
 
47 See also: Sewell's “eventful temporality” (1996). 
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construction in social movements, as well as “a more or less open-ended horizon of 
possibility, culturally structured through existing narratives yet still implying 
orientation, mission, even vocation, in a self-conscious engagement of a changeable 
future” (2001, p. 139). Indeed, activists can be defined as agents who are actively and 
purposefully involved in the making of the future, a future that is changeable, 
regardless of how they anticipate it to be. The past, as Mische also acknowledges, 
plays into this process as culturally structuring narratives, and I would also add, as 
organizationally structuring repertoires and interpretive frameworks. She gets at this 
point when she writes, “the process of project-formation also entails the capacity to 
interpret and coordinate one’s actions in accordance with the motives and projects of 
other actors” (p. 139). It is the interplay of future projections, or the imaginative 
engagement with the future, and the coordination between different actors on which I 
aim to elaborate in this paper.  
I use the language of imagination because it denotes a) the construction of a 
mental image of a society that is not (yet) in existence and b) the construction of a 
relationship with others, whether individuals or institutions, whom one does not know 
and who may or may not exist in the present. The classic example for the first aspect 
would be utopian futures in the form of science fiction or intentional communities. 
Examples for the second include Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" and 
Charles Taylor's "social imaginary". These two elements do not exclude each other; 
imagining a future society takes into account how people and institutions would relate 
to one another and imagining relations might involve thinking about alternative ways 
of relating. I highlight these two aspects separately because the scholarly use of the 
term tends to give weight to one or the other. Actors who strive for change are usually 
thought of as striving for a better future. For instance, Baiocchi et al. (2014) have 
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coined the term “civic imagination” as “the ways in which people individually or 
collectively envision a better political, social, and civic environment, and work toward 
achieving that future” (p. 20). They argue that the type of imagination that groups 
foster affects action, recognizing that it changes with changing circumstances. To take 
another quotation where they recap what they mean by civic imagination: “Civic 
imaginations underpin the processes of identifying problems and solutions, 
envisioning better societies and environments, and developing a plan to make those 
visions of a better future into reality” (p. 55). Imagining as an act of understanding, of 
interpretation, of “identifying problems and solutions” as they call it, resonates well 
with how I use it. Still, the concept does not account for situations where opportunities 
are shrinking and the drive for action is not a better, but a worse future. In such 
situations, the question becomes how people continue to act when they imagine the 
future to be worse, not better. And what if the future is so uncertain that they cannot 
make plans?  
Taylor’s (2004) “social imaginary” gives weight to the second, relation-
oriented aspect. He explains: “I am thinking […] of the ways people imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them 
and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations” (p. 23). It is “what enables, 
through making sense of, the practices of a society” (p. 2). He uses the term to 
elucidate the rise of Western modernity which requires undertaking a historical 
project, where “historical” alludes to the past and covers the present. But what about 
how actors imagine their social positions in the future? 
 My use of the term imagination combines these two points: based on past and 
present experiences, activists imagine their social and political environment in the 
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future in a bid to understand what is going on which they then use to prevent a dreadful 
scenario from coming true. However, “the future” is not one big chunk of temporal 
imagery. I find the different dimensions of future projections that Ann Mische (2009, 
p. 609-701) has identified useful when dealing with the more intricate properties of 
imagination. For example, as social movement scholars have acknowledged, actors 
engage in long-, medium-, and short-term imaginings (reach). But there is more to 
temporality than reach. Imaginings involve different levels of detail (clarity), different 
ranges of possible scenarios (breadth), and varying degrees of considerations about 
relationships with and between other actors (sociality); the future can be seen as fixed 
or dependent (contingency), contracting or expanding (expandability), moving toward 
or away from us (volition).  I will be using this language to look at how, during a time 
of rapid change induced by regime change, variation along these dimensions affect the 
way activists make sense of the situation and make decisions on which to act.   
Making sense, making decisions, and action do not resolve themselves 
automatically, especially in times of crisis when the future is opaque and ambiguous. 
David R. Gibson (2012) in his study of the Cuban missile crisis uses conversation 
analysis to understand how crisis-related talk shaped and was shaped by the machinery 
of conversation and the relationship between decision-making and wider external 
circumstances (p. 10-11). He describes the crisis John F. Kennedy and the ExComm 
(his advisors) faced as one in which all options were bad options, where no option 
seemed better than the others. One of his key findings is that the most important 
activity the ExComm engaged in was what Gibson calls “foretalk”, or talk about 
possible future scenarios in the form of stories of events that have not yet occurred. 
These stories are different than stories about the past (p. 33): There is no “epistemic 
authority”, meaning, no one has “been there” before; conditional assertions (if...then 
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statements) are commonplace which shift the criteria for plausibility from what 
happened to the causal relationships between events; and closely related to the last 
point, narratives become path dependent and contingent, making them extremely 
sensitive to the sequencing of each moment/event in the story.  These elements 
complicate the processes of sense-making, decision-making, and action. In my field 
site, we will see that this was also the case especially when the issue at hand was 
concerning the near future. It was extremely difficult for participants to predict what 
was going to happen, when, in which order, and the effects of their actions. Agreeing 
on all of this required coordination through foretalk. 
Iddo Tavory and Nina Eliasoph (2013) call the process by which “actors orient 
each other toward their futures”, “coordinating futures” (p. 909). They identify three 
modes of future coordination that might fuse, disentangle, or clash with one another 
in everyday interaction. Two of these modes are particularly relevant to my work: 
trajectories and temporal landscapes.48 Trajectories refer to the series of moves actors 
make, often with a shared assumption of where they are going (p. 913), situating 
themselves within an extended time frame and taking their next steps accordingly. As 
I understand it, trajectories are located at the level between the immediate future (that 
would be what Tavory and Eliasoph call “protentions”, the level I leave out) and even 
farther horizons, or “temporal landscapes”49. The authors distinguish temporal 
landscapes from trajectories by its degree of naturalization: “People usually 
experience this kind of future as so naturalized that it forms the bedrock on which 
other future-oriented trajectories are being performed” (p. 916). In times of large-
 
48 Protentions is the third mode that I am not using. It refers to the moment-by-moment anticipations 
that actors usually take for granted. This level of analysis, however, risks being stuck in the moment 
and does not tell us much about the wider environment which I focus on in this paper.   
49 The term “temporal landscape” implies spatiality although I am not sure if this is intended, as their 
theory of anticipation does not explicitly deal with the relationship between space and temporality.  
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scale, historic change, the temporal landscape starts breaking down and is 
denaturalized. They suggest that in times like this, the relationship between trajectories 
and landscapes changes. Rather than being unable to make sense and know which 
trajectories to expect, people start glorifying individual projects (p. 928).  
The point at which the glorification of individual projects begins, if it begins 
at all, gives us insight into the relationship between trajectories and temporal 
landscapes. In this study, I use events as critical turning points that define the changes 
in this relationship. As we will see, the referendum was one such event, but not the 
one that led to the individualization of projects. It is also useful to think about Tavory 
and Eliasoph’s work in tandem with Mische’s dimensions of future projections. The 
differences between trajectories and temporal landscapes might be their scope (the 
near future versus the distant future) and the degree of naturalization, but they also 
differ in their level of clarity, range of possibilities, or volition, for example. Events 
as turning points marking the different stages of regime change alter the various 
dimensions of future projections, thus affecting trajectories.  
The ongoing regime change during my field work is the historic change that 
corresponds to a shifting temporal landscape. To use the spatial analogy implicit in the 
word “landscape”: the ground on which activists stand is snatched from under them. 
What is, under stable circumstances, routine and predictable becomes irregular and 
unreliable. The most glaring example, and the one that is debated in the meetings that 
I use as data in this paper, is the electoral schedule. Some of the uncertainties include 
questions like, “will we have elections? Local or general/presidential? When? Will 
they be rigged? Will the government start a war, domestic or abroad? Will they pass 
new laws to legalize their actions? Will we be allowed to win? What would be the 
consequences of a win? What is the political significance of the next elections?” The 
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transformation of the temporal landscape leads to these practical but politically 
charged questions, which are directly related to the trajectories that can be conceived 
as available at a given moment in time.  
 In this formulation, we see a particular relationship between the anticipated 
temporal landscape and possible trajectories. One might assume that when the 
temporal landscape, and the process leading to it, looks almost the same for everyone, 
it would be easier to agree on trajectories (what to do next). But that is not the case. In 
a transitional period during which the dreaded future seems more likely to be realized 
than the reversal of its implementation, there is nevertheless still some leeway for 
change, for reversal. However, after the referendum, in the absence of a structural 
opportunity in the near future, the trajectories to choose from were multiple and highly 
dependent on expectations about the sequence of events, as well as their pace. 
Therefore, the direct relationship between the temporal landscape and trajectories that 
could otherwise be assumed was broken, and activists were faced with the problem of 
coordinating futures, or in other words, the coordination of expectations about the near 
future. This is where foretalk comes in.  
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The Future: A Dystopian Temporal Landscape  
 
“We have an uncertain, colourless, grey process ahead of us” (S., assembly 
participant, field notes from January 2018) 
 
We are in a political party's office on the third floor of an apartment building. 
This week, we are trying out presentations to listen to and understand each other, 
desperate to solve an issue.  
 
During the third presentation, we hear a helicopter hovering very close to the 
building. Motorcycle noises follow. There are the flashing blue lights of the 
police on the windows. For some seconds, the presentation goes on, but no one 
is listening. Those who sit by the windows lean in to see what is going on. I listen, 
almost wait, for the quick and aggressive steps of the police climbing up the stairs 
of the building. The person sitting next to me, who is a member of the party 
whose office we are in, turns off his phone. And at last, someone voices what we 
are all thinking: "is the party being raided"? 
 
After the danger has passed, we talk about how bizarre it would be to get arrested 
there, because only a few people who are at the meeting are actually members of 
the party. One of them, a party member, says; "fascism does not discriminate", 
as if to prove a point he had made earlier in his presentation, that we need to stand 
together. (Field notes from January 2018) 
 
Our worry that what we were hearing could be a police raid was not without 
foundation, nor was it the result of overly anxious paranoia. In fact, raiding of activist 
homes, party headquarters, and public meetings was commonplace around the time of 
the referendum in 2017. Our instant assumption that we were being raided, and the 
way we nonchalantly talked about getting arrested point to the everyday expressions 
of the repressive regime.  
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The casualization of repression was not met with acceptance, and it was not 
normalized. Rather, it engendered anxiety and an urge to act (i.e. the need “to do 
something”). Through experiencing in the present and on a smaller scale50 how they 
imagined the future to be, these activists felt the need to devise ways to alter the 
awaited course of events. Their experience of the present was, as the excerpt above 
demonstrates, marked by threat. The source of the threat was the establishment of a 
new political order in which civil liberties, freedoms, and rights would be eliminated, 
making opposition activists much more vulnerable with regards to the state. In other 
words, the future held a dreaded, instead of a desired, political order. Dystopia 
replaced utopia as a driver of action.51  
I use the word dystopia to describe the kind of future that activists construct. 
It refers to a situation in which all scenarios about the future are nightmarish and 
difficult to change. Importantly, the dystopian imagination does not exclude the 
possibility of change or exit. In fact, dystopia, like utopia, is less about the perfect 
(perfectly good or perfectly bad) future and more about the present. As Ruth Levitas 
(2013) reminds us, "dystopia portrays the darkness of the lived moment, the difficulty 
of finding a way out of a totalizing system. It is not necessarily anti-utopian: anti-
utopianism actively opposes the imagination and pursuit of alternatives" (p. 110). 
Indeed, activists were fully aware of political opportunities, such as the 2017 
referendum or the 2018 elections, as events that gave them a chance to make a “crack 
in the system” which could then be deepened. But notice how even the prospect of 
 
50 The scale is smaller in the sense that daily repression in its various forms is experienced not by the 
opposition at large, but by active contenders of the regime. The non-engaged member of the opposition 
knows little, if at all, about the level of repression. What they hear about is the imprisonment of famous 
journalists, businessmen, and other public figures without necessarily feeling immediately and 
physically at risk.  
51 Dystopia replaces utopia because after the Gezi protests, utopia as a “better future” was a possibility 
that motivated certain types of grassroots politics.  
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winning an election or stopping a dictatorship via the referendum is only a “crack”; it 
is not a full victory. Winning in this case would be a morale booster as well as give 
the opposition a structural political opportunity, but it did not guarantee it. Even in the 
case of a win, the damage done by de-democratization would take years, maybe 
decades, to reverse; and worse, the regime could come out even stronger by crushing 
the opposition altogether, as it had done in 2015 after the HDP’s election victory – 
“we lost the election we had won 4 months ago”, as campaigners describe. The rigged 
referendum was lost in the same way: the “yes” vote to change the regime won by a 
margin – “neither yes nor no came out of the ballot box”. The state of failure-in-
success, the difficulty of making just a crack by winning a historic referendum, not 
knowing what will happen in case of success, and knowing that even if the AKP and 
Erdogan peacefully abdicate the throne so to speak (a highly unlikely scenario), re-
democratization would be extremely difficult and require an extended period of time 
is exactly what I mean by dystopia. Therefore, I use it as “a route into the debates of 
our time” (Sargisson, 2007, p. 32), not to conjure up a helpless and hopeless state of 
passive waiting.  
 What seems to be the central theme of the excerpt in the opening of the section, 
that “fascism does not discriminate”, appears in the form of a warning for what is to 
come. It speaks to the shape of the future that is anticipated by the activists, calling 
attention to the totalizing effect of a regime that will be unsparing in its repression. 
The presidential system that was the subject of the 2017 referendum was interpreted 
by some as “the last nail in the coffin” (Goktas, 2016). Throughout my fieldwork I 
heard people say, “we might not be able to do this meeting here in 2 weeks/2 months/6 
months”, suggesting the type of policing that activists anticipated, extrapolating from 
their experiences in the present. Once, when an assembly participant used the word 
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authoritarianism to describe the future, another activist remarked, “what 
authoritarianism? Are we in the EU?”, assigning the word authoritarianism an uptown 
meaning, a thing only for privileged people. What we will have is not authoritarianism 
but something far worse; “they’ll cut our asses off” was a repeated phrase. This is 
indeed the stuff of dystopia.  
 The dystopian imaginary was grounded in recent memory. The Turkish state, 
controlled by the AKP (Justice and Development Party; Turkish acronym AKP) 
government, had shown the terror it was capable of inflicting. During Gezi, the then-
prime-minister Erdogan had declared that he was “barely holding the 50% (his voters) 
in their homes”, a threat that meant he had full power over what his support base did. 
In 2016, during the military coup attempt, he did not hold them back but called his 
supporters to take to the streets to confront the military, and they did. The death toll 
was 240 people, and the photographs of the “democracy martyrs” were displayed in 
public places for months. Between the two general elections in 2015 which were four 
months apart, the war on the Kurdish people recommenced, cities were reduced to 
ruins, hundreds of people were killed and displaced in the process.52 During these four 
months, 33 young leftists died in a bombing in Suruç, a border-town close to Kobanê, 
on July 20th, and 103 died in the bombing in the capital Ankara on October 10th. In 
January of 2016, a bomb went off in Sultanahmet in Istanbul, and another on Istiklal 
Avenue, Istanbul, in March 2016. The bombings were blamed on ISIS by the officials, 
 
52 For HDP’s report on Cizre, see: 
https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/HDP'sCizreReport.pdf. For the Human 
Rights Association’s report on Cizre, see: 
https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/TIHV-IHD-
DiyarbakirBarosuCizreRaporu.pdf.  
For HDP’s report on Sur, see: 
https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/Surraporu.pdf. For the Human Rights 
Association’s report on Sur, see: https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/IHD-
TIHV-DTOSurIncelemeRaporu.pdf.  
For the HDP’s Yuksekova-Gever report, see: 
https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/geverrapor.pdf.  
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but the widely held belief in my field site was that Erdogan and his State were the real 
perpetrators of these terrors, either through direct involvement or indirectly through 
neglect.  
 As I have reviewed in the Introduction, the AKP’s terror was not limited to 
militaristic techniques. They were coupled with arrests, imprisonment, criminalization 
of the opposition, and mass firings due to political or religious affiliation. More than 
100,000 public sector workers were purged;53 tens of thousands were arrested and 
imprisoned, most of them HDP MPs including its co-leaders;54 elected mayors were 
removed from office; hundreds of media outlets and tens of publishing houses were 
closed down,55 hundreds of journalists were jailed;56 and Academics for Peace were 
purged and indicted with aiding terrorist organizations.57   
 Therefore, the dystopian imagination was rooted in the present and the recent 
past. When the future is so bleak, the question of action arises: How do people act 
when they expect the future to be worse? The open-endedness of the future and a sense 
of agency combined with foreseeable political opportunities marked this period. 
Hence, in the field, I usually heard about the future as an “if – then” clause: “a fascistic 
regime awaits us if we don’t do something”. Of course, both the first and second parts 
of this formulation changed according to the speaker’s naming of the problem and the 
solution they offered. But the idea remains the same. The first part describes the 
 
53 See: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/turkey. For detailed reports on the 
purges, consult the website: https://turkeypurge.com/.  
54 For the Human Rights Watch’s report, see: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/20/turkey-crackdown-kurdish-opposition.  
55 For the Human Rights Watch’s report, see: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/15/silencing-turkeys-media/governments-deepening-assault-
critical-journalism.  
56 For the Amnesty International’s report, see: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/6055/2017/en/.  
57 For the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey’s report on Academics for Peace, see: 
https://www.tihvakademi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Barisicinakademisyenlervakasi.pdf 
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dystopia, and the second the action to take to reverse the process leading up to the 
dystopia.  
 The “if-then” formulation hints at two distinct but concurrent ways of 
experiencing temporality. The first is the urgency to act, coupled with the sense that 
there is no time.58 The fascist regime of the future is imminent and all-encompassing. 
The threat is structural and political; it is also personal and physical. “We have no time 
– we are dying!” exclaimed one of the activists at an assembly meeting, a couple of 
weeks after the referendum. He meant what he said literally, referring to the massacres 
of the last couple of years, where hundreds died in bombings, among them his friends 
and comrades. He wanted to build an alliance between movements, now. Some 
thought it was impossible. Others said it was not the right time. But for some, “the 
right time” was a luxury that they did not have, there was simply no time.   
 To have no time means, in practice, that we experience time as accelerated 
time. Too many events happen in a short period, making last week’s news old news, 
allocating them to the sphere of the past. As events explode and then lose their 
importance as “event”, activists adjust their understandings, actions, and position. 
Adjustment means choosing from a range of possibilities. Activists need to make sense 
of the situation, compare possibilities, discuss their meanings and their pros and cons, 
rearrange their goals, review their principles, agree, disagree, negotiate, reorient their 
positions, think about their audience, core values, and a lot of other things. This 
process itself is not new or extraordinary. What is extraordinary is the frequency with 
which it is renewed and repeated under conditions of political uncertainty and looming 
dystopia. The most trivial of decisions become political quarrels, every single event is 
viewed as a critical opportunity that should be acted on – if not, we may never have 
 
58 Gibson (2012) uses the term “environmental impatience” to describe the same phenomenon. 
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the chance again. So, the “uncertain, colourless, grey process ahead of us” that S. 
(quoted above) foresees does not preclude possibilities. On the contrary, at these 
moments of reorientation, there are too many of them. In this sense, it is not the case 
that there is no time; rather, time stops.59 And this brings us to the second way in which 
temporality is experienced.  
 Inundation with critical political decisions to make every other day, or every 
week, leads to the suspension of time, which opens up space for possibilities by way 
of slowing down our perception of temporality. Imagine a basketball player shooting 
the ball from a distance exactly when their 24 seconds are up. It takes only a few 
seconds, maybe moments, until the ball reaches the basket. During this time, everyone 
falls silent and holds their breath. Even the players stop for that moment. Especially if 
the point is a critical one, a decisive one that will determine the winner and the loser, 
the participants of the moment go through a range of emotions and consider a variety 
of possible scenarios; what they would mean, how to react, what the team should do 
next. This all happens in a moment of uncertainty and anticipation, when we 
experience time in abeyance. Something similar happens in my field site. When the 
“disaster” is around the corner, every move becomes critical and politically charged; 
there is no time and simultaneously, it slows down, exposing us to the wealth of 
possibilities to choose from quickly and efficiently, all the while the dystopia of the 
fascist state looming closer and larger.60  
 
 
59 Similar to what Wagner-Pacifici (2000) describes as “the standoff”.  
60 In Mische’s terms, volition: the future is coming towards us.  
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Scenarios: Competing Anticipations, Trajectories, and the 
Disintegration of the Assembly 
 
Participants of the assembly shared the dystopian view of the future, especially 
after the referendum was lost. This view involved more repression, a greater risk of 
arrests and imprisonment, less opportunity to voice dissent, less participation, and 
fewer avenues of struggle. Everyone agreed that the overall political situation was 
getting worse, that the temporal landscape looked dystopian if it was not reversed, but 
not everyone agreed on what to expect, and when. The discretionary nature of the 
regime made sure that people stayed in the dark about the political schedule, disrupting 
the rhythm of politics itself, and therefore resulting in politics at all levels, but 
particularly at the level of the grassroots, turning into a matter of guesswork to 
“coordinate futures”. Below, I try to flesh out how disruption in the ordinary calendar 
of politics and the ensuing guesswork brought into light the differences in future 
projections, thus leading to the disintegration of the local assembly.  
There were a number of explanations for the disintegration of the assembly. 
Most centred around waning participation by unaffiliated members combined with 
political organizations’ insistence on their own agenda. When I asked M., a core 
organizer who left the assembly in the summer of 2017, why she left, her reply 
summarized the most common arguments for the break-up. I am reproducing here a 
lengthy part from our interview to give her the stage: 
 
After the referendum, a lot of people left the assembly. We were left alone with 
political organizations. I was never allergic to political organizations, really, but 
their dynamics are so different. This is how: You are an organization; you have 
an agenda you have set for yourself. Even if you say you do not, you do. The 
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independents [the unaffiliated participants] were the people who diluted the 
assembly. They were the ones who made it “softer”, who made our language 
more understandable for the person on the street. Political organizations do not 
work this way […] The referendum was over, and until May, June [2017] the 
independents were still with us. We held a big meeting to discuss what to do next, 
our roadmap. 100-odd people attended. We spoke, we discussed, we took notes. 
Summer arrived. These people are from [a middle-class neighborhood], they 
have summer houses in Bodrum, in Didim. They marched off to their summer 
houses. Or they just quit. But they always said this: If something happens, we are 
here. But they should have been here then. When we were left with organizations 
the situation got harsher. Because each organization had a different idea for after 
the referendum. We started talking about our roadmap, about what to do, every 
week and we entered into a process where we could not make decisions. We 
talked and talked. We held big meetings, made big decisions, but did not stick to 
them. I am an independent, what can I do in a situation like this? 
 
M. explains the coming apart of the assembly by the contrast in the operational logics 
of political organizations (such as political parties and other institutions) and 
grassroots organizations (such as the assemblies). The unaffiliated members in this 
explanation function as the buffer zone between organizations that push for their own 
agendas, or as people who ensure a balance in the group’s choices and actions. When 
they withdrew from the assembly61, organizations commenced to fight over the 
trajectory of the assembly, and the few unaffiliated members like M. herself felt 
powerless against the organized rhetoric of organizations who outnumbered them. In 
a way, this is both a story of a protest cycle (Tarrow, 1993; 1998) with a peak in 
mobilization during the referendum campaign followed by a decline in participation; 
and a classic case of movement co-optation by institutional actors (e.g., Piven & 
 
61 M. makes another temporal argument here to explain the withdrawal of unaffiliated participants: 
“Summer arrived […] They marched off to their summer houses”. This was not the first time that I 
heard this argument; activists were already anticipating a (hopefully temporary) diminishment in 
participation after the referendum, caused by the holiday season (of the upper classes). The arrival of 
winter was thought to be a significant factor in why the park forums could not sustain themselves after 
Gezi. As interesting as it is, I cannot go further into the seasonality of participation in this chapter.  
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Cloward, 1979). Two very plausible explanations backed up by the literature on social 
movements as well. 
 When I arrived in Istanbul in December 2017, I was aware of the process of 
decline from friends with whom I kept in touch. This is why, when I attended the 
weekly coordination meeting of the assembly, I was surprised by the number of 
participants (there were about 30 people at the meeting, which was not that different 
from the campaign period), and also by the number of new faces around the table. The 
smaller neighborhood assemblies had been inactive for some time, which I thought 
was expected in a period of demobilization, but the fact that the coordination group 
still met regularly with 30 participants, old and new, was a pleasant surprise. The 
discussion at that meeting revolved around the “roadmap”: Whether to campaign for 
a possible election or to organize a boycott; who we would campaign for in case the 
far-right candidate of the Good Party (Iyi Parti, Turkish acronym IYIP), Meral 
Akşener, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the AKP competed in the second round of the 
elections; and whether we should campaign against the state of emergency instead. It 
was a heated debate, verging on a fight from time to time. Lively discussions were 
characteristic of the assemblies, even though fights were rare but not unheard of. It did 
not seem to me like this was an unsurmountable problem. I started questioning the 
declining participation and co-optation explanations.  
 A closer reading of the quotation from M. gave me a lead as to what could be 
happening. “Each organization had a different idea for after the referendum”. What 
were these ideas and what were they based on? Where exactly lay the differences? Did 
each have a different plan or different interests? Were they simply trying to take over 
the assembly? The answer to the last question seemed the easiest to answer; at a stage 
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where the assembly had been narrowed down to the coordination group, this was the 
least plausible explanation. The meetings that followed helped me find an answer.  
 Before moving on to my analysis of the meetings that marked the 
disintegration of the assembly, let us listen to K., an unaffiliated assembly participant 
with a background in socialist politics. When I asked him for his interpretation of how 
the assembly came apart, he retrospectively reflected on it: 
 
It was because of the dissimilar future imaginations [benzeşmeyen gelecek 
tahayyülleri] of the organizations, groups, and individuals that were involved 
[…] I can’t say how each differed on behalf of them, but each had a different 
reading of politics in Turkey, according to which they positioned themselves […] 
Organizations that did not insist on the assemblies as a tool for the struggle were 
on the lookout for what the other two actors [the CHP and the HDP] were doing 
to determine their own future “projections” [gelecek projeksiyonları]. 
 
K.’s observations do not contradict the previous explanations but specify how they 
work. His focus is on the future and how not only organizations, but also individuals 
were trying to position themselves with regards to other powerful actors in politics. 
As we will see, my analysis of the series of meetings that culminated in the 
disintegration of the assembly in its specific form is much more in line with K.’s 
interpretation. He even uses the phrases “future imaginations” and “future projections” 
(even using the English word “projections”) the way I use them, even though I borrow 
the latter from Ann Mische (2009). In the rest of this section, I will delve deeper into 
the intricacies of the two competing future projections that are representative of the 
conflict that resulted in the disintegration of the assembly. As we will see, foretalk is 
the mode of communication that comes to the fore in these debates.  
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In late December 2017, a group of participants, mostly people who were not 
affiliated with a political party or organization, organized a meeting of about 35 people 
from different local assemblies, political parties, and organizations. The topic was the 
next elections, originally scheduled for November 2019.62 This meeting lasted for 
more than three hours, mostly because of the confusion and disappointment caused by 
the fact that the meeting had been scheduled on the same day and at the same time as 
the local assembly meeting normally took place. The organizers said the time conflict 
was only an accident, but essentially, this meeting pointed to a split in the local 
assembly. The reason why one group within the assembly held a separate meeting was 
because they had been discussing how to proceed for months, the discussion was 
deadlocked, and some people felt like they had to “move” (take action) fast. The issue 
in question was whether to continue by working towards the coming elections 
originally scheduled to take place in 2019, or to campaign against the state of 
emergency and the laws by decree. Those that advocated for the elections argued that 
there could anytime be snap elections, pointing out the discretionary nature of 
Erdogan's rule and the uncertainty of the near future. In other words, the problem was 
organizing for an anticipated but not yet officially scheduled political event that would 
be on the public agenda once it was scheduled, but was not yet. Those who opposed 
the former view claimed that elections were not on people's agenda and that to 
campaign for an election during the state of emergency would be inconsistent with the 
assembly's earlier stance on the illegitimacy of the current regime. Erdogan and his 
government were illegitimate after all, and to campaign for an election under 
undemocratic circumstances would legitimize the elections and the government. The 
dilemma here was the perceived contradiction between past and future actions. 
 
62 On 20 April 2018, officials announced that the general elections would be held on 24 June of the 
same year, giving only a two-month notice.  
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Outsiders were confused about why both could not be done together, as they fed into 
each other, but the two sides of this conversation had been insistent on their respective 
positions for two to three months. The original local assembly meeting could not be 
carried out that week because there were only a handful of people, most of which were 
from the same organization (the ones that opposed working towards elections).  
The week after the splinter meeting, the assembly gathered as usual. It was a 
tense meeting where the political group that was left out of the splinter meeting was 
questioning the ethics and principles of the assembly, its decision-making structure 
(i.e. “what do we do when we can’t make a decision? Splinter off?”), as well as voicing 
the disappointment and distrust that it had caused. The splinter group had a variety of 
responses, clustering around “You can’t question which meeting I prefer to go to”, 
“you (referring to the two political organizations that were left out of the splinter 
meeting) have been imposing your own views on the assembly and have caused an 
impasse”, and “we are not being cooperative and agreeable when we should be moving 
together”.  The last remark struck a chord and the meeting ended with the decision to 
hold another meeting next week, with anyone who had formulated a way to go forward 
to make a 30-minute presentation. Doing presentations was a last resort to fix what 
was thought to be the problem: People did not listen to one another to understand but 
to object to the other side's ideas.  
If we take a step back, the “not listening” interpretation also implies that some 
political groups were breaching the individual participation principle and attending the 
meetings with their own political group’s interests/agenda in mind, without being open 
to persuasion by others. It is also very likely that different groups were pushing 
forward their own agenda through the various conversational mechanisms that Gibson 
(2012) uncovers. According to Gibson, one way in which decisions can still be made 
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even when all options are risky is suppression; “the systematic and largely consensual 
nonsaying of something that could have been said” (p. 102). In my field site, there was 
a deadlock because no one (neither groups nor individuals) was willing to suppress 
and sacrifice their own version of how events would unfold in the near future. They 
did not, because the stakes were very high, and our chances of having another 
opportunity very low. Therefore, a closer analysis of the meeting reveals that this was 
not entirely about not listening or political parties' insistence on imposing their own 
views. Instead, it was a mismatch between disparate temporal frameworks that 
resulted in the dissolution of the assembly. Doing presentations was a way of 
sidestepping the narrative and conversational complications that arose from 
interlacing and competing stories about the future, by compartmentalizing each 
speaker (the “no interruptions” rule) and formalizing the delivery of foretalk (the 
problem first, the demand later, and lastly, concrete suggestions for what to do). This 
method, as we shall see, did not work because the problem was deeper and much less 
negotiable than activists thought; the difficulty, I argue, lied in the disparity between 
anticipations, a matter of the more intricate qualities of future projections.  
The next meeting was held on the second week of January 2018. Out of the 
five presenters, one had no formal political affiliation, one was a member of the HDP, 
one was from a party that was a part of the HDP, and the remaining two were from 
two different political associations. The presenters were asked to communicate how 
they interpreted the political situation and to offer a solution or a “roadmap” for the 
assembly’s next steps. At the end of each presentation, there was time for questions, 
but it was emphasized by the facilitator and the person who suggested doing 
presentations that the questions should be genuine ones to understand more clearly 
what the presenter had in mind. I will concentrate on two presentations here that I 
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think get at the core points of the two sides of the conflict. These presenters were then 
involved in two different campaigns – in the way each saw fit – for the 2018 general 
and presidential elections.   
The first two presenters were from political associations. It should be noted 
that these associations were the ones that have been accused, by the splinter group, of 
hindering the decision-making process. The first presenter started with an assessment, 
and I paraphrase: “democracy has been stolen from us via the shady referendum, and 
now we are going through a process of a transition to ‘open fascism’ (associated with 
military coups and junta regimes). We are dealing with a ‘stolen government’, a ‘stolen 
referendum’, and ‘stolen rights’. ‘We have an uncertain, colourless, grey process 
ahead of us.’ In a situation like this, our most important demand is democracy.” 
Everyone agreed on this point. Even her use of the term “open fascism”, although I 
knew that some people did not agree with it, did not seem to bother anyone. She went 
on: “There can be no election without democracy.” People started to get fidgety in 
their seats, checking their phones, taking notes, whispering to the person sitting next 
to them. But no one interrupted: “The referendum was held during the state of 
emergency and we lost. Then, we declared the results illegitimate. We were 
unsuccessful at the referendum because it took place under undemocratic conditions.63 
What we should do now is to ensure that the coming elections, if we have elections at 
all, take place under democratic circumstances. We should mould the path to the 
elections so that if we have elections, they will be carried out in a democracy.” She 
ended her presentation by offering three suggestions for campaigns/demands: “The 
state of emergency should be lifted; laws by decree should be nullified; and we should 
 
63 The parliament under the control of AKP changed a law on the day of the referendum, allowing 
unstamped ballots to be counted. This gave way to millions of invalid votes to be counted as valid.  
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pay more attention to local problems, because this would bring in more participants 
and help to fight the everyday fascist discourse of the regime”.  
  In this presentation, there are three main points: The first is that the future is 
dark and uncertain. Everyone agrees at this stage; this is “open fascism” and the 
demand is democracy against this regime. We observe the uncertainty in her passing 
remark, “if we have elections at all”. The scheduled political plan says November 
2019, but the presenter considers the possibility of the elections being called off. 
Secondly, she puts forth an argument: “There can be no election without democracy”. 
Here, the assumption is that elections will be cancelled altogether, or that people will 
boycott them. This assumption considerably lessens the possibility of an election 
taking place in the near future. And thirdly, she concentrates on the process leading to 
the elections in 2019, putting democratization chronologically first, and the elections 
second. When she was asked, “I agree that we might find ourselves living under open 
fascism any time now. Do we have duties that are particular to today? I mean, what 
are we going to do in case of an election?”, her answer captured these three points 
perfectly. She replied point-blank, “the election is not of any interest to me today, we 
have a year and a half to go. As long as we can shape the conditions that lead to the 
elections, we won’t need to do much afterwards”.   
The second group felt otherwise. The fourth presentation was by a man who 
was a member of one of the socialist parties within the HDP. He started with two 
interrelated questions that he thought we should ask ourselves: “How do we stop 
fascism from being institutionalized?” and “over which common denominator can we 
build a united front for the struggle against fascism?”. He then expanded the first 
presenter’s formulation: “Demanding democracy against the one-man regime, we 
must unify the democratic forces”. According to this view, it did not matter so much 
 173 
 
whether the elections were going to happen. The issue was not an either-or between 
campaigning for the elections versus the state of emergency. “Dictatorship and civil 
war await us either way. To prepare for the new order, we should have a united front. 
The two opposition parties in the parliament, CHP and HDP, should cooperate for 
such a front, but they will not unless their support bases put pressure on them from 
below. This coming together from the bottom up can only be accomplished through 
the assemblies, since they are not associated with any political party. Being prepared 
for what is to come can only be possible if we are able to implement a democratic 
culture in these spaces”. He ended his presentation by commenting on the use of the 
elections: “There might be snap elections, so we have to be ready for it. But more 
importantly, we must use the elections as a way to mobilize and organize people into 
local assemblies so that we can become political actors and have an effect on the CHP 
and the HDP.” Except for a few who rarely attended the meetings, the room seemed 
to be in agreement throughout this presentation, nodding, and occasionally expressing 
verbal approval (e.g. “exactly!”). That is probably why there were not many questions, 
except for an older socialist who expressed his scepticism by saying, “to ask for a 
revolution is easier than doing this”.  
If we compare this presentation with the previous one, we see that they are 
similar in their views about the temporal landscape: The situation is getting worse, it 
is a dictatorship, and there might even be a civil war. All options seem bad. They also 
agree on uncertainty: The presenter does not know if and when we should expect 
elections. However, we get the sense that he expects a snap election, first because he 
suggests using it for larger political goals, but also because he was a participant in the 
splinter meeting. Both sides view democracy or democratization as the ultimate goal, 
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but the second presenter, considering the elections as a tool, places the elections 
chronologically before the attainment of democracy.  
Bringing back Ann Mische’s dimensions, activists’ dystopian imaginary had a 
long-term reach in the sense that it covered an extensive future, even though when that 
future would begin was unclear. It was a near-future that extended into the further 
timescape and defined the whole, ranging from individual biographies and everyday 
experiences to possibilities of collective action to the shaping of political history. The 
dystopian future was rushing towards us, but its realization was contingent on our 
ability or inability to make use of political opportunities, at a time when they were 
perceived to be contracting. In terms of breadth, actors imagined the future to be 
heading in a dystopian direction, but there were multiple possibilities for action in the 
short and medium term.  
A shared dystopian imaginary was not enough to unite activists under a 
common agenda. Although the struggle was framed as a struggle for democracy 
against fascism, the disruption of the political schedule meant that different persons 
and groups anticipated disparate opportunities for action. Although the disparity in 
anticipations was not necessarily conflicting, they were competing interpretations that 
led to the dissolution – or transformation – of the assembly.  
The competing anticipations were multi-layered, and it was in these layers that 
lay the source of the divergence. The first group, which objected to campaigning for 
the elections at the time, saw the elections as fixed in 2019. The second, pro-campaign 
group accounted for a wider range of scenarios, not only about the date of the elections, 
but also about how different political actors (parties, leaders, organizations, the state, 
etc.) might act. In this sense, the second project was both wider in breadth (range of 
scenarios) and higher in its degree of sociality (relationships between different actors’ 
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actions). In terms of volition, while the first group perceived the next elections as 
moving away from us, as something that might not happen at all, the second group 
thought it was running towards us, as something that could happen any time. 
Accordingly, the reach of each imaginary differed. Whereas the first group focused 
more on what to do until the elections, the second group offered a project with a long-
term reach: Elections had to be used as a political tool for the development of the local 
assemblies, which would be the basis of organizing and mobilizing people against the 
fascist regime of the future.  
I add two more to Mische’s dimensions that were arguably more prominent in 
the discussions: Pace and sequence. Pace refers to the tempo or rhythm at which future 
occurrences are imagined to happen. Sequencing refers to the chronological order of 
the anticipated events. The two groups diverged regarding these dimensions. The first 
expected a slower pace, and a chronological order where the elections came last. The 
second awaited the continuation of the fast pace of politics and put the possibility of a 
snap election earlier in their imagined chronology. These differences produced 
different orientations: Shaping the process until 2019 versus being prepared and 
organizing for the snap elections and beyond, respectively.  
The second project turned out to be more ambitious than the first one. The 
meeting ended on a friendly note, but the assembly drew less and less activists and 
eventually disintegrated, also since the splinter group grew into a different, elections-
oriented assembly and attracted more people. This new assembly, however, was far 
from the vision of the second presentation, and they remained focused solely on the 
elections (on ballot safety, to be precise). One of their main organizers was imprisoned 
right after the assembly was established, and a small group splintered off from that 
group as well. Interestingly, the head of the association whose members fiercely 
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objected to campaigning for the elections was elected as an HDP MP in the snap 
elections of June 2018.  
   
Conclusion 
 
If I were to analyse this data in terms of structures of opportunity and threat, 
like social movement theorists often do, I would expect to find continuing alliance 
between diverse political groups that agreed, at least, on how to move forward. I would 
expect everyone involved to cooperate because they all agreed that they were in the 
same struggle against the same threat; namely, the struggle for democracy against 
fascism. In other words, the frame by which they constructed the situation was the 
same. Moreover, the stakes were so high for activists that I would assume they could 
not afford to dismantle an assembly that had become a model for all the others; that 
proved itself, during the referendum campaign, to be an efficient structure capable of 
attracting participants and mobilizing them. Instead, what happened was the 
bifurcation of the assembly, where different collectivities adopted divergent tactics 
and orientations towards the 2018 elections. Explaining this divergence through 
differing interests or goals would not be plausible as both sides of the conflict framed 
them in the same way. An explanation involving sectarianism or factionalism would 
entail a circular logic where factionalism-as-outcome would be explained by 
factionalism-as-cause, conflating the explanandum with the explanan. The data 
presented here would not sit squarely within a long- versus short-term goals/outcomes 
framework either, because the core of the disagreement was not short-term goals per 
se; once the 2018 elections were announced, both sides campaigned for them in one 
form or another. That is, the importance of the elections as a short-term goal was not 
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the source of contention. Instead, it was the mismatch between the different 
dimensions of anticipations about the near-future in a high-stakes political 
environment.  
In this chapter, I argued that the disintegration of the assembly was best 
explained by the activists’ competing interpretations and anticipations about the 
future. I tried to show how the divergence in orientations and trajectories was the result 
of; 
1. A shifting temporal landscape (Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013): Regime change led 
to the disruption of the rhythm of politics in general and of the regular calendar 
of politics in particular. This disruption prompted uncertainty, anxiety, and an 
urge to act to reverse the awaited course of events. Foretalk (Gibson, 2012) 
became the dominant conversational mode, where activists attempted to orient 
themselves with regards to the anticipated political situation, and to 
“coordinate futures” (Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013) with one another.     
2. A shared dystopian imaginary concerning the extended future and a specific 
experience of time: The transition to authoritarianism and the disruption of the 
political schedule affected activists’ future imaginings and brought about a 
dystopian imaginary. However, this common vision was not sufficient to 
coordinate action. The stakes were high, and a fascist future was moving 
towards us; in this sense, there was no time. Simultaneously, there was a 
multiplicity of possibilities and routes from which to choose; in this sense, time 
slowed down. Actors in the political field had to reorient themselves with 
regards to the various scenarios they anticipated. These scenarios constituted 
the content of foretalk.  
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3. Scenarios about what would happen next that differed in their reach, breadth, 
clarity, volition, and sociality (Mische, 2009), as well as in pace and 
sequencing: Choices made during this period were particularly critical, as they 
were perceived as a last chance to prevent a dreadful scenario from coming 
true. Events held historical, political, and personal stakes. In this context, the 
assembly was unable to agree on a scenario even though they were not 
conflicting ones.   
 
What activists attempted to develop in these meetings was a “feel for the 
game”, a way to predict the political schedule and orient themselves, and one another, 
with respect to that plan. When their projected futures did not match, the group came 
apart. We know that in times of drastic historic change, prediction and orientation 
involve making calculations and miscalculations (Ermakoff, 2008) and trying to re-
establish a shared sense of what the story is (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010). In this paper, I 
tried to show how even though both sides of the conflict imagined the future to be 
fascistic, they came up with different tactics and followed distinct trajectories based 
on their differing expectations. I argue that this has significant implications for the 
theory of social movements.  
As I have mentioned, social movement theory is not oblivious to temporality. 
It has been taken into consideration in theories of participation (e.g. McAdam, 1986) 
and movement outcomes (e.g. Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010). The political 
process model (McAdam, 1999) theorizes the role of opportunity - and to a lesser 
extent the role of threat (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001) - in movement politics. Although 
these theories imply time as a factor in movement participation, trajectories, and 
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outcomes, temporality in general and future projections in particular have not been 
systematically mobilized as a necessary explanatory dimension of activism. 
The debates analysed in this chapter are fundamentally debates about strategy 
and framing, which bring us to “collective action frames” (Gamson, 1992) and “frame 
alignment” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986) in social movement studies. 
The former is composed of three elements: An emotionally appealing definition of 
injustice, a clearly defined identity that delineates “us” from “them, and a 
consideration of agency (Gamson, 1992, p. 7-8). The frame alignment process 
involves bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation (Snow et al., 1986). 
Both concepts are anchored in the assumption that movement actors have to take into 
consideration how their decisions, actions, or frames will be received by a broader 
public. In other words, they construct frames expecting a positive reaction from the 
public or their target audience, hence their strategic character. The element of 
expectation is inherent in the framing literature.  
As I mentioned in the beginning of this conclusion, both sides of the conflict 
that split up the assembly framed the threat in the same way: They anticipated a 
dystopian temporal landscape in the distant future. This agreement can be viewed as 
serving as a collective action frame where all of the actors involved agree, in this case 
at both the individual and the collective levels, on the threat of a fascistic regime. It is 
a specific “reading of Turkish politics” as K., quoted above, put it in his interview. But 
this collective action frame did not lead to action as the literature on frames would 
expect. Can we explain this puzzle as the frame alignment process gone wrong?  
Throughout the chapter, I have tried to show that the knot that could not be 
untied was indeed caused by a misalignment, although it was not the misalignment of 
the frames of different groups or groupings within the assembly. The discussions 
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involved some degree of the frame alignment process in the sense that activists 
considered how their choices would resonate with the general public, which took the 
form of talking about what is or is not on the public’s agenda. However, the fit between 
activists’ framing (of the problem, the solution, and the motivation) was only part of 
the discussion and not the central issue. As I have argued, the misalignment, or the 
mismatch as I phrased it in the chapter, was between each side’s envisioning of the 
near future. More precisely, the conflict was over the political schedule, caused by the 
guesswork that had to go into predicting when the next elections would take place, if 
at all. That is why foretalk was the dominant mode of the conversations during this 
period.64  
To the extent that the conflict can be described as a temporal mismatch, the 
concept of “temporal blindspots” put forth by Robin Wagner-Pacifici and Colin 
Ruggero (2018) is closer to what I describe in this chapter. The term refers to 
“coordinative disjunctures” within and across different levels – whether they be 
individual, interactional, organizational, or movement – that have a stymieing effect 
on social movements (p. 2). Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero argue that individual 
temporalities and how they intersect with each other or with the temporality of the 
movement constitute the movement’s temporalities. They introduce the notion of 
“temporal ideologies”, defined simply as systematic “ideologies abut time itself” (p. 
2-3), as constitutive of temporal blindspots. Temporal ideologies and experiences of 
time include “the relative importance of history, speciﬁc historical experiences, and 
the precedents of prior social and political movements; the prioritizing of temporal 
commitments that vary over the stages of the life-course (work time, family time, civic 
 
64 Perhaps a “master frame” (Snow & Benford, 1992), an agreed-upon set of cultural values proven to 
be resonant by earlier movements which could then be used in other contexts, would solve these issues 
but that is a different level of analysis than what I have in this chapter.  
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time); explicit commitments to temporal reﬁgurations (e.g. preﬁgurational politics); 
the inter-relations of time, fatigue, and commitments to egalitarianism (e.g. 
participatory democracy’s ‘endless meetings’ in Polletta’s [2002] framing)” (p. 3). In 
this list, the broad category of temporal ideologies does not include orientations to the 
future, even though they are attentive to questions regarding the future throughout the 
article.65 I therefore believe that the process that I have described in this chapter speaks 
to this concept even though it is about anticipatory action rather than the elements 
listed above.    
Based on the above definition of temporal blindspots, we can view the conflict 
between different visions of the near future (i.e., scheduling of the elections) as a 
blindspot in the discussions we have witnessed in this chapter. As much as what I have 
described was a “coordinative disjuncture” whose point of contention was temporality, 
I used the word “mismatch” followed by “in anticipations”, “in expectations”, or “in 
different temporal frameworks” throughout the chapter as I think phrasing it this way 
captures more precisely the process that I describe, in which competing anticipations 
are co-present, acknowledged, and fought over. Moreover, the word “blindspot” 
suggests an obstructed point of view, a point that is out of sight. At the assembly, the 
two different approaches to the future that were being debated was not out of sight, 
they were not ignored either; quite the opposite, the conflict was very openly about 
what would happen next. And this was so important a factor in terms of the stakes 
involved in making strategic decisions, as well as for trajectory of the movement, that 
finding the middle ground to make way for coordinating action was perceived as 
 
65 For example, the future appears to be quite decisive in a tense situation, when a participant asks at a 
meeting “what happens after occupation?” (p. 8), or in the section where the authors discuss endurance 
and duration (p. 9-13).  
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impossible, even though the threat of fascism dictated an alliance on the part of the 
opposition, of which the assemblies were a part.  
In light of the discussions in this conclusion, I hope the findings of this chapter 
to contribute to a temporal approach to social movement studies. As I have argued, 
framing, which might have seemed at the outset to be the most likely explanation of 
the case at hand, falls short of taking into consideration the temporal intricacies of 
internal strategic discussions of activist groups. Temporal blindspots, a concept that is 
based on an approach that explicitly takes temporality as its explanatory tool, is much 
closer to the process described here, although I use temporal mismatch (whether it be 
in the form of a mismatch in anticipations, or a mismatch in expectations, etc.) to 
capture the workings of that process. 
To conclude: Around the time of the referendum and especially in its 
aftermath, the assembly was concerned with predictions about the volatile and 
uncertain political schedule that lay ahead of us. The timescale with which we were 
dealing varied from the near future to the distant future. More precisely, the near future 
was so volatile and unpredictable, as well as so critical for the shape that the distant 
future would take that it tended to contract into the present or stretch out into the future 
according to the different scenarios that were sketched out. At the most basic level, 
activists were trying to overturn a dreaded future by positioning themselves according 
to their anticipations of the near future – in this case, the possibility of an election and 
the steps other actors would take. In the next chapter, we will see how activists’ 
temporal orientation changes yet again. As the 2018 presidential and general elections 
first appear on the horizon as a fixed date, then end up being lost, the eventful 
temporality of the landscape is replaced with an uneventful one where expectations of 
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substantial political change are allocated to a far away, distant future, without a clear 
referent or object.  
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Chapter 5 
Defeat, Hope, and Historical 
Embeddedness: The 2018 Elections 
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen how the assembly split up in January 
2018, in spite of its participants’ shared understanding of the threat and their shared 
conviction that the only viable strategy moving forward was to continue working 
together. Even though the period with which that chapter was concerned was a 
particularly eventful one that presented a variety of opportunities to act on (e.g., laws 
by decree, the state of emergency, hunger strikes), as well as a multiplicity of political 
directions to take (from doing local politics to pressuring the opposition parties in the 
parliament to form an alliance), the assembly could not coordinate their actions as a 
group. I have argued, by examining a series of meetings that marked the dissolution 
of the assembly, that the main reason behind the split was the temporal mismatch 
between different future imaginings. Activists’ future imaginings were about the 
political schedule in the near future. To be more precise, they were debating whether 
the next elections would be held at all; whether they would be held in 2019 as 
scheduled; and if not, when they would be held.   
The elections were indeed held, albeit earlier than expected, as I will explain 
shortly. In this chapter, I look at the period immediately before and after the elections 
that were held in 2018. The elections were regarded as a defeat by the activists, unlike 
the ambiguous results of the 2017 referendum which had been rigged and in which the 
difference between the “yes” and “no” votes was marginal.66 The conjuncture of this 
 
66 The “yes” vote won by 51.41% of the overall votes, against 48.59% of “no” votes. Independent 
institutions, international institutions, and opposition parties alike have reported fraud both during and 
before the elections. See the previous chapter for more details.  
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period led to the waning of political and temporal agency on the part of the activists. 
The eventfulness of the previous period gave way to a flattened temporal landscape 
where expectations of new political opportunities were scant. In this context, I seek to 
understand how activists regained their sense of agency after defeat. I focus on the talk 
of hope that became dominant among activists in this period.   
I find that activists placed themselves within a broader time frame of ongoing 
struggle – a narrative of historical embeddedness that is oriented towards the future – 
which enabled hope and action. By differentiating between two types of hope and 
pessimism and the temporal orientations of each, I argue that hope emerges as a 
political resource to be created, maintained, and mobilized in the context of defeat. I 
suggest that social movement theory’s conceptualization of hope as anticipation of 
success is insufficient in the case of defeat and shrinking opportunities. In the 
conclusion, I attempt at a reconceptualization of hope as a political resource that 
encompasses not only the emotion of hope, but also the cognitive consideration of 
possibilities, a future-oriented historical embeddedness, a concurrent relationship with 
pessimism, and the imperative of action.  
 In the context of a suffering economy and a boosted nationalist sentiment 
followed by the military occupation of Afrin, the westernmost canton of Rojava in 
northern Syria, the presidential and general elections ended up being held on 24 June 
2018, instead of November 2019 as previously scheduled. This was a particularly 
significant election as it was the first presidential and general elections after the 2017 
constitutional referendum, in which sweeping executive powers were handed over to 
the office of the president. The post of the prime minister was abolished; the neutrality 
of the president was no longer an obligation, which enabled Erdogan to continue his 
affiliation with his party, the Justice and Development Party (Turkish abbreviation 
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AKP); the President appointed members of the cabinet; and the ministers’ power to 
initiate a vote of no confidence was removed.  
  There were two main alliances running for parliament: The People’s Alliance 
(Cumhur İttifakı) and the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı). The former was made up of 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the far-right Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP). The second consisted of the main opposition Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), the splinter nationalists of Good Party (IYIP), and the Islamist 
Felicity Party (SP). The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) ran by itself. 
If the Nation Alliance performed well and the HDP got over the 10% electoral 
threshold, the AKP would lose its majority of the parliament. The HDP did get over 
the threshold, but the parliament remained under the control of the AKP-MHP 
alliance.  
 As for the presidential race, Erdogan of the AKP, Muharrem Ince of the CHP, 
the imprisoned Selahattin Demirtas of the HDP, and Meral Aksener of the IYIP were 
running. If, on June 24th, none of the candidates won more than 50% of the votes, there 
would be a second round in July, in which the two candidates who got the most votes 
would run. Erdogan won in the first round with 52% of the votes. He was followed by 
CHP’s Ince with 30% and HDP’s Demirtas with 8% of the votes.  
 
Finding Patterns: Why Study Hope?  
 
The first time I was made aware of the political significance of hope was the night of 
the referendum in 2017, as a result of a social “mistake”. I had been at the ballots the 
whole day; involved in quarrels with the head of the voting observation committee – 
a woman from the AKP – as well as the police forces to get on the bus with my sack 
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of votes67 to ensure its safe and unadulterated travel to the collection centre. By the 
time I was done with elbowing my way through, hostility, fights, signatures, and 
documentation, the results had already taken shape. When I arrived at the bar that was 
our planned meeting point, we had lost. I was slipped a glass once I got there; the sale 
of alcohol was prohibited on election day, but people shared. I spotted two close 
friends outside the bar and asked, “did we really lose?” They replied at the same time, 
with slightly different takes on the situation, in a way that was to become emblematic 
of the period that followed: “let’s see” and “yes, my dear”.68 Three months of 
campaigning and a day spent at the ballots – all gone to waste. I was devastated. Like 
many others, I was surprised at my reaction: had I really believed that we could win, 
that they would let us win? I kept asking people, looking for a real answer, “what do 
we do now?”. My “now” was often taken literally, perhaps because it lent itself to 
easier answers: “we drink now”, “let’s wait for the official results”, “we take to the 
streets”, or a desperate shrug of the shoulders. I was looking for a more programmatic 
answer, however, or for someone who knew what to do in the long term.   
There was one person, a friend and an assembly participant, whose usual 
upbeat demeanour remained shockingly and bewilderingly unchanged that night. His 
response to my question of what to do not only explained his attitude, but also revealed 
a specific outlook on political action which I was going to encounter – and observe as 
a pattern – many more times after the 2018 elections. He replied in a calm and matter-
 
67 Turkey uses paper ballots. Setting up the ballot box and the voting booths, sorting and recording of 
the ballots before the voting starts, and counting and transporting the ballots to the official collection 
centre are all done by citizens who have volunteered, through a political party, to be a polling clerk on 
the day of the elections. At the end of the day, the votes, envelops, pens, and everything provided by 
the government, that comes in a sack in the morning, is put back into the same sack, and sealed. These 
sacks are then transported to the main collection centre via a police bus, accompanied by the head of 
the polling committee and up to two other clerks, along with the official report.  
68 The previous chapter explored this period, in which an urge to act was accompanied by the inability 
to act together. In the same vein, the referendum was officially lost, but the high “yes” rate was also a 
win. This in-betweenness of the activist situation in that period is what I mean in this sentence. It 
changed when the elections were lost and perceived as a defeat.  
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of-fact fashion, as if my question was a no-brainer: “we’ll do what we’ve always done. 
The struggle continues. Nothing ends here”. As reassuring as it was to be around 
people who did not simply despair and give up, I could not help but feel devastated, 
completely destroyed. I sat on the sidewalk across the bar for a while, trying to make 
sense of it.  
My devastation was picked up by a close friend (and assembly participant) and 
it came up whenever we talked about that night. He half-jokingly, half-seriously 
scolded me and a couple of others: “you were in shambles, you were devastated, totally 
hopeless. You guys were a disgrace!” I defended myself by saying that I was 
devastated only until we took the decision to protest the results, but the point was 
taken. To be hopeless was a faux pas, a breaking of the norm.  
The fact that I was reproached and admonished for being hopeless meant that 
I had made a social “mistake”. I had failed to follow the “feeling rules” of the specific 
social context I was in, and to “manage” my emotions in response to them 
(Hochschild, 1979). This situation sensitized me to the role of hope in activism, and 
the particular temporal orientations generated by defeat that buttressed hope’s political 
function. So, the seeds of this chapter, even though it takes as its main focus the 2018 
elections, were planted at an earlier moment of defeat. 
 
Hope in Social Movement Theory, Sociology, and Anthropology 
 
The literature on the role of emotions in social movements has established that 
emotions are an important factor in the emergence, sustainability, organizational 
choices, frames, and tactical logics of movements. Movement organizers use emotions 
strategically to motivate or sustain action and movement organizations (Gould, 2002), 
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to build and maintain networks (Taylor & Rupp, 2002), to attract supporters (Perry, 
2002), and to specify strategies and audiences (Gould, 2002; Kim, 2002). Emotions 
are especially important for the internal solidarity and informal networks of groups 
that rely on friendship and consensus in their activism (Polletta, 2002). Feminist – and 
other – movements work to transform feelings that inhibit collective action such as 
shame and guilt into active and politicized emotions (Reger, 2004; Ahmed, 2017). One 
such politicized emotion is anger, which figures prominently as a precondition for 
action (Collins, 1990; Castells, 2015). Hope is another.  
 Hope has been conceptualized in social movement theory as the expectation of 
positive impact or success (e.g., Jasper, 1998; Kemper, 2001; Summers-Effler, 2002; 
Gupta, 2009), and therefore, a driver of action (Jasper, 2011) and recruitment 
(Klandermans, 1984; McAdam, 1986). James M. Jasper (2011) places hope on the 
positive pole of what he calls “moral batteries” which have a negative and a positive 
pole, where the tension or conflict between opposing emotions spark action. Similarly, 
Erika Summers-Effler (2002) includes hope in what she calls “emotional energy”69. 
She states that a high level of emotional energy, defined as “a feeling of positive 
expectations for future interactions, or a feeling of hope” (p. 53-54), is needed when 
the risk of participation is high, and the prospects of positive outcomes are low. More 
precisely, she states that “hope is required to inspire subversive action. Hope is the 
anticipation that struggle will produce positive results …It is based in both emotional 
circumstances and the cognitive assessment of the risk involved in participation” (p. 
53, emphasis added). Her formulation, along with other scholars of emotions working 
within the field of social movement studies, evokes what McAdam (1982) termed 
“cognitive liberation” as one of the three necessary conditions for social insurgency: 
 
69 See also Collins (2001) in Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (2001). 
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“While important, expanding political opportunities and indigenous organizations do 
not, in any simple sense, produce a social movement” (p. 48). “Before collective 
protest can get under way, people must collectively define their situations as unjust 
and subject to change through group action” (p. 51, emphasis added). The term 
cognitive liberation is closer to the Marxist conception of consciousness and McAdam 
does not go into a discussion of emotions in the cited book. Its temporal consideration, 
i.e. the necessary conviction that collective action can and/or will bring about change, 
is what converges here with the current discussion about the relationship between 
futurity and hope, in the form of assessing the risks and the possibility of positive 
outcomes. 
Three points emerge out of this literature that are important for the discussion 
in this chapter: first, that emotions, including hope, are used strategically by 
movement actors; and second, closely tied to the strategic use of emotions, hope can 
be a resource for political action, both in the initial mobilisation stage and in its 
sustainment. The third point to be emphasized is the conceptualisation of hope as the 
expectation of positive impact. Although this conceptualisation applies to certain 
contexts, my field work and the specificities of its political context require that we 
expand this conceptualisation to include conjunctures where the expectation of success 
or a positive outcome is unrealistic, at least in the foreseeable future. A further 
limitation of hope as conceptualised by social movement scholars is the under-
theorisation of temporality inherent in the concept. Even though the temporal 
dimension of hope is acknowledged, as is evident in the use of words like 
“anticipation” or “expectation”, no further elaboration in terms of the temporalities of 
hope has been made. In this literature, hope is not theorized in relation to specific 
conceptualisations or experiences of time – to temporality – and not in the context of 
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defeat and shrinking opportunities. Furthermore, the question of hope in a context of 
defeat requires an understanding of hope’s relationship to agency. In contrast to the 
way hope has been conceptualized in the literature, the main question for the 
opposition around the time of the 2018 elections in Turkey was to find – more 
precisely, to purposefully create, as we will see – hope in a seemingly hopeless future.  
 For a more complex formulation of hope, I will briefly turn to the broader 
sociological literature on the concept and recent work in anthropology. I believe an 
overview of the work done on hope in these two disciplines is useful to understand 
how it has been conceptualised in relation to temporality and agency, specifically. In 
sociology, hope and temporality have been a topic of interest in studies of youth, in 
medical sociology, and in the sociology of work (Cook & Cuervo, 2019). In a recent 
attempt at bringing together different conceptualisations of hope in sociological work, 
Cook and Cuervo (2019) discuss the relationship between hope, futurity, and agency. 
Reviewing this literature, they identify two different treatments of hope. The first is 
“a hoped-for outcome situated in the future” and the second is “the role of hope in 
coping with the present” (p. 2). Self-evident in these characterizations are two 
temporal orientations: a future-oriented hope and a present-centred one. Underlying 
both is the question of agency. Some, like Kuehn and Corrigan (2013), take hoping as 
an indication of the lack of agency, while others like Alacovska (2018) find that it is 
constitutive of agency and a way of coping with the present, as an informal labour 
practice. The “work of hope”, as Pedersen (2012) has phrased it, is generative of 
agency in this line of thought.  
 Cook and Cuervo (2019) do not offer a definitive answer to the question of the 
relationship between hope, futurity, and agency, but argue that the two approaches to 
hope, one that takes hope as future-oriented and the other that takes it as present-
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centred, correspond to two modes of hoping. They characterize the two modes as 
representational hope and non-representational hope, respectively. The former seeks 
to achieve a goal, or to obtain something in the future; it has a referent, an object. The 
latter does not have a clear object or objective to be attained. They find that modes of 
hoping change over time, that a change in one’s sense of agency does not necessarily 
indicate a loss of hope but a switch to a different mode of hoping, and that social 
position is a determinant of the work that goes into maintaining hope (p. 6).   
 In my field site, I find it extremely difficult to distinguish between a future-
oriented hope and a present-centred one. As I will demonstrate in the coming sections, 
hope is already recognized as a political resource by activists, a resource that has to be 
created in the present and mobilized in the future when an opportunity arises. The 
collective creation of hope, then, becomes a long-term project that should be built 
starting from the present day. Acts of hope, as I call it, or the “work of hope” 
(Pedersen, 2012), do not only require a sense of agency but it is also generative of it. 
So, the hope that activists in my field site were trying to generate was the non-
representational type where there was no immediate object to be attained. However, 
generating hope was an objective in itself in the present. The longer-term objective 
was to strategically use hope to be able to mobilize more people in the future. I will 
argue that the switch to a particular sense of temporality enabled hoping in a situation 
where hope did not have a referent.  
 The anthropological literature on hope offers some helpful insights into the 
concept as I develop it here. I build on anthropologist Hiro Miyazaki’s work on hope 
where, following Ernst Bloch, he develops the notion of hope as a method of self-
knowledge and as a psychosocial resource. According to Miyazaki (2004), the legal 
struggle of the Suvavou in Fiji to reclaim their ancestral land from the government 
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was a way of confirming their identity, of self-knowing. In the face of repeated 
rejections from the government, Miyazaki asks how the Suvavou could insist on 
hoping. He finds that the indeterminacy of their hope, stemming from the “not-yet” 
nature of hope’s future-orientation, also helped to sustain it. “Indeterminacy is not, 
therefore, a given condition, but a condition to be achieved…the indeterminate 
character of self-knowledge is strategically created” (ibid., p. 84). Indeterminacy is 
indeed a condition to be achieved in my field site during the period under scrutiny in 
this chapter. I will demonstrate below how the dystopian imaginations of the previous 
period in Chapter 4 are toned down in this chapter, in a bid to dissipate the determinism 
of the earlier dystopia; hence, making way for a horizon of possibilities, albeit in an 
undefinable, distant future.  
Miyazaki further argues that the struggle itself sustained hope. In this sense, 
the struggle generates hope, as much as hope enables the struggle (2004, Chapter 4). 
This last point is evident in the section where I discuss acts of hope, when activists 
from the assembly start getting involved in alternative activist networks with very 
different politics; the assemblies aiming at national institutional politics, and the others 
concentrating on building everyday life and maintaining relations. So, the struggle 
itself serves to generate hope as Miyazaki suggests, just as much as hope is needed to 
sustain the struggle. Contrary to Vincent Crapanzano who states, “one hopes – one 
waits – passively for hope’s object to occur, knowing realistically that its occurrence 
is unlikely, even more so because one does nothing to bring it about” (2003, p. 18), 
following Miyazaki, I find that this type of hope necessitates the deployment of an 
active notion of hope rather than a passive one where hoping is synonymous with 
waiting or paralysis. Quite the opposite; hope is used as a strategic resource to be 
produced and mobilized for future action.  
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The main concern of this chapter is how hope is created and maintained by 
activists, but the context in which hope is engendered is an important factor that is 
implicit in the analysis. In this regard, I take another anthropologist, Ghassan Hage’s 
formulation of the “distribution of hope” across society as a helpful model to think 
about the state’s role in this process, and activists’ position within it. Hage (2003) 
argues that “societies are mechanisms for the distribution of hope, and that the kind of 
affective attachment (worrying or caring) that a society creates among its citizens is 
intimately connected to its capacity to distribute hope” (p. 3). Looking at questions of 
migration and hope in the context of neoliberal capitalism, he makes the connection 
between the unequal distribution of hope across society and the dominant social and 
political phenomena that a specific society adheres to, such as nationalism or racism. 
In my case, the Turkish state, in its attempts at establishing a new political order, can 
be said to distribute hope unequally: while promising a hopeful future, stability, and 
welfare to some citizens (i.e. its constituency), it closes down avenues for a hopeful 
future by laws by decree, criminalization, or imprisonment for others in the opposition. 
The unequal distribution of hope makes reclaiming hope for the purpose of future 
action a resource and a strategy for change. In this chapter, I will argue that activists 
work to reclaim hope through a specific temporal framework.  
 
Introducing terms: hopes and pessimisms 
 
The day before the presidential and general elections, on 23 June 2018, when asked 
about his predictions, one of the organizers of the local assemblies, F., replied that he 
had calculated the amount of votes that the government would need to rig to win the 
majority in the first round. It was a considerable amount, but not an impossible task 
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for the government. He thought that we would vote for a second round, but then he 
added: “I’ll go for revolutionary pessimism and say that they will win. If not in the 
first round, in the second one”.  
 The second time I heard the phrase “revolutionary pessimism” was during an 
interview with an activist historian and translator.70 When I asked him about a time or 
an event when he felt hopeful, he only cited Gezi. Intrigued, I asked him about the 
2015 elections (I knew he was involved in the campaign for the HDP) and the 2017 
referendum. He said he took elections seriously, but that they did not bring about the 
same sense of empowerment (muktedirleşme) as a mass protest. Then, about the 
referendum, he said: “I more or less anticipated the results, I was not surprised. I 
always believed in revolutionary pessimism [he smiles]. Actually, I was happy. The 
results were good, I mean, we won Istanbul and Ankara…We were ahead of the AKP 
in Uskudar [a conservative neighborhood that traditionally votes AKP], and so on, it 
was a success”. He listed the facts to be happy about, but his voice was flat, growing 
faint towards the end of his sentence. His revolutionary pessimism kept him from 
getting his hopes up by the results, however positive they might be.  
I interpret revolutionary pessimism to mean something similar to a phrase 
associated with Antonio Gramsci: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will”.71 
Being pessimistic in this sense is to understand historical continuity, referring to an 
acknowledgment of structure and how it shapes possibilities. It is not a coincidence 
that F. often called for “a concrete analysis of a concrete situation”, quoting Lenin, 
during meetings when strategy was at stake. For those who want to make a break with 
the existing system, however, analysis simultaneously calls for a collective will that 
 
70 The two people who used this phrase come from different political traditions. Roughly, one comes 
from a Marxist-Leninist tradition and the other from a Trostkyist one.  
71 See Selections from the Prison Notebooks (eds. Hoare and Smith, 1992) page 175, footnote 75.  
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challenges the limits of possibilities and strives for change. This is why “optimism of 
the will” is such a crucial resource that needs to be produced, maintained, and searched 
for (especially) when faced with defeat. Pessimism of the intellect, therefore, implies 
structure, continuity, history; optimism of the will implies agency, change, and the 
future. Political action requires both.  
I draw on Terry Eagleton’s (2015) term “hope without optimism” to 
distinguish between hope and optimism. According to Eagleton, hope assumes the 
feasibility and possibility of attaining what one does not have in the present. It differs 
from optimism because hope requires working towards the desired outcome, whereas 
optimism essentially functions as a belief where the optimist thinks that things will 
work out because they always have, or because the world tends to work in favourable 
ways in general. In short, what distinguishes hope is the imperative of working to 
achieve the desired outcome. I use hope instead of optimism as my analytical category 
because in hope, there is effort and a forward motion.  
I separate what I call “cautionary pessimism” from “debilitating pessimism”. 
The former is what appeared above as revolutionary pessimism or pessimism of the 
intellect. As I have already discussed, this type of pessimism refers to the 
acknowledgment of the power of the past, continuity, and structure to shape present 
and future circumstances. It is a matter of understanding the situation, of being able to 
analyse it well in order to strategize. It can also be used as a cautionary reminder of 
the past at times of hopefulness. The latter, debilitating pessimism, is the dictionary 
definition of the word: “a tendency to see the worst aspect of things or believe that the 
worst will happen; a lack of hope or confidence in the future” (Oxford Dictionary). 
This type of pessimism is frowned upon in my field site, just as hopelessness is 
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frowned upon. In this chapter, I will use the term pessimism to mean cautionary 
pessimism, unless otherwise stated. 
I also distinguish between hope as anticipation of success and hope as a 
political resource. The first type is dominant in explorations of hope in social 
movement theory and is found in political environments where positive impact is 
feasible and a realistic possibility. Temporally, it usually refers to a consideration of 
possibilities in the near future, such as the next elections or whether or not to join a 
protest event. The emphasis here is on a short-term vision and the emotion of hope. 
The second type, what I call hope as a political resource, does not necessarily have an 
object or an immediately recognizable goal. It refers to the strategic use of hope where 
the political function of the emotion is recognized as a driver of action and is 
intentionally produced. Temporally, this type of hope is enabled by a political 
imagination that is embedded within a long-term vision of struggle. Hope thus made 
possible is produced by acting in the present (i.e. by joining alternative activist 
networks) to build movement capacity for later. Therefore, hope as a political resource 
is not only a driver of action, but is driven by action as well. Although I observed both 
types of hope in my field site during the period under scrutiny in this chapter, my 
contribution will be the reconceptualization of the second type. I will arrive at a fuller 
reconceptualization in the conclusion of this chapter, after having analysed the data.  
I opened this section with a vignette about "revolutionary pessimism" and used 
Gramsci's famous quote to open up the concept. Inspired by this quotation and in line 
with Jasper's (2011) idea of the tension between oppositional emotions, I find that 
pessimism and hope are concurrent; they are often found together. This is doubly so 
in a situation where the prospect for change or the amelioration of the political 
situation is not a realistic expectation in the foreseeable future. Studying hope in an 
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"objectively" hopeless situation requires a conceptualization of hope that does not 
approach it only as an individual emotion. It is also not a type of "atmosphere" that we 
"sense" when we go into a room, or a co-constructed feeling or sensation that is pre-
discursive or unspoken, as affect theorists would approach it (Massumi, 2015; 
Brennan, 2004; Ahmed, 2004). In fact, I do not know whether my interviewees were, 
indeed, feeling hopeful when they said they were hopeful. As we will see in the coming 
sections, the question of hope was often brought up by my interviewees when the 
conversation was getting darker and more debilitatingly pessimistic.  
 
Temporal Agency and the Political Environment Before the 
2018 Elections 
 
The debates and discussions, meetings and protests, negotiations and conflicts, the 
analyses and the strategizing, and the efforts at coordination did not alter the status of 
the 2018 presidential and general elections as snap elections, referred to as the “baskın 
seçim” by the opposition at large. The word baskın in Turkish means a raid or a sudden 
attack. Much like the adjective “snap”, it denotes an act or a decision made on the spur 
of the moment, unexpectedly, or without prior notice. Even though the scheduling of 
the elections to an earlier time was not entirely unexpected, it nevertheless caught 
activists off guard, unprepared, despite the extensive talks after the referendum about 
the volatile political timetable, as detailed in the previous chapter. We were “busted”, 
to follow the raid analogy.  
When I arrived in Istanbul a month before the elections, daily conversations 
revolved around predictions. Yet, I soon noticed how different the political 
atmosphere was than the period around the referendum; the grassroots liveliness of the 
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referendum campaign had disappeared. In stark contrast to the period before, I did not 
receive invitations to join meetings, protests, or gatherings to distribute flyers and 
posters. This translated into the materiality of the neighbourhood in the form of 
leftover scraps of posters and stickers from earlier campaigns on the walls and in cafes 
and bars. The streets were not littered on a regular basis with confettied flyers 
(kuşlama). Instead, there were party flags and banners on the billboards and hung 
between streetlamps. Political parties also had campaign tents by the docks – a 
transportation hub – where each cranked up the volume of their campaign jingles and 
handed out flyers or talked to those who showed interest. But even their campaigns, 
including the usual provocations of Erdogan, were dull, lifeless, unimpassioned. 
Two main reasons account for this change of scenery: First, unlike the 
referendum that cut across party lines, presidential and parliamentary elections were 
ostentatiously the business of political parties. But even parties were “busted”, and it 
took some time for them to decide on their election strategy and candidates. Second, 
the local “no”/democracy assembly in the neighbourhood had disintegrated already 
because of reasons discussed in the previous chapter. There was no space in which the 
usual “grassroots” (i.e., non-partisan locals) could organize themselves. The “election 
assemblies” that splintered off from the local “no”/democracy assemblies only 
concentrated on ballot safety and registering volunteers to observe the voting process 
(müşahit and sandık görevlisi). This meant that they were not conducting a political 
campaign per se. Furthermore, they concentrated on districts that were more 
questionable in terms of ballot safety and did not hold local meetings in the 
neighborhood that I was in, which presumably had enough volunteers already. Neither 
was there the time or the consensus necessary among grassroots actors to mobilize an 
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independent election initiative like the one in 2015.72 In short, the ball was in the 
political parties’ court this time.  
 At a meeting after the 2018 elections in July 2018, a participant that I did not 
know contrasted the political situation with the aftermath of the referendum: “We had 
the assemblies during the referendum; we could protest in spite of the CHP”. These 
two factors, the dissolution of the local assembly and national elections being in the 
sphere of party politics, led to a loss of political and temporal agency. The “if …then” 
statements of the previous chapter assumed agency in that activists still saw avenues 
for political intervention: “a dystopian future awaits us if we don’t do something”. In 
this chapter, the “if…then” formulation gives way to the “what if…” where 
possibilities are considered without envisioning intervention. Thus, I define temporal 
agency as the sense of having control over one’s time, the ability to use time to further 
one’s own purposes, or to repurpose the time that is imposed for one’s own goals. One 
of the underlying themes in this dissertation is that the struggle over temporal agency 
is part of a larger power struggle. The state, and the authoritarian state in particular, 
has hegemony over time: it not only imposes a different political order through regime 
change, but also constantly disrupts the political schedule by referenda or snap 
elections, to get the upper hand in the political contest. If the hegemony over time is 
one way of exercising power (Auyero, 2012; Schwartz, 1974), repurposing time 
becomes part of the oppositional political struggle. The political atmosphere that I 
described above – from the material to the discursive, to the organizational – hints at 
the beginnings of a loss of, or a decrease in, temporal agency that will become 
accentuated with the defeat of the 2018 elections. This loss, in turn, will lead to a 
 
72 E.g. There were independent election initiatives that campaigned for the HDP in the 2015 general 
elections from outside of the political party itself. I have described aspects of these initiatives in Chapter 
3. 
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different understanding of time in the form of a narrative of historical embeddedness, 
which will then be used to justify and generate hope.  
 In keeping with the political atmosphere, scenarios about the 2018 elections 
oscillated between hope as anticipation of success in the short term and cautionary 
pessimism (also referred to above as revolutionary pessimism as pessimism of the 
intellect). A few days after I arrived in Istanbul, I was having drinks with friends at a 
bar in the buzzing centre of the neighborhood. They were all non-party-affiliated 
activists, S. being from the assemblies, O. a union organizer, and B. a feminist whose 
politics was closely aligned with the Kurdish Movement. As we were sipping our 
drinks, two “neighborhood guards”73, a recent invention of the government, passed by 
that attracted our attention. Even though we were not entirely sure of their legal 
capacities, we all agreed that they were the government’s additional tool for more 
social control and criminalization. Then, B. started telling us what happened to a friend 
of hers who was a member of a party that was under attack by the government: the 
motorcycled police (yunus) did a stop-and-search to her friend, and looked through his 
texts and social media messages, before threatening him and letting him go. B. was 
worried because the police had seen her conversations with her friend. We asked her 
if she mentioned any names or places, to which she replied with a firm no, so we 
concluded that she should be safe.  
 After a brief silence, we started talking about the coming elections. Would 
Erdogan flee the country if he lost? This was a possibility, as he would be tried and 
found guilty of a number of crimes in the case where he and the AKP lost the elections. 
Would he give up that easily? And what about the professor who threatened the 
 
73 These are local armed officials that operate under the general security forces: 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc049/kanuntbmmc049/
kanuntbmmc04900772.pdf Accessed on 20 March 2019. 
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opposition on national television that they (AKP voters) would dig up the weapons 
they had buried under the Belgrade Forest in Istanbul if they lost?74 What if Erdogan 
could not get more than half of the votes in the first round; would he do what he had 
done three years ago in 2015, or would he mobilize his supporters to use these 
mysterious weapons? He probably would, in one form or another; we agreed that he 
was not the type of person who would hesitate to use coercion and brute force. Would 
there be civil war? This was also a possibility, although we were not sure who the 
battling sides would be. Would the Kurdish Movement take part in this? Would “we”, 
the non-partisan activists participate in a civil war? Was “the opposition” a 
homogenous entity that could be a side in the conflict? Probably not. Would the 
military intervene? Most of us were sceptical about that possibility. We were all 
excited about the thought of Erdogan losing, even if only in the first round, because 
such a result would raise the opposition’s spirits and it would also be daunting for the 
government, but the possibilities of what would follow forced us to reconsider our 
excitement. This could, indeed, very quickly turn into another 7 June 2015 (i.e., a 
victory crushed by war and loss).  
 This snippet is a good illustration of the everyday life and concerns of activists 
at the time as well as a rundown on the possibilities that were being discussed on a 
national level. Question marks and “probably”s dominate the excerpt because we 
simply did not know. I kept hearing the phrase “anything can happen” which 
summarizes the situation well: when people talked about predictions about the 
 
74 Days before the elections, a university professor declared, on a television programme known for its 
strong adherence to Erdogan and the AKP, that they would unearth the guns they had buried in the 
Belgrade Forest for training, in case the results of the elections are not as they prefer. This declaration 
on television was taken by some in the opposition as evidence of the AKP’s losing, and by some as an 
open threat and a snapshot of what was to come in case Erdogan did not win. See the link for further 
information in Turkish: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/353271/belgrada-gomduklerimizi-cikaririz-
diyen-ahmet-marankiye-sorusturma Accessed on 20 March 2019. 
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elections, they frequently ended with a pensive “anything can happen…” This is the 
“what if…” formulation that I mentioned above at work, where the consideration of 
an outcome elicits a reaction, but no real possibility of intervention. Still, even though 
it was out of our control, the lifelessness of the election campaign combined with the 
threats of AKP supporters made it “feel” like it was a real possibility that Erdogan and 
the AKP would lose this time. Furthermore, the AKP needed the MHP to get the 
majority of the votes, and the MHP seemed like it was losing voters. Formerly a 
staunch critique of the AKP, the MHP’s sudden turn to this alliance was thought to be 
met with loss of constituency. Also, it had a new rival, the far-right nationalist IYIP. 
When the economic crisis was added to this picture, the ruling party looked like it was 
losing power.  
Discussions about the possible outcomes of the elections dominated everyday 
conversation in the period leading to the elections. Most people were “hopeful” about 
the coming elections. This hopefulness was limited to the near future, however. This 
type of hope had more affinity with the act of prediction and possibilities in the short 
term. Although we thought that Erdogan and the AKP could lose, at least in the first 
round, given the dynamics of politics at the time, we were still being cautious. We 
were quick to remind ourselves that the elections could be rigged, and that Erdogan 
could use coercive measures like he had done in the past. In this case, cautionary 
pessimism can be viewed as guarding the activists against “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 
2011), in which the hoped-for object or goal becomes an obstacle in the way of 
achieving the desired outcome. In other words, hopefulness about the near future was 
almost immediately combined with cautionary pessimism.75  
 
75 Cautionary pessimism also guards against the “complicity of hope” (Parla, 2017), in which hope 
obscures more than it enables transformative politics. For Ayse Parla’s brilliant blog post on the 
complicity of hope during the political campaign for the referendum in 2017, visit: 
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Indeterminacy and hope as a political resource 
 
My interviews contain the same cautiousness. E.A., a socialist historian who 
has been involved in the socialist struggle since the 1970s, although hopeful about the 
chance of Erdogan losing the first round, gave me a much longer and a more detailed 
account of what would happen if Erdogan won again. After stating his predictions for 
the economy and international relations, he said:  
 
“it would mean the continuation of the extant injustice that is even heavier today 
than it was in 12 September [the military coup of 1980], and a government that 
cannot rule without the state of emergency. Therefore, rather than the possibility 
of a civil war, the period before us would be that of continued injustice, social 
tension, arbitrary power, and lawlessness that makes one choose a death among 
deaths [ölümlerden ölüm beğendiren].”  
 
E.A.’s description of the time-to-come, of the not-so-distant future, is as vivid as 
descriptions about the future get in my field site. It is important that he uses the 1980 
coup as a reference point that informs his experience in the present and expectations 
concerning the future. C.A. from the same generation of socialists as E.A. also 
compared the present to the violence of the 1980 coup:  
 
“After July 15th [the 2016 military coup attempt], the difference between 1980 
and today becomes clearer. There’s a saying; ‘to plant a fig tree in someone’s 
home’ [ocağına incir ağacı dikmek]76, they attack with that determination. The 
1980 coup attacked only you, only the revolutionaries, leftists, and so on. They 
 
https://politicalandlegalanthro.org/2017/05/03/the-complicity-of-hope/. Accessed on 3 September 
2019.  
76 This saying means to ruin someone’s livelihood and family. 
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didn’t attack thParlae rest and didn’t meddle in people’s lifestyle. But the present 
day is darker than that. The government attacks your friends, your relatives, your 
extended family.” 
 
The past makes an appearance as a comparative reference point that helps describe the 
present and informs future imaginings. The fact that my interviewees chose the 1980 
coup as a comparable event is itself significant, as this period is associated with long-
term imprisonment, torture, hunger strikes, deaths, and disappearances in collective 
memory. My interviewees from this generation have personal memories of these 
atrocities. Therefore, although the dystopian future (of the last chapter, Chapter 4) that 
is now “forthcoming” (i.e. much closer now) is never explicitly described in its gory 
details, this particular reference demonstrates the experience and anticipation of the 
state as an extremely repressive, all-encompassing, and violent one. Also, notice how 
this possible future is kept indeterminate. Indeterminacy is intended to keep people 
from debilitating pessimism, from despair.   
For example, a soon-to-be HDP MP from the Turkish left, when I asked him 
what his predictions were for the 2018 elections, painted a fairly hopeful picture in 
which he was “excited” about “the multiplicity of steps that can be taken”: “what they 
[the AKP and the MHP] plan and plot at the desk can suddenly be overturned by the 
opposition. After June 24th [the 2018 elections] that will be our starting point, I think. 
If not, we have nothing to lose. But we have the possibility of winning and changing 
[politics]. And that is sufficiently hope-inducing”. I ask him about other scenarios, and 
he responds:  
 
“Disastrous scenarios are to instil fear into us. I think some are quite consciously 
done and some are not, but they are caused by hate, anxiety, and fear […] The 
struggle continues, even under the worst circumstances. If we lose, we will be 
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sad and demoralized but we have no choice but to continue with the struggle. 
What is essential is this: they [the current government] will be defeated once and 
for all. So, I think the left should represent this line of hope. Defeats are of course 
important. They make it more difficult for us to get back on our feet the next time. 
But let’s not assign a bigger meaning to it than the continuation of the darkness 
of the past 16 years, nothing more. One day, the darkness will be over and then 
the real struggle will begin.” 
  
Even though disastrous scenarios are not less likely to occur than positive scenarios, 
they should be suppressed – at least in conversation – because they lead to fear and, 
we can safely assume, to inaction. And this is exactly what my interviewee does in 
this interview. He talks about all the ways in which the opposition might come out 
stronger from the elections, and all the possibilities a positive outcome would entail, 
but he brushes over what a defeat would bring, except for sadness and demoralization, 
and some more difficulty in “getting back on our feet the next time”. But he quickly 
reverts to the end of darkness, which he places somewhere in the future. Only after 
this vague “one day” of the future when the reign of the AKP is over will the “real 
struggle” begin. The “one day” formulation does not only serve to make indeterminate 
the process between the present day and the future day of change. It also extends the 
horizon, the timescale in which change will take place, further into the future, instead 
of remaining within the timescale of electoral cycles.77 I will come back to this point 
about the extension of the horizon of change in the next sections.  
 Indeterminacy here works like the ambiguity in the narratives of the 1960 
student sit-ins, in which the students claimed that the protests were spontaneous 
(Polletta, 1999). Polletta finds that the spontaneity narrative was marked by the 
ambiguity of the process, which built the collective identity on which students took 
 
77 “Electoral cycle” might not be the right phrase to use in this case. Electoral shocks are more 
appropriate as they do not follow a neat cycle or a predetermined schedule.  
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action: “Sit-in stories – and their narrative form was crucial – also motivated action 
by their failure to specify the mechanics of mobilization. Their ambiguity about agents 
and agency, not their clarity, successfully engaged listeners” (1998, p. 138, italics in 
the original). What activists in my field site did, when they had to consider defeat, was 
similar to what the students in 1960 did in the sense that they, too, made the 
“mechanics” of the process ahead ambiguous to allow for action. Detailed scenarios 
about defeat would have the opposite effect.  
Indeed, the debilitating type of pessimism came up as a possible, dreaded but 
anticipated result of the elections, both before and after the 2018 elections78: “I don’t 
see the middle ground; the future before us will be a matter of either life or death [ya 
herro, ya merro]. Imagine! June 24th is already a defeat, and pessimism prevails. The 
pessimism of a lost local elections on top of that will be very difficult…” I asked him 
to clarify the difficulty: “I don’t know how long it would take for the opposition to 
recuperate”. Here, the dreaded defeat takes the form of an anticipated debilitating 
pessimism on the part of the opposition. More than the structural, institutional, and 
political effects of the defeat, this type of paralyzing pessimism was regarded as the 
outcome against which we should fight.   
In this context where debilitating pessimism is defeat itself, hope emerges as a 
political resource:  
 
“I read some of my generation’s writings in astonishment, the ones that say things 
like ‘do not get too hopeful, nothing is going to change, nothing will change even 
if the others come to power’. It’s as if people like me, whether they be from the 
Turkish Left or the Kurdish Movement, who try hard at the elections are under 
the illusion that we will have achieved the Revolution if we win the elections. 
It’s true that none of the structural issues will change. But one thing will change 
 
78 Local elections were coming up in March 2019. 
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and that is very important; the hope that structural issues can be changed, the 
possibility of staying side by side will be created.”  
 
In this quotation, hope is explicitly connected to possibilities and to the future: winning 
the elections will bring about the possibility that some of the structural problems to be 
changed can, in the future, be changed. Hope in this sense is more than a state of 
feeling or emotion. It is not only an emotional reaction that emerges after the fact, or 
an offshoot of a political outcome, but a goal to be attained. I do not mean to say that 
hope does not feature as an emotion. I am, however, highlighting the temporal 
dimension of hope, and where it is situated in activists’ temporal orientation towards 
the future. Hope as a type of imaginary where the possibility of change is considered 
to be attainable in the future is treated here as a political resource. It is a political 
resource in that it can create the conditions, the favourable future orientation that 
perceives change as a possibility, which can be used to mobilize and organize the 
opposition, or at least to maintain it by “staying side by side”. It is a resource to build 
movement capacity.  
One of the main issues this chapter and the activists that I study grapple with 
is where to find hope when the situation seems hopeless, and the past offers no 
meaningful openings for change in the foreseeable future. Like Miyazaki (2004), I 
find that indeterminacy is intentionally maintained to uphold hope, as a way of keeping 
the future open to opportunities so that action, or intervention into politics more 
generally, can logically still be perceived as possible. We see this intentional 
indeterminacy in activists’ projections of the future, in which a clear image of the 
future is not drawn, alluding instead to a past event – the military coup of 1980. In the 
same vein, activists’ reluctance to voice “disastrous scenarios” comes up as a 
resistance against debilitating pessimism, as a safeguard against pacification. Toning 
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down dystopian imaginations, in this case, indicates that activists affiliate certain 
emotions, like hope, with action.  
When hope is recognized as a necessary driver of action, it becomes a resource 
– in my case, a political resource – to be created and mobilized in times of contracting 
possibilities. As we have seen in the discussion above, debilitating pessimism figures 
as an outcome of the elections that is dreaded, or at least verbalized, more than its 
structural effects. To counter this possible effect, and as preparation for a time when 
action will be possible, activists did not only resort to a discursive indeterminacy, but 
also a specific temporal narrative and practices to generate hope for future 
possibilities. I will come back to the latter two points in the sections that follow.  
 
Defeat: the night of the elections 
 
I had a long day at the ballots as an attendant from the HDP. It was a day spent sorting, 
counting, stamping, recording; as well as dealing with the attendants from the AKP, 
the IYIP and the CHP. By the time the votes were counted, disputes settled, and all 
the official reports were signed, the ballots had already started to be opened in the rest 
of the country. By the time I could leave the school I was assigned to, people had 
turned off the television in the common room in anger and frustration: there we were, 
in a room with a television in an elementary school, with our huge sacks of votes, 
waiting for the police to arrive so that we could transfer the sacks to the main collection 
point. Reports on TV, however, claimed that more than 60% of the ballots were 
already opened. Erdogan and the AKP were winning.  
I hopped on a car with the other HDP attendants from my school and we drove 
back to our neighbourhood. On our way back, we passed by the AKP district 
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headquarters. In the streets that led to the headquarters, AKP supporters were honking 
their cars’ horns, waving Turkish flags and flags with Erdogan’s face on them, 
shouting their love for Erdogan in celebration of their electoral victory. It was loud 
and the traffic was not helping. When we parked our car near the HDP headquarters 
to hand in our official reports, it was a completely different scene. People were 
standing outside the building, some of whom I knew from the assemblies or other 
activist circles, smoking, chatting, and in general, looking sad. There was a sense of 
disbelief mixed with defeat and disappointment.  
I started walking towards the café where I knew the election assemblies were 
gathered – if we win, to celebrate together; if we lose, to not be alone in difficult times. 
I was walking around in the centre of the neighbourhood – densely populated, lively, 
and noisy under normal circumstances – and there was almost no one on the streets. 
The silence was visceral. I had been trying to stay level-headed, as I had been 
reproached after the referendum for being devastated by the results, but this silence 
was unbearable. I could physically feel the defeat.  
When I arrived at the café, which was packed, I thought it looked as if an 
important football match was on – an attempt to keep my spirits up by making jokes 
to myself. Outside in the terrace, people were chatting, hugging, and supporting one 
another. Inside, where the TV was, there was the same silence. All eyes were on the 
television on the wall. No one spoke. I glanced at the screen in vain before saying “hi” 
to a couple of people I knew from my field site: the head of a socialist party, and a few 
other assembly participants. No one had the energy to be polite, to ask “how are you?” 
or even to smile. I mumbled a few words about the struggle going on, smiling. An 
activist I knew from the feminist movement praised my composure. The truth is, I was 
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only overcompensating. I wanted to get out of there as soon as possible. I wanted to 
be at home with my friends.  
Throughout the night, our silence was broken by speculations about how they 
could win and discussions about what we could do. Every now and then, we would 
hear someone shout or scream and we would prick up our ears to understand whether 
it was an attack or someone celebrating. This was perhaps the manifestation of our 
concern that our safe and progressive neighbourhood was now open to attacks from 
AKP supporters. We were afraid of our bubble bursting, in a way. In the meanwhile, 
the presidential candidate of the main opposition party CHP, Muharrem Ince, had 
texted a journalist “the man [Erdogan] has won”, which quickly went viral.  
Such readiness to accept defeat closed avenues for action, as it meant that 
political parties had accepted the elections as fair and the results legitimate. Unlike the 
night of the referendum where we, grassroots organizers, could make the decision to 
take to the streets, political parties were responsible for calling for protest this time, as 
opposition parties had promised to call for mass protest in case of fraud. This pacified 
the politically non-engaged opposition and led to a loss of agency on the part of 
activists. All we could do that night was wait, in vain, for a party to call for protest.  
 
Historical embeddedness 
 
The response to the defeat was a flattening out of the temporal landscape where 
time was stretched out: “Now, we are defeated. Now, what we need to do is to start 
from scratch and slowly, step by step, build a movement from below”, as one of my 
interviewees told me. The pressing events of the previous period where we had to 
make critical decisions every week, where we woke up every day to check the news 
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to see if anything had happened overnight, the dystopia that was rushing towards us, 
the ambiguous near-future full of possibilities, good and bad, were gone. We had time; 
we did not have an opportunity to seize in the foreseeable future. The distant dystopian 
future had become what Bourdieu (1963) terms “forthcoming”: “the experience of 
'forthcoming', understood as the horizon of the perceived present, is essentially 
different from the future as an abstract series of interchangeable, mutually exclusive 
possibilities” (p. 225). We were, in other words, within the dystopian world that we 
had imagined would be awaiting us in the distant future.  
 In response, activists turned to historical time where they placed themselves 
within a much broader time frame of struggle. Anthropologist Sian Lazar, in her 2014 
article where she discusses temporalities in social movements, defines historical time 
as “a sense of emplacement within a historical narrative of political action that looks 
back to the past and to illustrious ancestors and forwards to an imagined set of 
possibilities for the future” (p. 93). She focuses on historical narrative and “mediating 
practices” that “make the past present” (p. 98), such as commemorations or the 
narrative periodization of epochal time through past political events. Even though 
Lazar contributes to the long-standing scholarship on narratives (e.g. Polletta, 1998), 
memory (e.g. Armstrong & Crage, 2006), and myth-making (e.g. Meyer & Rohlinger, 
2012) in social movements, she only scratches the surface of the role of the future in 
creating the “sense of emplacement within a historical narrative of political action”. I 
suggest that the future figures heavily in such historical emplacement in my field site. 
Indeed, hope can only be turned into a political resource as long as there is the process 
of placing political action within a broader historical vision of struggle that will persist 
in the future as much as it existed in the past. In a political context where the 
expectation of success is unrealistic, historical emplacement makes hoping for the 
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future possible, which is seen as a political resource against the stifling effect of 
debilitating pessimism. 
 Historical embeddedness, the switch to historical time, explains the 
stigmatization of hopelessness with which I opened this chapter. I was reproached not 
because I was feeling hopeless, but because of what that feeling implied; namely, that 
I was not placing myself within a historical struggle. I was prone to inaction, or 
retreating from the struggle, in other words79. This became much clearer after the 2018 
elections, which were recognized as a defeat, unlike the ambiguity of the referendum 
before.  
 When I asked an interviewee, a former militant in his late 50s, what he 
expected of the future, he said, “there will be a revolution in Turkey, socialism will be 
established. We will live happily as a society”. He laughed: “jokes aside, this is my 
personal belief, my ideal. I strive for this and fight for this. This is not a subjective 
belief; it is the necessary conclusion of the historical process. The question is how to 
shorten this process”. Then, without any prompts from me, he continued: “I am 
hopeful about the future. Even if we lose. Provided that democracy forces and leftist 
forces and socialists produce more sensible politics, this painful period can be 
shortened”. I ask him how he can be so hopeful: “I am hopeful because I am a 
communist”. He laughs again. He is only half serious.80 Indeed, in these words, we 
hear a hint of cautionary pessimism in an ostensibly hopeful narrative. He avoids 
substantiating his hopefulness and gives me a generic response instead. Gloomy 
 
79 This speaks to the “emotion culture” (Taylor & Rupp, 2002) of the groups that I study, that are either 
socialist or leftist more broadly. If I were studying a feminist organization, I would probably not be 
reproached for feeling hopeless.  
80 The hope that arises from an orthodox Marxist understanding of history does not seem sustainable to 
my interviewee; hence the jokes and laughs. It would be interesting to compare this type of hope to 
Gramsci’s approach to hope and temporality, Badiou’s (2008) approach to defeat, or Benjamin’s 
complex understanding of the past and the present. Such a comparison merits a separate article.  
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scenarios about the future are kept at bay. The thought of defeat almost automatically 
triggers a historical imagination, not with a nostalgia for a glorious past, but an 
historical embeddedness that is future-oriented.  
 A socialist in his mid-40s, when I asked him if he remembers a particularly 
hopeful time, responded: 
 
I belong to a time of defeat. I became politicized and the Soviets dissolved. We 
had also been defeated on September 12th [the 1980 military coup] and I kept 
reading and listening to the great tortures that they had been through. But I never 
thought they [the left] were over. I admired their horizon/vision [ufuk]. Their 
defeat never concerned me. I admired their ideals. I still do. And that is what’s 
important. I mean, to get defeated for the sake of great causes. 
 
The idea of defeat triggers historical time in the form of horizons, visions, and ideals, 
all of which refer to the “not-yet” of the future. Defeat is not the end:  
 
The fight goes on in tidal waves; we work on it at every stage [uğraşıyoruz]. We 
can never say “we’re dead now, it’s over, we are completely defeated”. […] So, 
we should not talk about disastrous scenarios, the middle classes will get a sense 
of disappointment if we do. There is no historical reality that dictates that we will 
win at a battle within a big war. […] You can even lose the war. But it is 
unnecessary to say, “let’s quit if we lose this battle”. 
   
The struggle is always ongoing. So, the elections are a defeat at one of the battles 
within a bigger war – a war that extends far into the future. There is no guarantee that 
we will attain our goals but talking about disastrous scenarios is unnecessary as it will 
only lead to disappointment. He uses the word disappointment, but we can safely read 
it as debilitating despair, the kind that leads to inaction and paralysis, a dreaded 
outcome of the elections as an earlier quotation in the previous section indicated.   
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 It is not only communists and socialists who think like this. In this new context 
of defeat, phrases like “life goes on”, “a society never dies”, “they will eventually 
fall”, or “this is not a sustainable regime” became more and more frequent. The defeat 
was not the end. Instead, constant struggle came to the fore, putting the emphasis on 
the attempt to change things in the long term. An unaffiliated activist phrased it by 
saying, “let’s fail bigger if we are to fail again” when she was talking about defeat, 
putting the emphasis on making the effort, on the attempt itself. Another interviewee 
succinctly expressed the shift in temporal vision: “we know historically that periods 
of repression will come to an end. Even if we can’t succeed in our time, we know that 
those who will struggle after us will succeed”. We will see more of the same political 
imagination at work in the next section, where building networks and garnering hope 
are framed as part of a long-term vision.  
It is worth reiterating that the idea and the talk of defeat were usually 
accompanied by historical emplacement. Activists switched to historical time and a 
narrative of ongoing struggle, denying an end-of-time rhetoric which sees the defeat 
as final. This kind of political imagination that is historically embedded and oriented 
towards the future does not only enable hope and action, but it also justifies them. 
When a defeat is not the end of the struggle, debilitating pessimism becomes untenable 
and hence, discredited as a viable emotion (and future orientation) to be held. When 
considered together with the blurring of dystopian imageries of the forthcoming – 
where debilitatingly pessimistic scenarios are toned down – historical embeddedness 
can be thought of as an intentional choice to reclaim temporal agency.    
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Acts of hope: Taking action to hope 
 
 Activists channelled their political activity to less ostensibly political 
organizations such as food cooperatives, alternative football leagues, and the like, 
where the focus was more on everyday activity on a local scale. This is not to say that 
there was a shift in the dominant types of activism, say, from assembly-type organizing 
to prefigurative politics. Rather, people who were involved in and advocated for the 
struggle for democracy at a national level, which took as its adversary macro-political 
institutions, started getting involved in – and inviting me to – alternative activist spaces 
that did local work in ways that were not directly political in the conventional sense 
of the term. Playing football, discussing veganism, doing permaculture, being part of 
an organic food cooperative, or rallying for animal rights did not fit squarely into the 
logic of the assemblies and the type of politics that they did (see Chapter 3). These 
spaces had proliferated after the Gezi protests of 2013, in keeping with the activist 
scene of the time. What was new after the defeat of 2018 was the re-channelling of 
political energies into these already existing alternative spaces.  
 Having clarified this, I claim that these were not only “prefigurative” acts or 
individualized activities disguised as lifestyle activism, at least not for the activists 
from the assembly.81 Rather, they were concrete examples of organizations – or more 
precisely, networks – that embodied long-term projects, with an emphasis on 
generating hope through maintaining relationships and doing something. For example, 
my interviewees who got involved in these spaces did not claim, verbally or in 
practice, that “the medium is the message”. They were not repeating the 
 
81 Based on this research, I cannot make a claim about the nature of these spaces, as I have not based 
my research on them. Hence, the claim I make here is limited only to assembly participants who got 
involved in these spaces.  
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“prefigurative” chorus of “being the change you want to see”. Although these 
motivations are not absent from their reasons of participation, they put the emphasis 
on maintaining or creating hope. An interviewee, immediately after mentioning that 
repressive periods eventually come to an end, remarked, “to build our own small 
everyday lives, tirelessly, and to be able to get out of our own circle: yes, this is 
difficult, but we have to do this. This is what gives me hope. Networks, when 
established well, create hope”.  
 This is a dense quotation, taken from an interview with an activist in her 40s, 
an assembly participant and a part of the local food cooperative. Even though I only 
italicized her last sentence, the quotation is filled with words that are charged with 
meaning. The word “build” (inşa etmek), for example, conveys the idea of taking 
action to construct something; in this case, “our everyday lives”. The added 
“tirelessly”, especially when we consider what comes after it, implies that this is a 
strenuous process. It also encourages effort, attempt, and struggle. Building the 
everyday is not an individual effort; it is a collective one and a matter of getting “out 
of our own circle”, which gets us to building connections, networks, or relations.  
 Placing themselves within historical time and in preparation for the time when 
they can intervene into politics in a substantial way, activists from the assembly joined 
these groups to establish and/or maintain relations. Joining these groups was an action 
that was taken explicitly to create hope. They did not participate in a queer football 
league because they were feeling hopeful. They participated because they wanted to 
generate hope, to sustain their sense of (political) self, and to maintain their relations. 
Continuing to be politically engaged, even if in a different form, was preparation, 
rather than waiting for, the opportunity to arise. Opportunities, after all, can be created; 
they are not always given. 
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 In fact, this kind of activism was framed as a way of being together and doing 
things together. In an interview with a 26-year-old activist who was one of the first 
organizers of the local assembly, she said about these alternative spaces, “being 
together is invaluable from now on. Any kind: you can meet with 20 people every 
week to have dinner at someone’s place, or hang out at the cooperative, or be a 
percussionist in a women’s rhythm collective. All kinds of togetherness are invaluable 
as of today”. Togetherness and being involved in these activities are a way of 
maintaining ties and building new ones, of “getting out of our own circle”.   
 Another interviewee who joined the local assembly after the referendum, who 
does not identify as a socialist like most of the other participants, but as “someone who 
is against injustice”, was enthusiastic about her involvement in an alternative football 
group that also engaged in activism around queer politics and veganism, among other 
issues. In our interview conducted after the elections, she brought up the football group 
early on in our conversation. When I asked her why she joined them, she spoke about 
it as an attempt to organize and build networks:  
 
People there are not hopeless, they don’t think that nothing will happen anymore. 
They help me survive [beni ayakta tutuyorlar]. They are still discussing things, 
it’s something else! This is not only being in the streets82 [bu sadece alanda 
mücadele etmek değil]. This is also a way of organizing. I was introduced to the 
[food] cooperative there. There is a network there. I am not yet involved in the 
cooperative. But it gives me…I mean, people don’t stop. It is not like political 
organizations [she means parties and other organizations]. People do things 
among themselves. I mean, the struggle is not over. There isn’t one right way of 
being in the struggle. Also, people who hear about us come and join us. Some 
come for the women’s question, others for gender, yet others for animal rights. 
 
82 This sentence can also be translated as “this isn’t only doing politics in public spaces/in the public 
domain”. The Turkish word “alan”, in leftist jargon, denotes doing politics with “the masses”, in the 
streets, squares, or public spaces that are politicized.   
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In a nutshell, her answer to why she chose to be a part of this group is because they 
give her hope in the absence of any other grassroots alternatives, since the assemblies 
were disbanded. They give her hope not only because “they are not hopeless”, but also 
because she sees this as a form of organizing, of building networks that open up to 
new networks, like the cooperative. They give her hope because they “don’t stop”, 
they keep on doing things, “they are still discussing things”, which seems to be quite 
surprising to her. This “still doing things” convinces her that the struggle is not over.  
 She then said, “this is a space where I can breathe” and continued to talk about 
the diversity of interests people had in the group, highlighting the growing number of 
participants. Then, she repeated her earlier point, with an important addition: “it seems 
to me that the struggle is not over. I am certain that other things will emerge out of 
this”. She sees these spaces as tools for organizing for when the time comes when 
these ties can be mobilized for other, perhaps larger-scale, purposes. In social 
movement terminology, this is a process of building movement capacity. It is not 
optimism, as less than ten minutes after this conversation, she said, “I don’t know how 
these ruins [of the current government] can be recuperated but I think they [the 
government] will fall. As pessimistic as I am, this is what I think”. So, hers is not 
optimism but a hope that incorporates the given situation into account. The 
combination of cautionary pessimism and a long-term hope as a political resource that 
is enabled by historical embeddedness is typical in my field site.  
 The same anticipation of a possible repurposing of these alternative spaces is 
brought up by another interviewee as well. When I asked her what she thinks of 
cooperatives, she replied:  
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Makes sense, good. It is very important to stay in contact […] There is no way of 
knowing what a cooperative in this neighborhood will evolve into tomorrow. A 
cooperative here can sell a pack of rice for 10 Turkish liras tomorrow when it 
becomes 35 liras in the market. To organize people. And it can persuade people 
to get involved in something like the cooperative, something much “softer” and 
bureaucratic and stable. There is no way of knowing what that would bring, if we 
act smart. 
 
It is important that the owner of the last quote was not involved in the cooperative, but 
she was friends with people who were involved, and occasionally went to their 
meetings. Her not being a member of the cooperative, however, did not keep her from 
referring to them in the first-person plural, as “we”. This goes back to the point about 
the importance of networks, of togetherness, or organizing for when the time comes. 
In my interpretation, the vision of repurposing, of maintaining relations and generating 
hope are very much future-oriented and strategic. It involves cautionary pessimism to 
the extent that it takes into account the past, or “the ruins” of the current regime, the 
damage that has already been done; the present, or building our everyday lives, 
creating networks, organizing, and sustaining hope; and the future, where our attempts 
in the present come to fruition one way or another.  
Even though ideological tendencies and partisan identities played a significant 
role in the framing of the struggle as a long-term one that extended into the past as 
well as the future, with a goal the attainment of which was deferred to an unknown 
future, this specific temporal orientation was not only adopted by socialists and 
communists. As this has shown, former participants of the assembly with no partisan 
affiliations and who did not identify as socialists also subscribed to the same 
understanding of an ongoing struggle. While those with partisan identities were clearer 
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and much more confident sounding in their wording, those without a partisan identity 
adopted the same narrative of historical embeddedness but in slightly different words.  
 
Reconceptualizing Hope 
 
I started this chapter with the observation that instances of defeat brought up 
the question of hope. After the 2017 constitutional referendum which the opposition 
officially lost, grassroots activists still had a sense of agency; we took to the streets to 
protest the rigged results, to be joined by thousands within minutes. The night of the 
2018 elections was starkly different than the previous defeat. Not only had we lost the 
elections, but they were deemed legitimate by the opposition parties. Election 
campaigns were organized by political parties, the local assembly that previously 
allowed for grassroots organizing had already disintegrated by the time the elections 
were announced, and the elections put a long pause on grassroots political action at 
the national level in the foreseeable future. “The man” had won, in Ince’s terms; 
Turkey had chosen its dictator. The new regime was firmly treading on towards its 
consolidation. Even before the elections were lost, the two months’ notice of the 
government that the elections, normally scheduled for 2019, were going to be held in 
June 2018 was itself a loss of agency on the opposition’s part – we were “busted”. In 
the context of defeat and hopelessness83 of 2018 and beyond, hope regained its 
importance in activist circles. 
 I observed two types of hope: Hope as the expectation of success or positive 
impact and hope as a political resource to be created and mobilized. These two hopes 
 
83 I am defining the context as hopeless to mean that opportunities for change in the foreseeable future 
were scant. Chances for another political opportunity were extremely slim.  
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have different temporalities: the former usually concerns short-term expectations and 
features in this text in the form of predictions about the coming elections; the latter is 
part of a long-term project, when the attainment of goals, or the object of hope, is not 
immediately in sight. The two are not mutually exclusive, and I am not claiming that 
there was a rupture or break that led to a change from one type to the other. I am 
claiming, however, that I observe a pattern in the conditions in which they emerge. 
Hope as a political resource as I conceptualize it in this chapter became prominent at 
times of defeat, when there was a sense of loss of political and temporal agency. I will 
elaborate on the point about agency after I make my point about hope as a political 
resource clearer.  
When faced with defeat, hope emerged as a political resource to build 
movement capacity in a period of “abeyance” (Taylor, 1989) or decline, in preparation 
for when it could be usefully mobilized. Although social movement scholars have 
studied the first type of hope, or hope as expectation of success, the political function 
of hope in times of defeat has been understudied in the literature. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I suggest that social movement scholars need to reconceptualize hope in 
relation to actors’ temporal experiences, paying special attention to the political 
function of hope84 in times of contracting opportunities, when future imaginings do 
not involve many political openings amenable to desirable social and political change. 
 Hope as I conceptualize it in this chapter is the manifestation of an historical 
understanding of process, of embeddedness within a shared – if not universal – and 
ongoing struggle, and of a forward-looking vision. It is an inter-subjective temporal 
orientation and a collective endeavour; not a purely individual emotion. It is closely 
 
84 Although I use the word “function”, I am not making a functionalist argument here. My concept of 
hope as a political resource is not derived from the function of hope. Rather, I derive the function that 
it serves from empirically grounded research.  
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connected to the construction of a collective will, of spaces and relations, and to a 
temporal vision of embeddedness in the past as well as the future. Hope, in the context 
of defeat and a flattened temporal landscape, is as much an end in itself as it is a 
precondition for action. In fact, the awareness that hope is needed to act at the next 
political opportunity is what drives activists to intentionally attempt to create hope by 
creating or engaging in alternative political spaces as I have shown in the last section 
of this chapter. In this conceptualization, hope harbours five factors: the emotion itself, 
the cognitive consideration of possibilities, a concurrent relationship with cautionary 
pessimism, a future-oriented historical embeddedness, and the imperative of action. 
Let me unpack each: 
1. The emotion: While I recognize the fact that hope is an emotion with a specific 
temporal orientation, my data are not conducive to analysing hope as an 
emotion or affect. Even though hope is created inter-subjectively and is a 
collective effort, my data are overwhelmingly discursive in this chapter. 
Hence, I do not know whether my interviewees felt hopeful when they were 
talking about hope or being hopeful. What I do know is that activists recognize 
this particular emotion’s role as a driver of action, as opposed to other, negative 
(Jasper, 2011), emotions such as despair, pessimism, hopelessness, etc. Part of 
the struggle was to retain the emotion of hope. However, the hopelessness of 
the political situation requires that we look beyond hope as an emotion and try 
to uncover how people continue to act (or hope) when the expectation of large-
scale positive change or success is unrealistic.  
2. As in hope as expectation of success, hope as a political resource also involves 
the consideration of possibilities. I find that when success is out of reach in the 
immediate future, gloomy but realistic possibilities are toned down, as these 
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would be more likely to lead to debilitating pessimism when there is no other 
political opportunity to look forward to in sight. So, talk about possibilities 
were kept indeterminate, but without optimism.  
3. Closely related to the previous point about possibilities and an important 
contribution I wish to make to the literature on hope is that both types of hope 
carry within them a level of cautionary pessimism. I distinguished between 
debilitating pessimism and cautionary pessimism: the first figures as an 
obstacle to action, while the second kind of pessimism is related to an 
understanding of how structural forces and historical dynamics shape 
possibilities. Cautionary pessimism cautions against optimism, recognizing the 
imperative of action as necessary for hope in this context. The point about 
action is the fifth element of my conceptualization.  
4. The most important finding of this chapter is that activists switched to a 
narrative of historical time (Lazar, 2014) when faced with defeat. “Arguably 
the most important”, because the switch in temporal visions is the key to 
answer the question of how grassroots activists continue to act in the absence 
of grassroots organizations, in the context of contracting political 
opportunities. Contrary to the eventful temporality of the previous period, the 
defeat of the 2018 elections brought about the narrative of embeddedness 
within a broader, and ongoing, historical struggle. Rather than reverting to a 
nostalgic past with martyrs, heroic figures, or triumphal events, their historical 
embeddedness was much more oriented to the future. The idea that “the 
struggle did not end” implied that the time of abeyance could be used to build 
networks, organize, discuss, and create hope that can later be mobilized. This 
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switch in temporality was what made hope possible in the first place; it was an 
attempt at reclaiming temporal agency.  
5. Finally, I find that there is a reciprocal relationship between hope and action, 
in that activists act to generate hope and hope in order to be able to act. We 
already know that action requires some hope and that participation bolsters 
positive feelings. What I would like to emphasize with this finding is that this 
intentionality is part of what makes hope a political resource to be created and 
mobilized in my field site.  
 
The big picture in this chapter is one in which activists reclaim agency by taking 
control over their use of time in a seemingly hopeless political situation with 
contracting possibilities for change. I define temporal agency as the sense of having 
control over one’s time, the ability to use time to further one’s own purposes, or to 
repurpose the time that is imposed for one’s own goals. In my field site after the 2018 
elections, activists placed themselves in historical time so that hope could be possible. 
Hope had to be made possible – and logical – because its force to drive action was 
recognized. In other words, it was recognized as a political resource. Raymond 
Williams’ impelling insight, “to be truly radical is to make hope possible rather than 
despair convincing” (1989, p. 118) fits perfectly here. Faced with defeat and 
dictatorship, debilitating pessimism had to be avoided if action was to be retained. I 
also tried to show how activists in my field site were creating their own “resources of 
hope” (1989), to use another one of Williams’ powerful phrases. By building networks 
and engaging different kinds of activism when the local assembly was disintegrated, 
activists created hope so that intervention into politics could become possible in the 
future, so that they would be ready for it instead of being disbanded altogether, or of 
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convincing one another to despair. I think at a time when there are no opportunities to 
seize, in a flattened temporal landscape, the endeavour to organize becomes an attempt 
to repurpose time, so that the “abeyance” (Taylor 1989) period is just that: abeyance 
but not defeat. Through action, the abeyance period is saved from being empty time 
where nothing happens, and instead it is put to use for maintaining the collective and 
possibly, expanding it.   
  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I looked at the period around the 2018 elections. Even though 
activists had been discussing the possibility of an early election at length, as we have 
seen in Chapter 4, the snap elections still caught them off-guard. The local assembly 
had already disintegrated when the elections were announced, and the elections being 
presidential and general meant that the political campaign was carried out by political 
parties. As these were snap elections, grassroots activists had no time to put together 
an independent election initiative like they did in 2015 either. These factors culminated 
in a decrease in the sense of agency that activists had during and immediately after the 
elections. In this case, political and temporal agency were intertwined. The decrease 
in agency meant that activists did not conceive themselves as having the capacity and 
the structural position to intervene into politics in a way that would have a desirable 
effect. It also meant that they could not make use of the two months before the 
elections to devise a way to shape the process in their favour. The elections were a 
temporal shock, and without the grassroots infrastructure and the time needed for 
mobilization, activists were largely left out of the process.  
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Opposition parties had promised to take to the streets in case of fraudulent 
results, so the call for protest had to come from them on the night of the elections. 
Furthermore, when the CHP candidate’s text message to a journalist, “the man has 
won”, was broadcasted, election results were legitimated by the opposition. Therefore, 
unlike the night of the referendum, activists could not take the initiative to call for a 
protest this time, which perpetuated the loss of agency. The defeat placed Turkey in 
the dystopian future that activists were anticipating in the previous chapter. As what 
used to be the distant future collapsed into the present, the eventful temporal landscape 
of the previous period gave way to a flattened one in which the possibility of having 
another political opening that could effectively reverse the descent into fascism, or the 
consolidation of authoritarianism, was unlikely.  
In this context, hope emerged as a narrative response to defeat. I will not go 
over how I have conceptualized hope here but briefly reiterate the main contributions 
of this chapter. Confirming the existing literature on the role of emotions in social 
movements, hope did come up as an emotion that was recognized by the activists as 
potentially having a strategic use, and also as a resource. However, contrary to the 
existing literature’s association of hope with the expectation of success or a positive 
outcome, the context in which the talk/narrative of hope emerged was one of 
contracting opportunities and defeat. To keep the horizon of possibilities open and 
make (future) action possible, activists resorted to a narrative of historical 
embeddedness, from which the struggle was conceived as consisting of the past, the 
present, and the future. This narrative is consistent with Polletta’s (1998, p. 139) 
argument that narrative’s “temporally configurative capacity equips it to integrate 
past, present, and future events”.  
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Toning down of the dystopian rhetoric and keeping the future indeterminate 
helped to keep the debilitating kind of pessimism and despair at bay, thus allowing for 
the possibility of action and sustainment. The narrative work of keeping the future 
indeterminate follows Miyazaki’s (2004) observation about indeterminacy being a 
condition to be achieved. It also confirms Polletta’s (1998) argument on ambiguity as 
a tool for motivating action. However, the cautionary type of pessimism was 
interlinked with this type of hope. Finally, action and hope had a reciprocal 
relationship during this period, in which one generated the other and vice versa. 
Sustaining hope meant sustaining the networks and relations among activists in place, 
so that action would be possible at the next political opportunity.  
 To conclude, I will end with a brief anecdote that I think fits well with the 
themes in this chapter. After the referendum, that is, the "no" campaign, we had made 
a huge banner, the length of a three-floor building, and we unrolled it from a political 
party’s headquarters on the fourth floor of a building on a major avenue, as the 
protesters were flowing by. It read, in capital letters: 
 
no 
the fight is not over it continues 
and it will 
until the surface of the earth becomes the surface of love! 
 
We had added the "no" to the last three lines of the poem below, the last part of a 
longer poem by Adnan Yucel: 
 
oh, those who say everything is over 
who eat despair at the table of fear. 
neither the flowers that resist in the fields 
nor the angers that billow in the cities 
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have yet said farewell.  
the fight is not over it continues 
and it will 
until the surface of the earth becomes the surface of love!85 
  
 
85 My translation from the original Turkish: 
“ey herşey bitti diyenler 
korkunun sofrasında yılgınlık yiyenler. 
ne kırlarda direnen çiçekler 
ne kentlerde devleşen öfkeler 
henüz elveda demediler. 
bitmedi daha sürüyor o kavga 
ve sürecek 
yeryüzü aşkın yüzü oluncaya dek!” 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
I started this dissertation by characterizing the period that I study as an intense 
time (della Porta, 2016) in which macro-political institutions, from the state to the 
parliament to political parties to the military and jurisdiction, were undergoing 
immense changes. I described the current political regime in Turkey as an authoritarian 
one that had yet to consolidate itself. In the Introduction, I thus identified the period 
as a transition into a constitutionally authoritarian regime. Against this political 
context, I asked a broad question which guided this thesis’ exploration: How has 
Turkey’s authoritarian turn affected activism on the ground?  
The first and most general finding of my research answered the question above 
with the observation that activists’ temporal orientations changed, quite quickly over 
the span of a few years, from an orientation towards the past at the initial phase of 
organizing to a future orientation that enabled or constrained political action and 
movement sustainment. The frequency of transformative events (Sewell, 1996) 
accounted for the changes in temporal orientations, as activists sought to accommodate 
themselves to recent developments as well as a future that was constantly in the 
making. In this sense, it was a “restless” time (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010) where the 
meanings and the political significance of events were in constant flux. For example, 
when we tease out the analytical nuances in chapters three and four, the referendum 
that was regarded as a victory for the opposition ended up losing its victorious 
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connotations in only a few months. Throughout the dissertation, I sought to reflect the 
changes in activists’ temporal orientations in the structure of my chapters.  
This broad finding led to two more specific questions: How has the 
intensification of authoritarianism in Turkey affected grassroots activism during 
intense times? And how has temporality factored into the different stages of political 
action? Acting within a rapidly changing temporal landscape (Tavory & Eliasoph, 
2013) was intertwined with acting within an authoritarian regime. It was not only that 
activists’ orientations changed from the past to the future; there were minute temporal 
framings and future imaginations that had to be matched in order for the group to 
continue to do politics together. The goals of the group changed from one chapter to 
the other, from one episode to the next, as marked by the transformative events of the 
referendum and the elections. From a single-issue “no” assembly, the name of the 
assembly changed to a “democracy assembly”, reflecting clearly how the group’s 
shared goals transformed from an object attainable in the near future to an overarching, 
broad, and vague democracy attainable in the distant future. Moreover, “democracy” 
was never substantiated; it was a contentious subject that was deferred to a later stage 
in the struggle, perhaps because the point at which this goal could be attained appeared 
too far away.  
The disruption of the political calendar and the electoral cycle generated 
instability, ambiguity, and the feeling of being caught off-guard. At the same time, 
however, it led to an accumulation of experience of the kind that yielded itself to rapid 
political learning: The chain of events that lent themselves to causal inferences (which 
are so important in political learning) were so tightly linked in Turkey during this 
period that it was difficult to forget what had gone wrong before – either cognitively 
or discursively. Learning lessons from the past and gaining political experience were 
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not achieved through the act of voting itself, but via the episodes of mobilization and 
contention that the ballot box made available.  
 This had another effect on activists’ perception of time: Gezi seemed so far 
away in the past, even though at the time, it had been only three to four years after the 
mass protests that had gripped the whole country had taken place. The reason for this 
perception was not only that so much had happened since then, but also that so much 
had changed. The issues at stake were different, more immanent. Gezi might have 
been the result of authoritarian measures already well underway in 2013, but the global 
wave of uprisings, the cancellation of the project that would destroy the park to erect 
a military barrack in its place, together with the HDP’s electoral victory in 2015 all 
created the vision that perceived of positive change as feasible. Soon after the HDP’s 
victory, however, with a four-month period of state-led or state-sanctioned 
terrorization of the population and the criminalization of the opposition, followed by 
the AKP’s regaining the majority in the parliament, followed then by the military coup 
attempt in 2016, the political scene changed considerably for the activists. Regime 
change had been accelerated. This is why Gezi seemed so long ago; it belonged to 
another time, so to speak.  
 The acceleration of authoritarianism, in the form of changes to the constitution 
to make a de facto regime into a de jure one, demanded a re-reading of the Gezi 
protests, or more precisely, a re-evaluation of the repertoire of action that Gezi had 
popularized, in expectation of an increase in repression. By campaigning for the “no” 
vote through grassroots mobilization, while at the same time trying to build the 
infrastructure that would allow for long-term, permanent, organizing (i.e. in the form 
of the local assemblies), activists tried to reverse the authoritarian momentum in their 
favour. This attempt at reversion never took the form of “turning back time”, or 
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nostalgia. There was no glorious past that could be longed for. The campaign was 
rather an effort to make use of contingency, of the multiplicity of possibilities, of the 
various paths that the event of the referendum opened up. As a result, the 
organizational structure of the assemblies took shape to cater for quick and 
participatory decision making via a decentralized structure and mechanisms for 
democratic control. 
 Immediately after the referendum, in May and June 2017, the assembly was 
still making use of past experiences to repurpose the assembly and to solve some of 
the strategic and organizational problems that participants encountered. The main 
reference point was in the past, from Gezi to the other local initiatives that 
experimented with different kinds of organizing, but activists’ (re-)reading of the past 
involved a view towards the future. There were hints of the expectation of a more 
repressive political order from the very beginning of the assembly, when it was first 
established. However, as the possibility of early elections appeared on the horizon, the 
reference point for making decisions shifted towards the near future. From then on, 
talk about the past receded and eventually gave way to foretalk (Gibson, 2012): by 
January 2018, talk of the future, or talk about events that have not yet occurred and 
that might never occur, had become the dominant mode of conversation among 
activists.  
 Foretalk involved future imaginings, imaginings of both the near and the 
distant future. Activists shared a dystopian imaginary when it came to the distant 
future; darkness, increasing repression, and a fascistic regime were some of the ways 
in which this anxiety-inducing future was expressed. The dystopian imaginary was 
supported by evidence from the recent past – the bombings in Suruc and Ankara, and 
the war on Kurdish cities between the two elections in 2015 – and the present which 
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was experienced on a daily basis through arrests, police raids, and other instances of 
state violence. A dystopian future was imagined as a shared social and political 
landscape (“fascism does not discriminate”, as we heard a participant remark in 
Chapter four), and the assembly had already decided on their common goal as a more 
democratic order. However, these shared interests and a shared threat were not enough 
to coordinate action among the different groupings that had formed within the 
assembly. The point of contention rested deep in the scenarios about the near future.  
 Scenarios were not full-blown narratives but fragmentary and partial 
formulations about the near future. They were part of the guesswork that was the result 
of the unpredictable and arbitrary electoral shocks that were imposed from above by 
the AKP government. Questions of whether elections would take place, when, and the 
constellation of political forces and actors that would shape the conditions under which 
an election would take place made up the content of scenarios. Different scenarios 
harboured different levels of complexity; more precisely, they differed in terms of 
their reach, breadth, clarity, volition, and sociality (Mische, 2009), as well as in their 
pace and sequencing. The group disbanded when these different layers of future 
imaginings did not match, even at a time when uniting the opposition was regarded as 
the only viable strategy. In other words, the usual suspects of framing, collective 
identity, grievances, internal problems, and the like were left behind (or, perhaps, 
suspended), and the assembly had united under the broad umbrella of the struggle for 
democracy. However, the temporal mismatch between different scenarios led to the 
dissipation of the assembly when a common trajectory could not be agreed upon by 
those involved.  
 The June 2018 presidential and general elections came as a surprise even 
though the possibility of an early election was the subject of the scenarios mentioned 
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above. The government announced in April 2018 that the elections were going to take 
place the same year in June, giving the opposition a short two months to campaign. In 
the face of a dissipated local assembly and a political campaign that was carried out 
mostly by political parties, grassroots activists suffered a loss of – or a decrease in – 
political agency. There was no grassroots organization that could mobilize 
participants, appeal to a broader public, and take critical decisions such as taking to 
the streets at critical moments. Instead, with the election’s delineation of the campaign 
to political parties meant that parties held more agency. Hence, activists were left 
dependent on a call for protest on the night of the elections. The fact that none came 
from political parties further legitimated the elections as free and fair, consolidated the 
sense of defeat, and left activists even less powerful in terms of the possible avenues 
of action available to them. 
 Political agency, in this case, was inextricably linked to temporal agency 
defined as a sense of control over time whereby actors assume the power to manage 
time according to their needs and wishes. Shaping temporality, from the perception of 
it to narratives about it to the uses and repurposing of it, was fundamental to how 
activists handled the perceived decrease in their agency to shape political processes; 
in this case, the reversal of the authoritarian turn. The narrative tool with which they 
reclaimed their temporal and political agency was talk of hope. Hope, understood as a 
temporal orientation more than an emotional state of being, emerged as a narrative 
device after the defeat of 2018. This was a hope that was mostly directed towards the 
distant future. It consisted of a certain type of pessimism, what I called cautionary 
pessimism, that functioned as a break against an overly optimistic belief that things 
would eventually sort themselves out for the better. Cautionary pessimism warned 
against “cruel optimism”, in Berlant’s (2011) terms, whereby the wished-for goal 
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becomes itself an obstacle in its attainment. Hope also involved the consideration of 
possibilities, the acknowledgment of the open-endedness of political action. Hence, 
acting in the present generated hope for the distant future; but this was not the whole 
story. After the defeat, activists toned down their earlier dystopian imaginaries in 
favour of a long-term narrative of historical embeddedness. Indeterminacy in 
opposition to the determinacy of a dystopian future in case of failure, was intertwined 
with a historical view of political struggle. Importantly, this historical view covered 
the distant future, and not only the past. Awaiting another political opening in the 
future, a considerable number of the participants of the dissipated local assembly 
turned to self-organization, even though the type of politics espoused by these 
alternative organizations was not exactly the type of politics that assembly participants 
subscribed to.  
 My dissertation ends after the 2018 elections, but in March 2019, municipal 
elections were held. The strongest candidate of the opposition in Istanbul was the 
CHP’s Ekrem Imamoglu, who won the majority of the votes and became the next 
mayor. However, backed by the president, the High Election Board (Turkish acronym, 
YSK), scrapped the results of the Istanbul election, and ordered a rerun to be held in 
June. Imamoglu won once again and is currently the mayor of Istanbul. What is more 
striking for my purposes in this dissertation is, first of all, that once again a state 
institution, the YSK, refused to accept the AKP’s electoral failure and complied to 
Erdogan’s call for a rerun. The votes could not be manipulated on the day, but that 
does not obscure the fact that the rerun itself was an attempt to manipulate the results. 
Thus, the electoral cycle continues to be disrupted, unpredictable, and arbitrary. We 
can, then, expect further changes in activist’s temporal orientations and consequently, 
their organizations, tactics, and strategies.  
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 Secondly, Imamoglu’s election campaign used an exclusively and overtly 
hopeful language. Some of his election slogans were: “Everything will be beautiful”; 
“if there is Imamoglu, there is hope” (hope written inside the shape of a heart); and “if 
there is Imamoglu, there is a solution”. His advisor, after the repeat elections, 
interpreted their victory by saying, “there has been a huge crisis of hope in Turkey and 
Imamoglu rekindled hope” (T24, 2019). Even though I do not study hope as an 
emotion or as a tool for mobilization, Imamoglu’s campaign has reinforced the 
salience of my observations about hope being a crucial element in politics in Turkey 
today. In my reconceptualization of hope in Chapter five, I have included pessimism, 
a sense of the multiplicity of possibilities, a reciprocity between action and hope, and 
a temporal orientation that perceived of political action as embedded in an extended 
view of history. However, my findings only apply to activists at a specific moment in 
time and do not include politically unengaged populations, party politics, and electoral 
campaign strategies. Therefore, further research on the role of hope in politics should 
consider this crisis of hope, how political campaigns make use of it, and the different 
manifestations, conceptualisations, and uses of hope in different contexts and for 
different people.  
 
Contributions 
 
My dissertation bears witness to the emergence and decline of one of the first 
and largest local “no” assemblies in Istanbul. The local assemblies were only one type 
of grassroots organization and surely do not represent the whole scene of political 
activism in contemporary Turkey; there are numerous political organizations, non-
governmental organizations, consumer cooperatives, solidarity groups, political 
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parties, and more. However, through the local “no” assemblies, I could trace the 
changes and continuities in grassroots organizing over the last five years, from 2013 
to 2018, since the organizers and participants of the assembly that I studied have also 
been involved in the Gezi protests in 2013 and the various other local grassroots 
initiatives that were inspired by them since then. The rapid process of political learning 
that grassroots actors have been going through (that is still ongoing), and the changes 
in organizational structure and strategy that accompanied this learning process, as well 
as what was adopted and adapted from Gezi were all embodied in the local assembly. 
Therefore, my research documents the continuities and changes in grassroots 
organizing in Istanbul during the two-year-long state of emergency, at a politically and 
historically crucial juncture where Turkey’s authoritarian turn took its constitutional 
form. Although only a fraction of the whole picture, I hope my dissertation can provide 
useful historical and analytical information for further research on grassroots activism 
in Istanbul and elsewhere. 
At the theoretical level, my work contributes a temporally sensitive approach 
to the study of social movements, and thus can be considered a part of the emerging 
scholarship on time and social movements that I have reviewed in the Introduction 
(e.g., Gillan, 2018; Mische, 2014; Wagner-Pacifici & Ruggero, 2018). This approach 
brings the imaginary, the future, the experience of time, and hope as a specific future-
orientation into the analysis as explanatory factors. My research shows that from the 
initial stages of creating spaces of contention to the peak of mobilization and then to 
the dissipation of an activist organization, several temporal factors affect internal 
dynamics, strategy, and sustainment of social movements: Time constraints imposed 
on activists by regime change and electoral cycles; a dystopian future that is perceived 
to be rushing towards the inhabitants of Turkey; political opportunities that expose 
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possibilities; the differences in how activists imagine the near future; and lastly, how 
they view history and their place in it. I have relied on talk and practices based on 
ethnographically gathered data, but textual analysis, comparative case studies, and 
historical work can expand this approach and advance our knowledge of how 
temporality works within and outside of movements, and the effects it has on different 
aspects of contention.  
Another field of research to which my study contributes is social movements 
in authoritarian regimes; more specifically, contention during authoritarian transitions. 
As I have reviewed in the Introduction, the role of social movements has been studied 
in democratic transitions, in democratic regimes, and in authoritarian regimes. 
However, contention during transitions into authoritarianism has been understudied. 
My work adds to the transitions literature by providing an ethnographic view of one 
type of grassroots contention against an increasingly repressive regime; the 
considerations and decisions that its constituents had to engage in; and the forms that 
it took during this period. I have also sought to demonstrate activists’ relationship to 
the past, to the near and distant future, and to their own position in history; why, how, 
and when their temporal orientations changed; and the consequences of the specific 
temporality of a rapidly changing regime. Repression, the anticipated increase in 
repression, and an impending threat of fascism were the contextual factors that 
affected activists, but the transitional nature of the regime also accentuated a sense of 
agency, as well as the acknowledgment of living through historical times, of making 
history, and of making the future. In other words, the uncertainty, anxiety, and urgency 
that the political events of the period brought about was not only an effect of 
authoritarianism but of the authoritarian transition. As such, the findings of this study 
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can shed light on activism under other regimes in transition, as well as contention 
during politically volatile times in general. 
Taking a step back from the immediate contributions of this research, I suggest 
that scholars of social movements and contentious politics should pay more attention 
to the aspect of futurity involved in politics. If, as I have argued in this thesis, 
coordinating action, and therefore collective action, requires the coordination of 
futures, then the study of politics should always be, in part, a politics of anticipation. 
I propose the term “politics of anticipation” to capture the future-orientation inherent 
in political action. Especially under conditions of uncertainty and volatility, when 
historical, political, and personal stakes are high, the work of sense making and 
decision making revolves around foretalk, and anticipations of events-to-come take 
centre stage. Anticipations involve the imagined constellation of events and actors, 
and the relations among them. Politics, then, turns into a matter of “coordinating 
futures” (Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013) in order to coordinate action. Coordinating futures 
might mean to agree on a wished-for society or a hoped-for outcome (as in 
prefigurative politics, for example), but as we have seen in this dissertation, it might 
also mean coordinating shorter-term predictions even when there are differences 
among groups about what the ideal, or desired, long-term outcome would be.  
A fully theorized “politics of anticipation” would account for contingency and 
individual and collective agency while recognizing the constraints on the way. Both 
autonomy and interdependence would be weaved into the analysis. Institutional and 
structural constraints, along with threats and opportunities, should include temporal 
constraints and disruptions as well. The state’s hegemony over time would be 
countered by temporal agency, tentatively defined as the ability to use time to further 
one’s own purposes or to repurpose the time that is imposed for one’s own goals. The 
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intentional and purposeful work that goes into shaping aspects of temporality, or “time 
work” (Flaherty & Meer, 1994, p. 717), is a part of the political struggle and should 
therefore be a part of our analyses of these struggles as well.  
Future research into the intersubjective construction and configuration of 
temporalities will lead to a fuller theorization of the politics of anticipation. If “power 
is at its most effective when least observable”, as Lukes (1974, p. 1) has argued, our 
understanding of contention and political change would benefit immensely from an 
active notion of temporality. As I sought to demonstrate in this dissertation, social 
movements do not only exist in time but have a relationship with time that operates on 
a collective level and shapes action. It is analytically necessary to define the temporal 
context, or the timescape (Gillan, 2018), in which movements operate; it is also 
necessary to uncover the variety of temporalities with which movements organize 
themselves, mobilize others, and imagine future possibilities. When and how these 
different temporalities – both within and outside of movements – accommodate one 
another, clash, compete, subside, or cooperate might hold the key for understanding 
politics today. Both the micro-foundations of group work and the macro-politics of 
alliances, rivalry, and conflict involve temporal dynamics that have been understudied 
in the literature. Therefore, both the most basic and the most overarching contribution 
of my research is that temporality itself is a point of contention, and that it can help us 
understand and explain the underlying dynamics of contentious politics.  
 
Theoretical Implications and Further Research 
 
One of the theoretical prompts that emerge from the findings of my research is 
the relationship between dystopia and political action. I have shown that the shared 
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anticipation of a dystopian future did not, in itself, lead to inaction when the prospects 
of overturning the process of the consolidation of authoritarianism were perceived as 
possible. When the electoral chance to materialize that goal was lost in the 2018 
elections, activists found themselves in the dystopian future they imagined would 
await Turkey if the opposition could not come out triumphant from the elections. 
Defeat and the loss of temporal and political agency led activists to considerably tone 
down their dystopian rhetoric. In other words, defeat was the point at which dystopia 
ceased to be compatible with, or yielding to, either political action (including 
mobilization) or the internal cohesion of the group.  
My primary finding about the relationship between dystopia and action can be 
further elaborated and developed. The historical precedents from which this narrative 
of descent into fascism (or a dystopian political order) takes its cues – whether they be 
mythological projections of history, heroic idols of the past, or comparative cases in 
other times and places – can inform us of the specificities of the dystopian imagination 
at work in this case. Another avenue for further inquiry is to identify the particular 
ways in which certain aspects of the dystopian imagination affects action. In which 
contexts and under which conditions does dystopia figure as a driver of action? In 
which contexts does it lead to inaction and paralysis? How does it affect internal 
movement dynamics, movement discourse, strategies, and collective identity? Who is 
more likely to resort to dystopian imaginaries, and who are its targets? These and other 
questions can help scholars and activists alike to better understand the link between 
dystopia and political action. It would also be interesting to compare the political uses 
of dystopia with those of utopia, which is a subject that has garnered more scholarly 
attention (e.g., Jameson, 2007; Wright, 2010). Given that we are living in dark times 
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(e.g., climate change, the rise of right-wing politics, the crisis of democracy, etc.), this 
is a topic worth pursuing academically, that has a strong political significance.  
Connected to the above point, a substantive hermeneutics of the future can also 
be beneficial for political sociologists and scholars of social movements. I have used 
Ann Mische’s dimensions of future projections (2009; 2014) to decipher the formal 
anatomy of future imaginings. A hermeneutic approach can further substantiate the 
more intricate properties of future projections and uncover a range of different topics 
such as the memory politics of activism (of the left or right in Turkey or elsewhere), 
or the question of matching metanarratives (for example, of ideological positions) with 
narratives (for example, of issue-based activist groups) for movement success. My 
work suggests that this last point is especially important for sustaining movements in 
which diverse groups work together; even when all those involved agreed on the 
necessity of a project of democracy against fascism, the unification that was called for 
could not be realized when there was a mismatch in future projections. A similar 
mechanism might be at work between different levels of narratives. Further research 
into cases in which movement trajectories are matched through the process of politics, 
thus allowing shared imaginations to manifest themselves in strategy and action, could 
shed light on the findings of my project as well as on broader questions of temporal 
orientations and strategy.  
 Even though I take regime change as the political context in which the 
processes that I have sought to understand unfold, the state and other macro-political 
institutions such as the government, as important as they are for a wider perspective 
on the period, do not appear centrally in this work. However, they are a constant 
presence throughout the analysis. The state makes an appearance in ways that range 
from subtle to brutal manifestations of itself from the beginning to the end of the 
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dissertation: It is what forces activists to re-read the Gezi protests and learn new 
lessons from them; it figures in the memory of the 1980 coup; it shows itself as the 
sound of a helicopter and the flashing lights of a police car; we hear it in an assembly 
participant’s outcry when he spills out, “we have no time – we are dying!”, or when 
another participant protests against the use of the word “authoritarianism” for Turkey 
and asks, “what authoritarianism, are we in the EU?”; we can even hear it in the phrase, 
“there is no need to bake cookies” if we know the context; we witness it pass us by in 
the street, in the form of neighborhood guards; we see it in the number of people who 
died, the number of people who were purged, the number of people who were 
imprisoned; we sense it in the urgency, the anxiety, and the drive for action; it is there 
when activists are assessing possibilities, imagining futures, or when they are 
competing over scenarios; it imposes itself as a two-year-long state of emergency; it 
is implicated in the feeling of being “busted” by the snap elections; it comes in the 
shape of months in jail with no indictment and no trial; and more instances can be 
lifted from the previous chapters. The state, in short, is an integral part of the story that 
remains in the background but is always present in my research.  
Benjamin’s “angel of history”, with which I opened this dissertation, that 
turned around its own axis from the first substantial chapter to the last, did so not by 
the winds from Paradise as Benjamin imagined it but by the winds of a changing 
regime. Activists’ temporal orientations – including how they interpreted and used 
past experiences, how they strategized, and how they imagined their position within 
history – were formed in relation to much broader political processes and structures; 
whether those structures be ossified or changing, historical fact or future imagination. 
This point speaks to another issue that has exceeded the scope of this dissertation: the 
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temporalities, and the temporal agency, of different political regimes and their effects 
on contention.  
Temporalities of capitalism (e.g., Thompson, 1967; Sennett, 1998; Bauman, 
2013; Wajcman, 2015), modernity (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Adam, 1992; Osborne, 2011; 
Rosa, 2013; Jasanoff & Kim, 2015), and post-modernity (e.g., Harvey, 1989) have 
been studied. Tomba (2012) has argued that to fully grasp capitalism today, we need 
to understand how multiple layers of plural temporalities in modernity come into 
conflict with one another. Clark (2019) has studied how different conceptions of 
temporality and history affect the way those who wield power govern. More broadly, 
in sociology, Durkheim (1912) laid the foundations for studies of time that take the 
concept as socially constructed and collectively experienced; and the Durkheimian 
approach was followed critically in anthropology (e.g., Munn, 1992). Zerubavel has 
studied the structure of collective memory (2003) and the role of calendars in social 
life (1985). Hall (2000) wrote about religious movements and their conceptualisation 
of time. These examples show that there is a broad literature that spans different 
disciplines that is interested in temporal approaches to macro processes. Therefore, 
political sociology and social movement studies have the theoretical tools to engage 
in temporal studies of specific political regimes.  
In this dissertation, the disruption of the electoral cycle had significant 
consequences on how activists took or did note take action, as well as on the internal 
dynamics of the group. While democratic regimes can also hold early elections or 
repeat elections, a quick look at the frequency with which Turkey went to the ballot 
box from the 2013 Gezi protests to the 2018 elections, and the reasons behind them, 
make clear the authoritarian tendencies encapsulated within the disruption of the 
normal calendar of politics. This empirical observation raises several questions: What 
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is the relationship between disruptions in political routines and contention? How do 
those in power use temporal agency to impose their own political agenda onto 
activists? Is there a difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes in 
terms of their conceptualisations of time, history, and the future? If so, what are these 
differences and how do they change over time? What are the characteristics and 
consequences of the authoritarian timescape (following Gillan’s (2018) neoliberal 
timescape)? How does it affect activism temporally?   
Even though the findings of my research provide some answers, a more 
developed account that takes into consideration different parts of the equation – such 
as political parties, the parliament, voters, the economy, the state, and so forth – can 
lead to a fuller theorization of the temporal logics of authoritarian regimes. Ways to 
overturn authoritarianism, reclaiming temporal agency, and the political uses of 
different conceptualisations of temporality on the part of grassroots actors will then be 
easier to understand and develop.  
An even bigger topic emerges out of the above discussion; namely, the 
relationship between temporality and power. For example, we know that calendars 
have been used as a tool of political power (Zerubavel, 1985); that unreliability and 
unpredictability can have the effect of binding people to the state as well as a 
proliferation of the sense of agency (Auyero, 2012; Parla, 2019); that making people 
wait is an instrument of domination (Schwartz, 1974; Auyero, 2012). In addition to 
this literature, further questions can be asked: How does the state or the regime 
construct itself temporally in the eyes of both cooperating and contending actors? Is it 
a timelessly permanent entity, one that is under construction, a future-oriented one or 
one that takes its power from tradition and the past? How accommodating are these 
temporal frames for political action? When and how do ruptures, crises, or instability 
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steer future imaginations in a direction that opens up avenues for action in the present? 
When do they close down possibilities for action?  
The questions above trigger a set of questions regarding contention. For 
example, how does contenders’ perception of the temporality of power (e.g., 
permanence, tradition, temporal orientation) affect repertoires of contention? When 
does the past override the future in claims-making, decision-making, collective 
identity, and vice versa? How does a movement’s conceptualisation of history affect 
their actions? A comparison between religious movements that subscribe to prophetic 
time or messianic time (Hall, 2000) and Marxist movements that have a variety of 
approaches to history (here, I have in mind Marx, but also Lenin, Gramsci, Benjamin, 
and others with different approaches to history, acceleration, and revolution) would 
give us invaluable insights into how temporal conceptions of power are linked to 
ideology, strategy, organizational structure, and other crucial aspects of political 
contention.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Neither a dystopian future nor a descent into authoritarianism or de-
democratisation are far-fetched concerns in today’s politics. Trump in the United 
States, Orbán in Hungary, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Boris Johnson and Brexit in the United 
Kingdom, and many other developments all over the world towards right-wing 
politics, anti-immigration policies, sexist and racist tendencies, international and civil 
wars, and climate change converge upon urgency and anxiety. The broader question 
which my study seeks to answer, the question of how contention is affected by these 
intense and volatile times, involves an assumption: The assumption that challenging 
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these regimes is possible and that challengers exist. How it exists and the difficulties 
that challengers encounter, along with how they attempt to overcome these difficulties 
lie at the core of this study.  
Some of the findings of this research cannot be limited to the case of Turkey 
only. My overarching argument that futurity and future imaginations play a role at 
every stage of organisation and mobilisation can be extended to other contexts as well. 
The role of hope, whether it be conceptualised as an emotion or a future-oriented 
temporal disposition, can provide insights into the political uses (and misuses) of hope. 
The relationship between a dystopian future and political action, or the relationship 
between hope and action or movement sustainment can be useful for scholars and 
activists alike when thinking about strategy and mobilisation. Movements’ 
relationship with the past and how the past can be re-read, re-framed, and re-presented 
to reconstruct the present and the future are, and I would assume will continue to be, 
crucial for movements against austerity, against extinction, against capitalism, and 
more.  
In addition to the findings of my research, the workings of temporality and the 
question of temporal agency – at a time when we are running out of time to escape 
extinction, or when time is such a crucial part of everyday life for millions who are 
running from war-ridden countries, political execution, or a inhumane life – are useful 
analytic tools to study contention and to think about possibilities for action. As I have 
claimed before, temporality is a major question in political struggles, and it therefore 
should be a question for social movement scholars as well.  
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